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Price Formation Under Uncertainty 
Abstract. 
The analysis presented in this thesis is aimed at better understanding the role of expectations fo the price 
formation process. Since general competitive analysis lacks a coherent explanation of how expectations are 
formulated it is difficult to promote theories that assume agents have no structural knowledge in favour of 
theories that assume agents have significant structural knowledge, e.g. rational expectations hypothesis 
versus the theory of rational beliefs. Accordingly, empirical evidence is presented to support analyses of 
models. in which agents are not assumed to have structural knowledge. 
Simple general equilibrium models are used to illustrate that modelling risk requires a thorough analysis of 
investor expectations embedded in asset prices to better understand ihe information conveyed by observed 
risk premia. Analysis of the role of diverse expectations in competitive equilibria shows that a prerequisite 
for the existence of a short-run Walrasian monetary equilibrium is the existence of at least one agent whose 
expectations are insensitive to current prices. · 
Ergodic theory shows that any stable dynamical system generates a stationary probability measure based on 
its underlying generating probability that is unrelated to the data generated by the dynamical system. This 
result is used to show that the conditions under which diverse beliefs arise are sufficiently general to 
warrant the study of the impact of diverse .expectati_ons on the price formation process. 
Enthusiasm for models that allow diverse beliefs is however tempered by a review of Sunspot theory that 
show that it is not necessary to abandon the rational expectations hypothesis in order for competitive 
markets to be subject to speculative fluctuations that are driven by expectations. 
This analysis is reinforced by a known example that shows that adaptive learning rules can lead rational 
agents to believe in nonstationary, indeterminate equilibria that are locally stable, such as Sunspot 
Equilibria This leads to an important conclusion; diverse beliefs are not temporary phenomena since 
disequilibrium-learning analysis cannot be relied on to teach investors the economy's equilibrium map. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1.1 Introduction. 
General competitive analysis considers the simultaneous resolution of the forces acting 
within an economy on the price formation process, which includes an analysis of the 
interaction between preferences, technology, expectations formation and the exogenous 
environment. However, many aspects of the theory still lack clarity. Specifically, the 
theory lacks a coherent explanation of how expectations are formulated. This implies that 
general competitive analysis cannot fully explain the impact of expectations on the price 
formation process, which is the analytical issue considered in this thesis. 
The efficient market hypothesis represents an early attempt at explaining the role of 
expectations on the price-formation process. This hypothesis states that asset-prices 
instantaneously and fully reflect all available information such that security markets are 
in continuous stochastic equilibrium. This means that investors cannot, but by chance, 
outperform the market in a sustained way by deviating from some objective long-term 
strategic benchmark. 
I 
Yet everyday a veritable army of analysts and portfolio managers attempt to add value to 
their clients' portfolios by taking active positions against their client's benchmarks. This 
endeavour, if successful, clearly flies in the face of the efficient market hypothesis. This 
contradiction suggests that an alternative dynamic might be at work that is not fully 
explained by the efficient market hypothesis. 
When forming portf<?lios, active investors buy and sell securities based on their 
expectations that reflect their diverse beliefs about the uncertain nature of the world in 
which they trade. The competitive nature of the act of buying and selling assets and the 
significant resources dedicated to obtaining an information edge in this activity indicate 
that investors believe that it is potentially profitable to trade at the ruling price based on 
their beliefs. 
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In an important early analysis of this issue Radner(1972 and 1979) shows that investors 
can hold diverse beliefs about the exogenous states of the economy and still attain the 
Arrow-Debreu (1954) equilibrium if it is assumed that they have rational expectations. 
Rational expectations require that all investors have expectations that are self-fulfilled, 
which means that investors' expectations of the prices that will clear markets under 
different future states do actually clear theth when the state is revealed at the future date. 
Rational expectations therefore require that investors know the equilibrium map between 
future exogenous states and spot market prices at future dates. Kurz (1994) equates the 
information assumed by the Rational expectations assumption to an investor knowing; i) 
the demand and supply functions of all market participants, ii) how to extract present and 
future general equilibrium prices and iii) the stochastic law of motion of the economy 
overtime. 
Only a moment's though is needed to realise that the information required for investors to 
act rationally, such that markets clear in the sense of Radner (1972 and 1979), is onerous. 
Also, admitting a diversity of beliefs is crucial in any study of markets in which trades 
occur sequentially in securities rather than in contingent claims. This idea was expressed 
in the General Theory where Keynes (1936) observed that the distribution of expectations 
among investors affects aggregate investment and consumption and is therefore central to 
equilibrium allocation. This observation encapsulates the key questions with which this· 
research agenda is concerned: 
i. What is the state of the empirical debate on whether agents have the structural 
knowledge implied by the rational expectation hypothesis? 
ii. What is the role of expectations in competitive equilibria under uncertainty? 
iii. What are the conditions under which agents have diverse expectations that are 
compatible with the data revealed by the dynamics of the economy, whilst having no 
structural knowledge of the economic system? 
iv. Is it necessary to abandon the rational expectations hypothesis in order for 
competitive markets to be subject to speculative fluctuations that are driven by 
expectations? 
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v .. Are diverse expectations temporary phenomena that will not persist in the limit ~hen 
investors learn the economy's equilibrium map? 
When surveying the state of the empirical debate on whether agents have the structural 
knowledge implied by the rational expectation hypothesis, a consideration of the efficient 
market hypothesis is natural. This follows from LeRoy (1989) who observed that the 
efficient market hypothesis, at its most general level, is the theory of competitive analysis 
applied to asset markets and that the rational expectations hypothesis is embedded in 
Fama's (1976) definition of the efficient market hypothesis. Chapter 2 first surveys the 
theory underpinning the efficient market hypothesis based on work by Fama (1970 & 
1976). There exists a large body of research that attempts to discredit the efficient market 
hypothesis. Given the research agenda, the survey will focus on methods that test whether 
observed market. volatility is greater than that expected by the efficient market 
hypothesis. · 
The logic is as follows: If one can observe that market volatility is greater than that 
expected by the efficient market hypothesis, then one may reasonably conclude that 
investor expectations play a bigger role in the price formation process than the theory 
allows for. Such a test constructs a null hypothesis that specifies bounds within which 
asset prices will vary if the efficient market hypothesis holds. The intuition underlying 
the construction of these variance bounds is as follows (Shiller 1981b): "Today's price is 
related to the expected present value of a path of future variables under the efficient 
market hypothesis. Since present values are long weighted moving averages, it would 
seem that price data should be very stable and smooth." 
This method has been widely used. See, for instance, studies of efficient market models 
in connection with long-term and short-term bond yields (Shiller - 1979, Singleton -
1980), stock prices and dividends (Shiller 1981b and 1981c, and Mankiw et el 1985), 
yields on intermediate and short-term bonds (Shiller, 1981a) and foreign exchange rates 
and money stock differentials (Huang- 1981, Meese and Singleton - 1980). Specifically, 
we consider whether observed stock prices are more volatile than would be justified by 
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subsequent dividend changes. The survey is therefore concerned with the research .of 
Shiller (1981b and 1981c) and Mankiw (1985). 
Shiller's original method is enhanced to allow the variance bounds to hold even in the 
presence of a speculative bubble. This method is then applied to monthly US stock data 
from January 1871 to January 2001 and finds that stock prices are significantly more 
volatile than predicted by the efficient market · hypothesis. A crucial assumption 
underlying Shiller's method is that a stationary stochastic process generates dividends. A 
Dicky-Fuller cointeration test of this assumption casts some doubt on its validity. Further 
tests show that the method suffers from small sarriple bias and is not stable. 
An alternative variance bound test developed by Mankiw et el (1985) is then considered. 
The main advantages of this method are that it does not suffer from small sample bias and 
does not assume that a stationary process generates dividends. A cursory analysis finds 
the results of this test to be highly dependent on the sample used. Specifically, this 
particular test. of market efficiency has relatively little power whilst a speculative bubble 
is evolving, which indicates that the test is unreliable as it is dependent on the 
·relationship between the starting price and the terminal price prevailing within the 
sample. 
However, an alternative explanation, and more appealing given the research agenda, is 
that asset price volatility varies over time. This refers to the GARCH phenomenon that 
observes that asset price volatility can. switch between low and high levels of volatility 
over time. This idea was not explored further in this analysis. The interested reader is 
referred to a survey of this topic by Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner (1992). 
The results of the empirical analysis are not encouraging as the survey concludes that 
there. exists only weak evidence that prices are more unstable than one would expect 
under the efficient market hypothesis. However, Baumol and Benhabib (1989) use chaos 
theory to show how a simple and deterministic dynamic mechanism yields a time path so 
complicated that it will pass most standard tests of randomness. The state of the research 
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in this direction is still in its infancy but should push the empirical debate on the efficient 
market hypothesis in a' fresh direction. 
Finally, remember that the fair game properties of the efficient market hypothesis 
assumes that: 1) the conditions of market equilibrium can be stated in terms of rational 
expectations, 2) the available information is fully utilized by the market in forming 
equilibrium expected returns and thus current prices, and, 3) the empirical models used in 
chapter 2 restricts the analysis to partial equilibrium infinite-lived, representative agent 
models. 
An analysis of competitive equilibria requires the simultaneous consideration of the 
whole economy. A p~ial equilibrium model facilitates the analysis by allowing the 
researcher to determine the outcome in the market under study in isolation from all other 
markets. However, this simplification comes at the cost of assuming that the prices of all 
assets, other than the one under consideration, remain fixed and that there is no income 
effect in the market under consideration. The latter assumption is not crucial when 
considering financial markets where the income effect is absent in the short-run, whilst 
the former assumption is particularly onerous in the context of financial markets where 
all assets are substitutes such that the cross-effects among markets with changing and 
interrelated prices cannot be ignored. Also, a side effect of the partial equilibrium 
interpretation of the efficient market hypothesis employed by Shiller and Mankiw is that 
cycles cannot be predicted ex-ante on the basis of observed price. Yet Grandmont (1985) 
provides an example that employs the rational expectations hypothesis that shows that 
endogenous competitive business cycles can arise in a predictable way when older traders 
are sufficiently more r~sk averse than younger traders. 
This suggests that, in order to gain deeper insight on how expectations affect the price 
formation process, one needs to consider the cross-effects among markets with 
interrelated prices. This necessitates a theoretical approach based on competitive 
equilibrium analysis in the rest of this thesis. 
5 
Chapter 3 takes a step in this direction by constructing, in line with Donaldson and Mehra 
(1984), a fully endogenous asset-pricing model for an economy with two goods; a non-
storable consumption good and an investment good. This model retains the rational 
expectations hypothesis under conditions of uncertainty through production shocks that 
are independently distributed. 
The focus of the analysis is on the role of relative risk aversion, as measured by the 
relative curvature of the intertemporal utility functions, in asset pricing. Specifically, the 
model compares the risk premia of a fully endogenous asset-pricing model with an 
infinite-lived representative agent (the Lucas asset-pricing model) to the risk premia of a 
fully endogenous asset-pricing model with overlapping generations (the OLG asset-
pricing model). 
The comparison allows us to consider the consequences for asset pricing in incomplete 
markets where the pooling of risks through Arrow-Debreu contingent claims are 
impossible. The introduction of this market friction plays an important role in the 
behaviour of the OLG asset-pricing model relative to the frictionless Lucas asset-pricing 
model. Specifically, the analysis shows that an increase in relative risk aversion is 
consistent with an increase in the risk premia of the Lucas asset-pricing model, but has an 
ambiguous effect on the risk premia of the OLG asset-pricing model. This difference 
arises because of the ambiguity resulting from income and substitution effects in the 
OLG asset-pricing model, called the intertemporal substitution effect, which is absent in 
the Lucas asset-pricing model. 
Finally, chapter 3 highlights the question of modelling risk by facilitating a deeper 
understanding of an often-heard premise in markets; "asset prices are volatile because 
investors have an inconsistent risk appetite". The difference between the two asset 
pricing models implies that observed values of risk premia may correspond to vastly 
different estimates of parameters, which include an analysis of investors' expectations 
that are imbedded in the intertemporal substitution effect found in the OLG asset-pricing 
model, but absent from the intertemporal substitution effect found in the Lucas asset-
pricing model. The analysis does not assert that investors do not have an inconsistent risk 
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appetite, a fact implicitly assumed in competitive equilibrium analysis through the 
assumption of consistent preferences. It does however indicate a need for a deeper 
analysis of investor expectations embedded in asset prices. 
Chapter 4 explores the relationship between expectations and the intertemporal 
substitution effect wit~in the framework of a simple exchange economy with money and 
no external uncertainty. The analysis is based on research by Grandmont (1974 and 1983) 
on the role of expectations in a short-run Walrasian monetary equilibrium model that 
relaxes the strict assumption that underlies the rational expectations hypothesis. 
Specifically, agents are assumed to have diverse beliefs about, i) demand and supply 
functions, ii) how to extract present and future general equilibrium prices, and iii) the 
stochastic law of motion of the economy over time. 
The analysis illustra~es through a series of examples that a strong intertemporal 
substitution effect is a prerequisite for the existence of a short-run Walrasian monetary 
equilibrium. The analysis proves, under very general conditions, that this equilibriating 
mechanism requires that the price expectations of at least one agent are insensitive to 
current prices (see Gr~ndmont 1983). The presence of an insensitive trader ensures that 
expectations vary in a manner that is not "wild", thereby maintaining the upper 
hemicontinuity of the aggregate excess demand function. 
This observation brings the analysis back to the issue of price formation under 
uncertainty. Specifically, the existence of. an 'insensitive trader" is questioned; his 
expectations may be~ome · biased by recent experience, requiring him to project a 
lower/higher than norinal equity risk premium (or price) in order to act as a stabilising 
flywheel and take the opposite trade. 
It would be tempting to make bold conclusions about the implications of the above 
analysis. However, chapter 3 argues that the intertemporal substitution effect is 
indistinguishable from relative risk aversion given the assumption of addative utility. The 
implication of this is that it would be difficult to distinguish between market inefficiency 
and a structural change in asset pricing. 
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Further, the equilibrium solution to the OLG economy specified under very general 
assumptions is not necessarily unique. This observation cautions against stating that price 
instability may be a function of either; a) market inefficiency, i.e. cases when the 
insensitive trader develops biased expectations, or b) structural changes, i.e. changes in 
the relative risk aversion of the trader. . 
Chapter 4 does not attempt to characterise the conditions that permit a diversity of beliefs 
to arise. Chapter 5 reviews the work of Kurz (1994) and Nielsen (1996) who made 
important contributions in this area through their development of the theory of rational 
beliefs . .At the heart of the theory is the postulate that agents formulate their beliefs by 
observing the data generated by a stable dynamic system. Agents are assumed to have no 
structural knowledge of the economic system, which is a significant weakening of the 
rational expectations hypothesis. The analytical implication of this is that agents do not 
know the true probability distribution that generates the dynamic system.· However, the 
:frequencies with which events occur in such a system converge in the limit to a stationary 
probability measure, which agents can learn. Since agents have no structural knowledge 
they do not necessarily adopt this stationary probability measure as their belief system: 
In an important breakthrough the theory of rational beliefs shows how agents can 
construct beliefs that are allowed to be biased relative to the stationary measure generated 
by the data in the short-run, but unbiased on average over his investment horizon. Whilst 
this is a plausible result, it does come with .a strong restriction; every agent is required to 
express a non-zero view on the likelihood of any conceivable combination of events 
occurring over his investment horizon. A . consequence of this method of constructing 
beliefs is that the range of variation in each· trader's expectations is not too large, which 
rules out significant over- or under reaction by the agent to observed events. Since every 
agent is "insensitive" in the sense discussed in chapter 4 it follows that an OLG model 
incorporating rational beliefs will have a strong intertemporal substitution effect, such 
that the existence of a competitive equilibrium follows in a natural way. 
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An important insight that follows from the theory of rational beliefs is that agents can 
express their uncertainty about the true probability distribution that generates the data as 
uncertainty about the beliefs held by other market participants. This suggests that an 
agent should compare the distribution of beliefs that currently influence the price 
formation process with his own. The analysis finds that uncorrelated beliefs have an 
ambiguous effect on the price formation process; the agent may trade if he perceives that 
observed beliefs are correlated and biased relative to his own in a significant way. 
Chapter 6 explores the impact of correlated beliefs further by considering the effect on 
the price formation process of extrinsic uncertainty that is perfectly correlated with the 
rational expectations of agents. As agents' preferences are assumed to be rational with 
respect to preference, endowments and production sets, price randomness in this 
extension of the model will be entirely due to the beliefs held by individuals about their 
environment. Such price randomness may become self-fulfilling if the beliefs are widely 
held, or correlated, and will not necessarily dissipate, even asymptotically, as individuals 
accumulate more observations. This phenomenon is also known as sunspot equilibria in 
the literature. Specifically, chapter 6 reviews the work by Azariadis (1981) and Azariadis 
and Guesnerie (1986). 
A simple two-period OLG model is used to show that stationary sunspot equilibrium 
exists in the neighbourhood of a monetary stationary equilibrium that is locally 
dynamically stable. The practical interpretation of this is that market participants do not 
have to be irrational, defined in the sense of the rational expectations hypothesis, for 
competitive markets to be subject to speculative fluctuations that are driven by 
expectations. However, the existence of sunspot equilibria is not sufficient justification to 
assert that competitive markets with rational participants could be subject to speculative 
instability. 
The use of the rational expectations hypothesis in economic modelling is often justified 
by using disequilibrium learning analysis to isolate locally unique rational expectations 
equilibria in which only fundamentals matter. For example, Lucas (1986) shows how a 
simple adaptive learning rule can be used to isolate the monetary steady state as the 
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attractor for almost all initial price levels. This is an important result as it is ·well known 
that standard versions of OLG models generally have two steady states: 1) an autarkic 
steady state in which re.al money balances have zero value, and 2) a monetary steady state 
in which real money balances are positively valued. All but one of the solution paths 
discussed above are characterised by an ever increasing price level which converges 
asymptotically to the autarkic steady state, the exception being the solution path 
characterised with an initial price level equal to the monetary steady state. 
This presents a problem for any research agenda predicated on investors having a 
diversity of beliefs. Chapter 7 reviews an important counter example proposed by Duffy 
(1994) of an adaptive learning rule that converges to nonstationary indeterminate 
equilibria that are locally stable. This result implies that agents will not necessarily learn 
the i~formation required by the rational expectations hypothesis from disequilibrium 
adaptive learning rules. A subtext to this result is that agents may well learn to believe in 
sunspot equilibria, which is a type if indeterminate equilibrium. Filially, without 
knowledge of how agents form expectations in a particular environment, it is difficult to 
specify an appropriate learning rule a-priori that rules out a diversity of beliefs. 
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Chapter 2 - Exploring Aspects of Market Efficiency 
2.1 Introduction 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) states that market prices instantaneously and 
fully reflect all available information such that security markets should be in continuous 
stochastic equilibrium. Fama (1970) defines three forms of market efficiency, each with a 
progressively broader definition of the available information set. Firstly, weak form 
market efficiency has an information set consisting only of historical prices. Secondly, 
semi-strong form market efficiency has an information set consisting of all public 
information. Thirdly, strong form market efficiency has an information set consisting of 
all public and private information; i.e., a situation in which investors have monopolistic 
access to information relevant to the price formation process. 
The efficient market hypothesis implies that security markets will be in continuous 
stochastic equilibrium. Fama (1970) represents this concept statistically using the 
following fair game model: 
' 
rj,l+l = ~h.1+1 In, J+ ej,t+I (1) 
where: 
j = 1,2,3, ... ,n; 
rj,t+I. the one period percent real rate of return for security j during period t+ 1; 
!li, the set of information available at time t; 
Ej,t+ 1 , the prediction error on security j in period t+ 1; 
The error term Ej,t+ 1 must be a non-systematic error which means that it is unbiased, 




1. The prediction error will be unbiased if its expected return, conditional on Ot, is· zero, 
i.e. Elej,t+I In, J = Eh,1+1 - Eh,,+1 I n, JI nJ= 0; and . 
2. The prediction error will be independent if it is uncorrelated with the expected return, 
i.e. E{ej,1+1Eh,1+1 I n,JI nJ= Elej,t+I I n,JEh.,+1 I n,JI n, = 0; and finally 
3. .. The prediction error is .efficient if it is both contemporarily and serially uncorrelated, 
i.e. Elej,t+l£i,1+1 IO.,J=O, Eltj,1+1£},I 1n,J=O and El~::·i;\1n,J=O; 
These statistical properties must be represented in a
1 
price formation process that fully 
reflects all available information to facilitate testing of the efficient market hypothesis. 
Such a price formation process specifies that, conditional on some relevant information 
set, the equilibrium expected return of a security is a function of its risk, where theories 
. differ in their definition of risk. Fama (1970) assumes that the conditions of market 
· . equilibrium can be stated in terms of expected returns, i.e.; 
j = 1,2,3, ... ,n; 
Et, the mathematical expectation conditional oh i~formation at time t, 01;_ 
Pj,h the real price of security j at time t; 
Cj,i. the real cash flow generated by security j at time.~; 
) . '(2) 
Observe that equations (1) and (2) represent a partial equilibrium price formation process 
as the prices of all assets other than the one under consideration remain fixed. Also, the 
investor is assumed to be infinitely lived, and therefore to have an infinite investment 
horizon. These assumptions will be· lapsed in the next chapter when we contrast the 
implication for risk premia of an investor with an infinite investment horizon vs. an 
investor with a finite investment horizon within the context of a fully endogenous general 
equilibrium model of asset pricing. 
Any empirical test of equation (2) above is therefore a test of the following multiple 
hypothesis: 
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1. The efficient market hypothesis; 
2. The assumption that market equilibrium can be stated in terms of expected return, 
and; 
3. The return theory or process that is assumed to underlie E 1rj.t+i; 
Equation (2) can refer to the price formation process of a single security j, or, an asset 
classj. 
Equation (2) can be rearranged such that: 





Equation (3) can be solved by recursive substitution to yield: 
~ k 
Pj,1 = L( IJ A.J,t+n+I )xE,CJ,t+k = E,P*1.1 
k=O n=O 
Where; 




Equation (4.a) represents a generalised version of the structure common to most models 
of market efficiency. The assumption that conditions of market equilibrium can be stated 
in terms of expected returns and that equilibrium expected returns are formed on the basis 
of the information set Oi rule out the possibility of trading systems based only on 
information in Q1 that have expected profits or returns in excess of the equilibrium 
expected profits or returns (Fama 1976). This is the first of two corollaries supported by 
the efficient market hypothesis. The second corollary states that financial market prices 
represent rational assessment of fundamental values. 
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Corollary 1 implies that the efficient market hypothesis can be written as follows: 
x. 1 = P. 1 -E1P~1 j, j, ), 
Such that 









1 j, j, ), 
Such that 





Thus, {xj,t } and {zj,t} represent a fair game with respect to information sequence {Qt}. 
Equations (5) and (6) above are commonly referred to as the fair game models. It must be 
noted that the fair game properties of these models are implications of the assumptions 
that: 
1. The conditions of market equilibrium can be stated in terms of expected returns, and; 
2. The information set Qt is fully utilized by the market in forming equilibrium expected 
returns and thus current prices; 
Two special cases of the fair game model are considered to better illustrate the flexibility 
of equations (5) and (6) relative to other specifications of the efficient market hypothesis 
that have been tested. The first case considers the comparison of the performance of a 
trading rule vs. a simple buy and hold strategy. The second case considers whether 
successive one period returns or price changes are independently and identically L distributed, also commonly known as the random walk model. 
Tests of the buy-and-hold strategy assume that E, lPJ,t+i IQ, J ~ P1,,, or equivalently, 
E, h,1+1 I Q 1 J~ 0. This additional constraint is needed to rule out expected profitability 
\ 
under a one-security vs. cash trading system, which can be profitable under the 
\ 
unc<?nstrained fair game model of equations (5) and (6); 
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Tests of the random walk model are based on the assumption that !~1.1+ 1 I Q 1 ) = !h,1+1), 
i.e. the conditional probability distribution function equals the marginal probability 
distribution function of an independent random variable. This assumption implies that the 
sequenc·e of past returns is of no consequence or use in assessing the distributions of 
future returns. 
The above represents a summary of the theory that underpins the efficient market 
hypothesis. From corollary one and two above it is clear that active management cannot 
be used as a method of improving the risk adjusted returns of a portfolio of assets. It is 
therefore worth examining work that criticises the findings of Fama (May 1970, 1976). 
Summers (1986), points out that the inability of a body of data to reject a scientific 
hypothesis does not mean that the tests prove the validity of the hypothesis. This 
observation is based on statistical theory that states that failure to reject a hypothesis is 
not equivalent to its acceptance. In fact, the usefulness of a hypothesis depends on its 
ability to discriminate between it and other plausible formulations. 
The above suggests that the validity of corollaries one and two can be questioned by 
specifying an alternative hypothesis for the price formation process that has a power at 
least equal to that of the efficient market hypothesis. Summers (1986) suggests the 
following characterisation of the price formation process: 
P1,1 = E1P * 1,1 +u1 
and 
u1 = au1_1 + v1 
where; 
• u1 and v1represent the natural logarithm of random shocks; 
• 0 :::; a :::; 1, i.e. this assumes that deviations persist but do not grow forever; 
Summers uses this approach to suggest that certain types of inefficiency in market 
valuations are not likely to be detected using standard methods. This means that failure to 
reject the price formation process of the efficient market hypothesis does not lead to the 
conclusion that market prices represent rational assessments of fundamental valuations 
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(Summers, 1986). Summers points out that most tests of market efficiency have relatively 
little power against certain types of market inefficiency. 
An alternative approach is to use measures of the variance of Pj,t to provide evidence 
against simple models of market efficiency. It is possible to construct variance bounds for 
Pj,t by assuming that both Pj,t and Cj,t. or some transformation of these, are stationary 
stochastic processes. This approach can be used to test whether prices show too much 
variation to be explained in terms of the random arrival of new information about the 
fundamental determinants of price. Shiller (1981 b) shows that given the assumptions 
outlined above, the conventional regression tests of the efficient market model are no 
longer suggested, and that volatility tests have more power in certain regions of the 
parameter space. 
This methodology was used to study efficient market models in connection with long-
term and short-term bond yields (Shiller - December 1979, Singleton - 1980), stock 
prices and dividends (Shiller, 1981c), yields on intermediate and short-term bonds 
(Shiller, 1981a) and foreign exchange rates and money stock differentials. (Huang- 1981, 
Meese·and Singleton-1980) . 
. 2.2 A Simplified Empirical Test of the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
\ 
The variance bound methodology will be used to construct a simple test of the efficient 
market hypothesis in the context of stock market variability. The derivation of all 
formulae was obtained from Shiller (198lb and 198lc). 
2.2.1 Specifying the Test 
By using a constant real discount factor A. , a simplifying assumption that is consistent 
with that used in simple tests of market efficiency, equation (4.a) reduces to the 
following: 
~ 




Equation ( 4.b) can be restated as a proportion of the long-run dividend growth factor, g: 
co _k+l , 








(cj,1 = (.,irr+l-T ' 
- l+g 1 -
A,= --= --and g < r such that r > 0 . 
l+r l+; 
By taking unconditional expectations on both sides of (4.c), Shiller (1981c) finds that: 
f _ ) i - E(pJ 
EIJl 1 = -_ x E(c, )-7 r = -;;r=-\ 
1-2 E\C1J 
If p 1,1 * is the present value of actual subsequent dividends, then p 1,1 = E, p 1,1 *, where: 
.. _k+I 
P . *="2 J,I L..J 
k=O 
c1.1+k · 
Since this summation extends to infinity, p 1,1 * cannot be observed without some error. A 
long enough price and dividend series may allow us to approximate p 1.1 *, whilst we can 
examine the sensitivity of the test results by using alternative terminal values for p 1,, * . 
Shiller (1981b and 1981c) uses the average of the series {p 1,, *}as the terminal value for 
p 1,, * at time T. It is possible that this specification introduces bias into the test since 
equation (4.a) is analogous to a buy-and-hold strategy; i.e. buy the market for a number 
of years after which the market is sold at the prevailing price. Therefore, using Shiller's 
specification of the terminal value for p 1,, * we will have that p 1,, -:t. E, p * 1,, • If the 
terminal value for p 1,, * is taken to be the prevailing price at time T (or some observed 
price after time T) then p 1,, = E, p * 1,, . The variance bounds derived using this 
specification will hold even in the presence of a speculative bubble. 
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I· 
Shiller ( 1981 c) derives the following variance inequalities to test the volatility of Pj,t and 
L'.lpj,t (see the appendix to this chapter for a derivation of these formulae): 
a(p 1,1 ) $; a(p * 1,,) 




The variance bounds derived by Shiller (1981b) assume that the series [pj,r, 0.t1· and 
[L1pj,r,L1a},r] represent a stationary random proc~s~. This assumption is part of the efficient 
market hypothesis and is explicitly modelled in the terminal condition of equation (4.a). 
This assumption rules out an explosive path for pj,t and L\Dj,r , and suggest tests with 
greater power that may reject the efficient market hypothesis more decisively than the 
standard regression test (Shiller, 1981b). This assertion is examined in more detail in the 
section dealing with the power of the test. The proofs of equations (7) and (8.a) are 
shown in the mathematical appendix. 
" In his original test Shiller restricted the solutions to roots of al/i 1,, J to real numbers, 
thereby ignoring complex numbers. This restriction seems arbitrary since the fact that 
variance matrices are positive semi definite does not imply that the square root of 
variance matrices is positive semi definite. If we allow complex number solutions for the 
quadratic then we find that al/i 1,, J has the form of a sinusoidal function and hence a 
cyclical type of time path. 
If ~e reinterpret r0' 2 [p1,,l- pak.J1[p 1,,l+ t 0'2 [~1,,] = 0 as the characteristic equation 
of a second order non-homogenous difference equation of the form: 
(8.b) 
Now the general solution of (8.b) is of the form: 
I 2 • x, =Au, +Bu, +u, · (8.c) 
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Note that this interpretation suggests that the time path of the market evolves according to 
a difference equation. equivalent to (8.b ). If the right number of initial conditions is 
imposed then there is a unique solution for the system. However, the solution to the 
system changes if one or more of the initial conditions are changed. Under this more 
general characterisation of Shiller' s original test, a test for EMH is equivalent to testing 
whether small changes in the initial conditions have any effect on the long-run behaviour 
of the solution, or wil~ the effect die out as t -7 oo. 
Equation (8.b) is globally asymptotically stable if the general solution Au: +Bu; of the 
associated homogenous equation approaches 0 as t -7 00, for all values of A and B, as any 
solution of equation (S.b) approaches the particular solution u;, which is independent of 
the initial conditions. The criterion for the stability of (8.b) is JaJ < 1 + b and b < 1. The 
efficient market hypothesis therefore holds if and only if 
po{cj,1] < 1 + a2 [~j.1] and a2[~j.1]<1 
r 2r 2r 
(8.d) 
Section 2.2.3 below d.etails the results of the original test specified by Shiller in terms of 
equations (7) and (8.a) based on the updated data set described in section 2.2.2 below. 
Section 2.2.4 critically examines various aspects of the original test specified by Shiller 
in terms of equations (7) and (8.a). Section 2.2.5 present the result of the stability test 
outlined in equation ($.d). 
2.2.2 The Data Set 
The data set, obtained from Robert J. Shiller (http://aida.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/), consists 
of monthly stock price, dividends, and earnings data and the consumer price index (to 
allow conversion to ' real. values), all starting January 1871. Monthly dividend and . 
earnings data are computed from the S&P four-quarter tools for the quarter since 1926, 
with linear interpolation to monthly figures. Dividend and earnings data before 1926 are 
from Cowles and associates (Common Stock Indexes, 2nd ed. [Bloomington, Ind.: 
Principia Press, 1939]), interpolated from annual data. Stock price data are monthly 
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averages of daily closing prices through January 2001. The CPI-U (Consumer Price 
Index-All Urban Consumers) published by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics begins in 
1913; for years before 1913 the CPI Warren and Pearson's price index was spliced in, by 
multiplying it by the ratio of the indexes in January 1913. For the Plots, the inflation-
corrected series is multiplied by a constant so that their value in January 2001 equals their 
nominal value, i.e., so that all prices are effectively in January 2001 dollars. 
2.2.3 The Test Results 




























From the above it is clear that the data violate equations (7) and (8) as the variance bound 
implied by equation (7) is violated by a factor of 1.13x and that implied by equation (8) is 
violated by a factor of 5.22x. The 1.13x ratio by which equation (7) is violated is much 
lower than that found in Shiller' s original test ( 1981 c ). This a direct consequence of the 
alternative specification used for the terminal value of p\1 (i.e. p*1r = 1208). If the 
average of the series {p .
1 
*} (i.e.p*1r= 435) was us~d the ratio would have been 8.21x. ), 
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~~-------------------------------·~ 
The relatively low ratio by which the variance bound of equation (7) is violated is 
concerning given the bias inherent in this particular test statistic (see section 2.3.3 blow 
for a fuller discussion of this issue). 
A plot of pj,t relative to p*j,t usingp\r = 1208 yields the following: 
1,330.00 
1,130.00 
- Detrended Real Price (p) 
930.00 - Present Value of Buy.and-Sell Strategy 
2.2.4 Critique of the Test 
Equation (8) was derived by assuming that the detrended cash flow series {cj,1} is 
stationary. This assumption is necessary as each cash flow is observed only once, and. 
therefore gives no information about the variance of the observed cash flow. To test the 
variance bounds it is therefore assumed that the cash flow series is stationary around a 
deterministic trend. This assumption means that the sample variance of the cash flow 
series will converge to the population variance as the sample becomes large. 
In order to test the stationarity assumption dividends were modelled using a simple first 
order autoregressive process, i.e. c 1,, = p x c 1 ·' + e 1,, , using non-overlapping annual data. 
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The data set contained a 130 annual data points for testing the following hypothesis test: 
HO: Dividends follow a nonstationary process, i.e. p = 1, vs. 
Hl: Dividends follow a stationary process, i.e. p < 1. 
A Dicky-Fuller Test was used to test HO v.s. Hl using EViews version 3.1. The test 
statistic was -0.62 versus a 10% critical value of-1.617. The simple Dicky-Fuller test 
only applies to a series following an AR(l) process, and is violated if the series is 
correlated at higher order lags. This assumes that the error term therefore follows a white 
noise process, which is tested by examining the correlogram of residuals which reveals 
no significant spikes. Also, the Q-statistic of the fir~t 9 autocorrelation coefficients is 
only significant at the 7.6% level, whilst the Q-statistic of the first 10 autocorrelation 
coefficients is significant at the 3.5% level, i.e.: 
Correlogram of Residuals for c j,t = p x c j,t + e j,t / 
Sample: 1872 2000 
Included observations: 129 
No AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
1 0.147 0.14? 2.8455 0.092 
2 -0.172 -0.198 6.7769 0.034 
3 -0.119 -0.063 8.6622 0.034 
4 -0.13 -0.142 10.931 0.027 
5 -0.098 -0.097 12.239 0.032 
6 0.008 -0.023 12.247 0.057 I . • 
7 0.012 -0.052 12.266 0.092 
8 -0.139 -0.189 14.974 0.06 
9 0.067 0.083 15.598 0.076 
10 0.165 0.071 19.445 0.035 
11 -0.081 -0.142 20.387 0.04 
12 -0.162 -0.135 24.167 0.019 
From the above it is clear that the hypothesis test specified above does not suffer from 
any serious specification problems. This simple hypothesis test therefore does not reject 
HO in favour of Hl at the 10% level, which casts some doubt on the validity of the 
stationarity assumption that was made. 
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Next, the first order differences of the dividend series were tested for stationarity using 
the same first order autoregressive process, i.e.11c 1,, = p x 11c 1,, + e 1,, , again using non-
overlapping annual data to test the following hypothesis: 
HO: The first order difference of dividends follow a nonstationary process, i.e. p = 1, vs. 
HI: The first order difference of dividends follow a stationary process, i.e. p < 1. 
The test statistic was -9.72 versus a 1% critical value of -2.58. The Correlogram of 
Residuals revealed no significant specification problems and is included below for 
completeness. 
Correlogram of Residuals for 11c 1,, = p X 11c 1,, + e1,, 
Sample: 1872 1999 
Included observations: 128 
No AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
1 0.147 0.147 2.8267 0.093 
2 -0.172 -0.198 6.73 0.035 
3 -0.118 -0.063 8.5976 0.035 
4 -0.13 -0.142 10.851 0.028 
5 -0.098 -0.097 12.151 0.033 
6 0.008 -0.024 12.158 0.059 
7 0.011 -0.052 12.176 0.095 
8 -0.139 -0.189 14.874 0.062 
9 0.067 0.083 15.496 0.078 
10 0.165 0.071 19.336 0.036 
11 -0.081 -0.142 20.267 0.042 
12 -0.162 -0.135 24.021 0.02 
13 0.095 0.126 25.332 0.021 
14 0.091 0.034 26.55 0.022 
15 -0.11 -0.159 28.337 0.02 
There is significant evidence that the first order difference of dividends is stationary. It 
therefore seems better to specify the Lagrangean as a function the variance of the first 
difference in detrended price series and the first difference of the detrended dividend 
series, i.e. 
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This survey will leave this alternative unexplored, as it will suffice to note that an 
application of the results from Shiller ( 198 i b) to this data set found that var(~ 1,,) did 
not violate the implied variance bounds derived from the above Lagrangean. 
Mankiw et al (1985) show that equation (7) is biased in small samples. This comes from 
the fact that sample variances are downward-biased estimators of population variances 
because sample means are used instead of population means. In an independent, 
identically distributed sample the estimated variance must be corrected by factor of 
%-T), however, in a serially correlated sample the correction for bias is much larger. 
Mankiw et al use the following example to illustrate their point: Market price is 
proportional to dividends under the assumpti6n that dividends follow a first order 
autoregressive process. Since p* is a weighted. sum of future dividends, it is a weighted 
sum of future prices, which tends to smooth p* relative to p, making the bias in 
estimating the variance of p* greater than the bias in estimating the variance of p (see pp 
608). 
This point can be illustrated empirically by assuming that dividends follow an AR(l) 
process, i.e. c 1,, = p x c 1,1 + e 1,1 were E(e 1,,) = 0 and V~r(e 1J = u; , and by defining the 
test statistic Q, where Q = Var(p ~,, )- Var(p 1,,), and assuming for simplicity that Cj,-J = 0. 
These simplifying as§_umptions do not detract from the general thrust of the argument 
, ' E(Q) I 
presented, but are used to keep the math tractable when calculating the ratio [ '-". ·)1 
E Var\PJ,t 1 
for different sample sizes and for different coefficients of the AR(l) process. The Dicky-
Fuller test conducted above reported p = 0.994, which yields the following graph: 
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This graph clearly illustrates the small sample size bias inherent in equation (7). In fact, it 
I 
is clear that extremely large sample sizes are needed before the bias inherent in equation 
(7) become acceptable. · 
From the above it is therefore clear that the original variance bounds derived by Shiller 
suffer from bias and use a stationarity assumption that is not supported by the data that 
was used. 
2.2.5 The Stability Test 
. pa[c , ]I a'[<¥> . ,] a' [<¥> 1, ] Stability requires that 1• < 1 + 1• and · <I. Now, using the.data set 
· r 2r 2r 
described above we calculate that p=0.3252, alci.1J=3.36, ald/J1,,J=61.20 and 
I 




[d/J1·'] = 45048. Using these derived quantities it is clear that the solution (8.c) to 
2r ' 
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equation (8.b) is asymptotically unstable. Thus we have that the efficient market 
hypothesis cannot be rejected using this methodology. 
2.3 A Simplified Unbiased Test of the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
Mankiw et al (1985) specify a volatility test that is unbiased in small samples and not 
dependent on a stationarity assumption. Let P;,1 be some naive forecast of the stock price 
at time t, i.e.: 
~ 
Pj:, = Irk+1FPj,t+k (9) 
k=O 
where ~Cj,t+k is the naive forecast of Cj,t+k at time t. This naive forecast does not have to 
be a rational one. However, it is important that the rational agents at time t have access to 
this naive forecast. 
Mankiw et al (July 1985) derive the following variance pounds which should hold under 
market efficiency (see the appendix to this chapter for a derivation of these formulae): 
E(P~, - Pn, )2 '"2::. E(P. 1 - P~1 )
2 
), j, ), ), 
(10) 
(11) 
The bias inherent in equation (7) arises from the use of the sample means in the 
calculation of the test statistics. However, equations (10) and (11) are unbiased because 
they do not use sample means. This is verified in the mathematical appendix. 
In order to apply the test statistics derived in equation (10) and (11 ), Mankiw et al define 
the naive forecast of dividends to be the dividends observed in the previous year, i.e.: 
Fe C h. h . pn r c· t j,t+k = j,t-1 W lC g1VeS j,t = 1- r j,t-1' 
This.specification allows the calculation of the test statistics derived in equations (10) and 
(11) for various different discount rates, Le.: 
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r% S1 = E(Pj~t ~ Pj~t )2 S2 = E(Pj~t - Pj,t )2 S3 = E(Pj,t - lj~, )2 R =~ R=~ I S 2 s 
2 3 
4% 71.85 54.01 26.97 1.33 2.66 
I 
5% 64.08 28.34 34.68 2.26 1.85 
6% 57.78 17.27 42.49 3.35 1.36 
7% 52.58 12.87 49.39 4.09 1.06 
8% 48.23 11.73 55.27 4.11 0.87 
9% 44.54 12.26 60.27 3.63 0.74 
10% 41.38 13.66 64.54 3.03 0.64 
i 
Calculations of the test statistics for reasonable discount rates give mixed results. 
Specifically: 
1. The test statistic implied by equation ( 10) is violated for none of the discount rates, 
which implies that the market price (i.e. P) is a better forecast of the perfect foresight 
price (i.e. P*) than the naive forecast price (i.e. P"), and 
2. The test statistic implied by equation (11) is violated at only the higher discount rates, 
i.e. volatility of the market price around the naive forecast price is greater than the 
volatility of the perfect foresight price around the naive price at high discount rates. 
So the test statistic implied by equation (11) is only violated when less weight is 
placed on the terminal price used in calculating the perfect foresight price P*. 







-Naive forecast price 
800.00 





Close examination of the data reveals that the test results are extremely sensitive to the 
sample used. If the test was repeated based on data restricted to the period 1871 to 1983, 
i.e. after the bull market experienced in the 60's and ?O's, then both test statistics are 
uniformly violated, i.e.: 
r°lo s, = E(Pj~I - pj:I )2 S2 = E(Pj~I - Pj,t )2 S3 ~ E(~,I - pj:t )2 R = §.i_ R~~ I S 2 -2 S3 
4% 3.37 9.54 3.38 0.35 1.0-0 
5% 2.21 6.17 4.51 0.36 0.49 
6% 1.84 6.10 7.38 0.30 0.25 
7% 1.71 7.35 10.47 0.23 0.16 
8% 1.66 9.12 13.35 0.18 0.12 
9% 1.63 11.02 15.93 0.15 0.10 
10% 1.61 12.91 18.21 0.12 0.09 




-Nn'ive foreC8st price 




This suggest that, although the test statistics derived in equation (10) and (11) are 
unbiased, the resulting test is not sufficiently powerful, as results are significantly 
influenced by the relationship between terminal price and the initial price. Therefore, this 
particular test of market efficiency has relatively little power whilst a speculative bubble 
is evolving, as the evolution of the perfect foresight price series is dependent on the 
terminal price at which the market is sold at, which may ~e relatively high in the midst of 
a speculative bubble (this is observed when applying the test to data spanning 1871 to 
2000), or may be low after a speculative bubble has unwound (this is observed when 
applying the test to data spanning 1871 to 1983). 
An alternative explanation for the above phenomena is that asset price volatility varies 
over time. This refers to the GARCH phenomenon, which observes that asset price 
volatility can switch between low and high levels of volatility over time. This idea will 
not be explored in this analysis. The interested reader is referred to the excellent survey 
of this topic by Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner (1992). 
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2.4 Comparing Implied Variance Bound Tests and Regression Tests 
Equation ( 4.c) suggests a fairly simple regression test to see whether the price formation 
process can be forecast. Specifically, let PJ,t+I +c1,1 = B1 + B2p 1,, + B3c1,1 + e1,1 where ej,t 
is assumed to have a normal distribution with mean zero and variance d. If the efficient 
market hypothesis held then we would have B, = B3 = 0 and B2 = 1 + r > 1 under the null 
hypothesis. 
The structure of equation ( 4.c) relates pj,t to an infinite weighted moving average of the 
expected future cash flows from asset j, partly within the sample and partly without, with 
successive observations that are not independent. In order to keep the mathematics 
tractable this discussion will assume that the data consists of T independent normal 
observations of the vector z, = [P,+1>Pt>c1 ]. The likelihood function is then: 
z(u,n I z) = (2K r3~ ID.I-~ exp(-t t (z, - u) n-1 (z1 -u )1 ) 
' 
Where; 
Z is the Tx3 matrix of observations; 
U is the lx3 vector of means; 
Q is the 3 x3 covariance matrix; 
Let w, be a linear transformation of z, such that w, = (p1+1 +ct>p"c,]. Both Ztand Wt are 
normally distributed. Now, let w, = lw:, w; J where w: = [p,+1 + c,] and w; = [p, ,c,] and 
let w, w1 and w2 denote the equivalent matrices of observations of order Tx3, Txl and 
Tx2 respectively. Define Y = w1 and X = [L, w2], where L is a column vector of l's, V is 
the two element vector of means of p and c and <I> is the 2x2 covariance matrix for the 
vectorw;. The likelihood function of Wt can then be written as a product of the likelihood 
function of w: , i.e. as the likelihood function for the regression of Y on X/3, and of w; , 
i.e. as the likelihood function of a bivariate normal vector, i.e.: 
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1(a2 ,fl, <I>, VI w )= 1(;2 ,/J,1 w1, w2 )xl(<I>, VI w2 ) 
_ (2 . 2 )-1i [ (Y -XfJ) (Y -X/J)J - !C_<J' exp - ___ 2_<1'_2 _ _ 
x(2lcri<I>l-1i exp(-t t(w;-v)<I>-1(w12 -vf) 
The generalized likelihood-ratio test statistic can be written as follows: 
sup L(8;x"x2 , •• • ,xJ 
A=A(X1,X2, ... ,xn)=Beeo ( ) 




Where the numerator is the maximised likelihood function constrained by the null 
hypothesis and the denominator is the unconstrained maximum likelihood function. The 





+1 ) and Var(pJ = Var(p1+1 ). If these restrictions are ignored then it can be 
seen that test statistic· implied by equation (13) will be a transformation of the ordinary 
regression test statistic, i.e. a transformation of the first factor in equation (11). 
i 
If the restrictions implied by the stationarity assumption are not ignored then one can 
write these restriction~ in terms of the parameters of the likelihood function of w,, i.e. the 
mean restriction becomes: 
(14) 
and the variance restriction becomes: 
<1'2 = (1- /312 )o-2 (p )+ 2/32 (1- /J3)<1'(p,c )-(1- /J3 )2 <1'2 (c) (15) 
Now, <J'2 (c) = 0 ~ a'2 = (1- /312 )o-2 (p). Since B2 = 1 + r > 1 under the null hypothesis, 
then for the null hypo~hesis to hold we must have a 2 (p) = 0 . The null hypothesis will be 




~2 (p) ~ 0 , which implies that - 2 log A. ~ oo , while, whether or not p is 
explosive in the sample - 2 log A. for the regression test will be finite. 
The likelihood ratio test defined above therefore has power of one in a region of the 
parameter space where the regression test does not. It follows that in this region a 
volatility test with test statistic equal to u(Ap )/ u{c) will also have power equal to one, 
which is obtained by using the invariance property of the maximum likelihood function. 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter a classical challenge by Robert Shiller to the validity of the efficient 
market hypothesis was reviewed. Although the results of the test showed that markets are 
more volatile than one would expect under the efficient market hypothesis, it was found 
that: 
1. we cannot accept the assumption that dividends are stationary, 
2. that the test results are significantly biased for small sample sizes, and 
3. that the test results are not stable. 
The original volatility test of Shiller's was extended to remove the small sample bias 
inherent in it and dependence on the assumption of stationarity of dividends. The results 
of the extended test was however found to be dependent on the sample used, indicating 
that this particular test of market efficiency is unreliable as it dependents on the relation 
between the starting price and the terminal price prevailing within the sample. 
These results are not encouraging, as they do not present a robust framework within 
which the validity of the efficient market hypothesis can be challenged. However, it must 
be remembered that the fair game properties of equations (5) and (6) are implications of 
the assumptions that: 1) the conditions of market equilibrium can be stated in terms of 
rational expectations, 2) the information set Qt is fully utilized by the market in forming 
equilibrium expected returns and thus current prices, and; 3) the models employed in this 
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chapter restrict the analysis to partial equilibrium infinite-lived, representative agent 
models. These assumptions will be reviewed in more detail in the sequel. 
Chapter 3 explores asset pricing in the context of an Overlapping Generations model 
(OLG model), which establishes the existence of equilibrium as a function of the 
interaction between preferences, technology, expectations formation and the exogenous 
stochastic environment. 
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2.6 Mathematical Appendix 
2.6.1 Derivation of equation (7) 
=> Equation ( 4.c) implies that p ;,, - p 1,, =u 1,1 is a forecast error that is uncorrelated with 
Pj,t; 
=> 0'2[p;,,]=0'2[p1,,]+0'2[u1J; 
=> Now, since 0' 2 [u1,,] ~ 0 (i.e. variance matrices are positive semi definite) we have 
that 0'2 (p ;J ~ 0'2 (p1.J ; 
2.6.2 Derivation of equation (8.a) 
Equation ( 4.c) implies that 1:!:.p J,r+i + c 1,, - rp 1,, =u 1,1 is a forecast error that is uncorrelated 
with Pj,t. Where !:!:., = E, - E1_1 is the innovation operator. 
=> Thus, O"l!:!:.1+1P1,1+1>P1,,J= 0--? O"l!:!:.P1,1+1 +c1,1-rp1,,J=0 
=> Given that !lp 1,1+1 = p J,t+I - p 1,, we have that O"W J,t+i + c 1,1 - (1+r)p1,1 J = 0 
=> Expanding this covariance yields O'(p 1,,+1,p 1J+ O"[c1,,,p J.t ]-(1+r)0'
2 (p1,,] = 0 
=> By combining 0'2 (p J,t+I - p 1,1] = 0'2 [!lJJ J,t+I] with the stationarity assumption which 
implies that 0'2 (p J,t+k] = 0'2 (p 1,1 J, we get that O'(p J,t+I' p 1,1] = 0'2 (p1,1]--t0'2 [!lJJ1,1] 
=> Substituting the equation derived in (4) into equation (3) and simplifying yields the 
following quadratic equation: r0'2 [p1J- pO'[c1,1 ]CJ(p1J+t0"2 [!lJJ1J= 0 , where pis 
the correlation coefficient between Cj,t and Pj,t· 
=> Solving for O"W 1,, J in the quadratic yields: 
O"r ... ]= pO"[c1.1]±~p20"2kJ-2r0"2[!lJJ1J 
~JJ 2r 
=> If a real number of O"W 1.1 J is to satisfy the model restriction then the expression 






[c . J 2 [ ] 0' 2 [c · 1] [ ] O'[c ·,] 2 => Thus 0'2 f:!:.n. :::;; 1' --? O' A,.,. :::;; 1' --? O' !lp. ::; --1'- since p ::; 1 
' r J,1 2r ~ 1.1 2r 1,1 ..fj; 
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2.6.3 Derivation ofequations (10) and (11) 
~ Define the identity Pi:, - P;,, =(Pi:, - Pj,i )+ (Pj,i - Pi:,) 
~ Observe that Pi:, ...,. Pj,t = v j,i and thus uncorrelated with information available at time t. 
~ Thus E, [(Pi:, - ~,, XPj,t - Pi:,)]= 0 as Pj,t and P1:, are known at time t 
~ This implies that E, (P1:, - Pi:, )2 = E, (Pi:, - ~,, )2 + E, (Pj,t - ~~' )2 
~ Such that E, (Pi:, ...,. Pi~' )2 ~ E, (~:, - Pj,t )2 and E, (Pi:, - Pi:, )2 ~ E, (Pj,I - ~:, )2 
~ The law of iterated projections means that one can replace expectations conditional 
on information at time t with expectations conditional on information prior to the 
beginning of the sample period. Let E denote the expectation conditional on the initial 
conditions, then: , 
~ E(~:, - Pi:, )2 = E(~:, - Pj,t )2 + E(Pj,t - Pi:, )2 
( • ")2> (• )2 ~ E pj,I - pj,I - E ~,I - Pj,t 
2.6.4 Lack of Bias Proof for Equations (10) and (11) 
~ To prove that the sample counterparts of these statistics are unbiased define S1 and S2: 
T T T T 
S1 = t L (Pi:, - Pi~' )2 -t L (Pi:, - Pj,1 )2 and S2 = t L (P1:, - Pi~' )2 -t L (Pj,1 - Pi:, )2 
t=I t=I t=I t=I 
~ Now, taking expectations conditional on the initial conditions on each side gives: 
E(S1 ) = f ± E[(Pj,t + v j,t - Pi:' )2 ]-t ± E[(Pj.t + V j,t - Pj,t )2] 
t=I t=I 
=t ±~[v~,,]+E[(P1.1 -P/,)2 Il-t ±E[v~,,] 
t=I t=I 







2.2.1 Derivation of equation (14) 
The regression test implied by equation ( 4.c) is p j,i+i + c j,i = B, + B2 p j,i + B3c j,i + e j,i . 
=> E(pj.i+i +cj.J=E(B, +B2pj,i +B3cj,i +ej_J 
=> E(p j,i Xi - p2 ) = p, + E(c j,i Xi - B3 ) given that E(pj,i) = E(p j,i+i) and E(e1,1) = 0 
=> P1 = E(p j,Ji - P2 )- E(c j,Jl - B3 ) 
2.6.5 Derivaton of equation (15) 
The regression test implied by equation (4.c) is PJ,r+i + c1,1 = B1 + B1pj,1.+ B3cj,i + ej,i. 
=> Pj,1+1 =Bi +B2Pj,1 +(i-BJ)cJ,1 +e1.1 
=> Var(p1,r+i)=Var(B1 +B2Pj,i +(i-B3 )c1,1 +~j.1) 
=> 0'2 (p j,i) =Pi 0'2 (p j,i )+ (i- p3 )2 0'2 (c j,i )+ <Y2 - 2p2 (i ~ p3 )a(p j,1,c jc,i) since 
a 2(pj,1)=a
2(pj,i+i), a 2 =a2 (ej,1), a
2 (pj,1,e1,1)=0 and a
2 (cj,1,ej,1)=0 
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Chapter 3 - Model Uncertainty and Asset Pricing 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2 we found that there is weak evidence of excessive market volatility. 
However, the significance of these findings was diluted by the modelling problems 
highlighted in chapter 2. In this chapter we shall review several of the assumptions that 
underlie the preceding analysis, i.e.: 
(a. l) conditions of market equilibrium can be stated in terms of rational expectations; 
(a.2) the information set n1 is fully utilized by the market in forming equilibrium 
expected returns and thus current prices, and; 
(a.3) the analysis is based on a partial equilibrium infinite-lived, representative agent 
model. 
, We compare the risk premia of a fully endogenous asset-pricing model with an infinite-
lived representative agent (the Lucas asset-pricing model) to the risk premia of a fully 
endogenous asset-pricing model with overlapping generations (the OLG asset-pricing 
model). A fully endogenous asset-pricing model allows us to place the focus on rational 
expectations in context. We shall see that asset pricing is a function of the interaction 
between preferences, technology, expectations formation and the exogenous stochastic 
environment. In this chapter we shall focus on the role of relative risk aversion, as 
measured by the relative curvature of the intertemporal utility functions, in asset pricing. 
We find that an increase in relative risk aversion is consistent with an increase in the risk 
premia of the Lucas asset-pricing model, but has an ambiguous effect on the risk premia 
of the OLG asset-pricing model. The behaviour of the Lucas asset-pricing model is 
inconsistent with the results of chapter 2, whilst the behaviour of the OLG asset-pricing 
model is consistent with the results of chapter 2. 
We use an overlapping generations model (OLG) as markets are incomplete such that 
pooling risks through Arrow-Debreu contingent claims are impossible. This follows from 
the fact that a consumer cannot sell contingent claims on the future dividend stream of 
the asset to which he/she has a claim, since potential buyers are not present in the market 
37 
5.2.3 Formation of Beliefs. -~. - . . 
From the analysis presented above it is clear that the object of an agent's tincertainty is 
~(TI) n <p * (e) itself. Let P(~(TI) n <p * (e )) d~note the space of all probabilities· on 
~(TI) n <p * (e). The agent must then select a · subjective probability 
qe P(~(TI)nrp*{t)) for his decision-making. We would then express the agent's 
. expectations by using a Lebesque integral: 
Q= fµq(dµ) (6) 
9!(n)nQJ(e) 
Equation (6) provides us with a representation result for rational beliefs. Since P(n,.S) is 
endowed with the topology of weak convergence it is a complete, separable metric space 
(see Gray 2001 p52-53). Let F(P(n,.S)) be the space of continuous and bounded real 
valued functions J:P(n,.S)~R. Since ~(TI)n<p*(e)cP(n,.S) then for each 
qe P(~(TI)nrp*(e)) the integral q(J)= JJ(x)q(dµ) is a weil-defined linear 
9!(n)nQJ(e) 
fun~tioil on F(P(n,.S)). We say that q represents Qe ~(Il)n <p * (e) if q(!) = J(Q) for 
all J e F(P(Q, 3 )) . This allows us to define the collection of real valued functions 
JS =V: P(n,.s)~ R lµ(S)= J5(µ), µe P(n,.S), Se .s}. "(7) 
Theorem 5. For any q e P(~(TI)n <p* (e)) let .Q(S) = f Js(µ)q(dµ) V'S e 3 (8) 
9!(Il)nQJ(e) 
then Qe~(TI)nrp*(e). Conversely, if Qe~(TI)nrp*(e) then there exits 
q e P(~(TI) n.<p * (e )) such that q represents Q and the support of q is the set of extreme 
points in ~(TI) ('I <p * (e). 
Proof. See the Mathematical Appendix for details. 
The reader may question why we have followed this line of analysis; why not let an agent 
select an appropriate belief system from ~(IT) n <p * {e) in a direct way? The result 
derived here has a subtle but elegant interpretation: Theorem 5 allows agents to express 
their uncertainty about TI , the true probability distribution, as uncertainty about the 
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Definition 6. (Weakly Uniform Stability) Let c: be a convergence function. Then 
<p* (e) = {Qe P,(.Q,g): Q(B({c},N, v,.Q)) ~ 1-c(N,D, v), \tN,D, v, \tC e gD} is said to be 
a set of weakly £-uniformly stable probability measures. 
I 
The set of weakly c-unifor,mly stable probability measures allows the set of realizations 
to vary relative to cylinders of a particular dimension, but requires that an agent pick a 
probability belief Q such that; i) the relative frequencies of all cylinders Ce gD converge 
at a uniform rate over a finite investment horizon N to the associated stationary measure 
mQ of the events JI c g , and ii) Q is bounded below by a suitable convergence function. 
By restricting agents' beli~fs to rational beliefs (as per definition 4) that are uniformly 
stable relative to a plausible convergence function (see definition 5) we exclude 
implausible beliefs that are unlikely to be seen in reality. 
This allows us to state the n:iain results of Nielsen (1996). 
· Proposition 1. The set <p * {e) is compact in the topology of weak convergence. 
This means that any weakly convergent sequence {Qn t=1 that converges to Q, i.e. 
limQn = Q where that Qn ~ <p * {e) \tn, we have that Qe <p* (c). 
n-+oo 
Proposition 2. Consider the weakly convergent sequence Qn ~ Q where Qn E <p * (c) \tn 
and mQ. is the stationary measure associated to Qn (see theorem 3). Then mQ. ~ mQ. 
Proposition 2 shows that the uniformity condition introduced here also imposes 
uniformity on the rate of convergence of the average beliefs. These place a restriction on 
the distribution of beliefs in the economy, which may restrict the ability of the theory to 
explain market volatility. 
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From theorem 4 it is clear that further restrictions on the beliefs of agents are required in 
order to construct a set of admissible beliefs that are closed in the topology of weak 
convergence. We will proceed as in Nielsen (1996) and restrict agents to beliefs that are 
compatible with the data (definition 3) and that are Weakly Uniform Stable (definition 6). 
The theory of rational beliefs does not predict which beliefs an agent will hold, or how 
the agent selects a particular belief. It is therefore not unreasonable to expect that agents 
consider criteria over an above t?at implied by definhion 4 when selecting a rational 
belief. In order to clarify exposition we consider an agent who makes investment 
decisions based on the frequencies of a collection of cylinders denoted as JI c 5 with 
which he is concerned. This collection may be the field of cylinders JI = ~ or, for an 
agent with an investment horizon of N years, the collection. of cylinders with dimension 
less or equal to N, i.e. J1={5° :D=l,2, ... ,N} where ~v denotes the field of all D-
dimensional cylinders in 5 . This agent may then restrict his consideration to probability 
measures in 9t(TI) for which the speed of convergence of the data is uniformly high on 
the specific class of cylinders with which he is concerned. The remainder of this section 
is a non-technical summary of the main results from Nielsen (1996) section 4. The aim is 
to clarify and apply the ideas presented by Nielsen to the original results_ derived by Kurz 
(1994), rather than reproduce the technical proofs of his propositions. 
Definition 5. (Convergence Function) A function E: N3 --7 R++ is a convergence 
function if for any D and v lim e(N,D, v) = 0. 
N--+oo 
Let P,(0,5) denote the set of all stable probability measures on (n,S). Further, denote 
the set of realisations x e n for which the frequencies of }t c 5 converge at a unifoni:l 
rat~ to the measure of the events JI. c 5 under the associated stationary measure by 
B(Jl,N,v,0)= xeO:supt~)A(T1x)-±L.1AT1x ~-forK,L>N, 
{ 
K-1 . L-1 · 1 l } 
Ae)I j=O }=0 V 
where ve N measures the speed of convergence. This leads us to a definition of weak 
uniform stability. Note that B(Jl,N, v,n) is increasing in N. 
·' 
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P{O, .S) the set of all probabilities on {n, .S). This allows us to precisely define the 
implications of having a probability belief Q that is compatible with the data represented 
bym. 
Definition 3. A probability belief Q e P(O, .S) is compatible with the known data if the 
system (n, .S, Q, T) is stabl~ and generates m(· Ix), i.e. mg (S) = m(S) 'v' Se 3 . 
Therefore, the belief is not compatible with the data if mg -:t m, which leads us to define 
the set of rational beliefs as ~(TI)= {Q e P(0,3): Q is compatible with the data} (5) 
5.2.2 The Topological Properties of the set of Rational Beliefs 
In order to completely specify suitable axioms that underpin the theory of rational beliefs 
we need to investigate the topological properties of ~(TI). These properties will 
I 
determine whether we need to impose further restrictions on the beliefs of agents, other 
than that Q is compatible with the data. Specifically, we wish to establish if the set of 
rational beliefs relative to any stable measure is closed in the topology of weak 
convergence, defined as: 
Definition 4. The seque~ce of probability measures {Qn }:=1 converges to Q, i.e. 
lim Qn = Q, such that Qn e ~(TI) \in and there exists no Q such that Q <C ~(TI). 
n-+~ 
This is a natural consideration when we wish to establish the existence of equilibrium in 
general settings as the topolpgy of weak convergence for a sequence space allows one to 
concentrate on the first members of the space since the set of continuous, bounded 
functions which are measurable relative to the set of cylinders determines convergence 
(see Nielsen 1996). 
Theorem 4. ~(TI) is not closed in the topology of weak convergence. 
Proof. See the Mathematical Appendix for details. 
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· n-1 · · · 
Note that mn(S)= lim~In(rks) has· nothing to dc,.with the data, it is simply an 
n-+~ k=O . 
analytical expression derived from (n, .S, II, T). This property says that in the limit the 
arithmetic mean of iterates of II with respect to T converges to a set function · mn (.). 
F~om Lemma 6.2.2 of Gray (2001) we know that mn 0 is a probability function. Since 
(a.5) assume~ that the dynamic system (Q,.S,II, T) is stable, we cannot employ standard 
ergodic theorems which are based on strong stability. This leads us to theorem 2. 
Theorem 2. (n,.S,II, T) is stable if and only ifit is WAMS. 
Proof. See the Mathematical Appendix for details. 
Theorem 2 allows us to link the finitely additive measure mn (.) and the family of finitely 
additive measures . m(· Ix) deduced from the data. 
Theorem 3. The probability measure mn 0 on fs can be extended uniquely to a 
probability measure mn on (n,.S) which is stationary with respect to T with the 
properties that: 
i: mn (SI ()(x) = m(Slx) mn a.e. 'if Se .S where ( = {s e .S : T"1S = S} , i.e. the 
collection of all invariant sets, and 
n. m(S)=mn(S) 'i/Se .S where m(S)= Jm(Slx)mn(dx) 
n 
Property i of theorem 3 shows that the limiting sample average of the indicator function 
of an event equals the descriptive definition of the conditional probability of the event 
given the a-field of invariant events. One interpretation of this result is that if we want to 
calculate the probability of an event S based on the outcome of all . invariant 
measurements, then the answer is equal to the relative frequency of the event in question. 
Property ii of theorem 3 states that every stable dynamic system (n,.S,Il, T) generates a 
unique sUttionary probability mn , which is calculated analytically from TI . Denote by 
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We can now make the following observations: 
i. Given (a.5), in trying to learn II, agents learn m(·lx), which is a stationary 
probability. In general1 we have that m(· Ix) -:t= II as the true dynamical system · 
(n, Z, II, T) may not be stationary such that II may not be learnt, 
ii. Agents know that m( Ix) may not be II , but m( Ix) is the only measure they can learn 
and agree upon given the available data, and 
iii. m( Ix) summarises the entire collection of asymptotic restrictions imposed by the true 
system, i.e. by (n, Z, II, T), on the empirical distribution of all the observed variables. 
We now write m(Slx) = 0 for x fi! C and S e Z , and m(nlx) = 1 'ef x . If all agents knew 
that the system was stationary they would adopt m(· Ix) as their rational belief. 
Assumption (a.5) makes no specific statement about the stationarity or non-stationarity of 
the system. Therefore, even if the system were stationary, agents would not know this 
and may still not adopt m(· Ix) as their rational belief. 
We can now strengthen our early definition of the theory of rational beliefs: The theory 
of rational beliefs characterises the set of all beliefs that are compatible with the available 
data by considering what analytical properties the dynamical system (Q, Z, Q, T) must 
have to generate m( Ix) as a stationary measure. To accomplish this task requires we 
introduce the concept of a weak asymptotically mean stationary (W AMS) dynamical 
system in definition 2. 
Definition 2. A dynamic system (n, Z, II, T) is W AMS if for all Se g the limit 
(4) 
It is strong asymptotically mean stationary (SAMS) if the limit exists for all S e Z . 
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adaptation of mathematical techniques that were developed for the study of strongly 
stable systems. 
The set of all m(SJx) defined above describes the normal patterns of the dynamics. 
Assumption (a.6) assumes that all agents are endowed with this knowledge. This is a 
simplifying assumption that keeps the mathematics tractable. In practice agents will 
approximate m(SJx) resulting in a diversity of opinions about the accuracy of the 
approximations, which will necessarily increase the diversity of beliefs. Further, although 
all agents are assumed to have the same information about the frequency with which 
measurable events occur in ·the limit, they may hold very different views about the 
interpretation of this information. The latter point will be made more precise later. 
The assumption of stability restricts agents in the economy to considering measurable 
events that are not necessarily simple. Note, however, that the implicit assumption 
regarding the data required to derive the empirical distribution of the frequency with 
which events occurred in the past becomes more onerous as the dimension of S increases. 
Denoted by 3 the field of all cylinders in 3. Observe that (a.5) assumes that the 
probability measure m(Slx) exists TI a.e. 'd S E g , it does not specify for which x E Q 
m(Slx) exists rr a.e. vs E g. J'.urther, the probability measure m(Slx) exists only on the 
field 3. We consider whether one can extend this to a unique probability measure on the 
a-field generated by 3 , denoted a(3). This is an important consideration as a(3) 
contains all the limiting sequences of cylinders. These results are summarised in Theorem 
1. 
Theorem 1. There exits a set Ce 3 with TI(C)=l and for each xe C a probability 
measure m(Jx) on (n,3) which is a unique extension of m(SJx). The dynamical systems 
(n, 3, m( Ix 1 T) are stationary for all x e C . 
Proof. See the Mathematical Appendix for details. 
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We interpret (2) as the relative frequency at which the dynamical system visits the set S, 
given that it started at x. Observe that· agents can learn something about the true TI if 
mn(Slx) converges so that with sufficient data limmn(Slx) can be computed. We make 
n--+~ 
this notion precise in definition 1. 
Definition 1. The dynamic system (n, 3, TI, T) is stable if for all finite-dimensional sets, 
or cylinders, SE g the limit of mn (Six) exists TI a.e. The dynamic system is said to be 
strongly stable if the limit of mn (Six) exists TI a.e. for all SE g . We denote the limit of 
mn(slx) by m(Slx)= limmn(slx) TI a.e. 
n--+~ 
(3) 
The distinction between stability and strong stability needs clarification; a finite number 
of observations is needed to verify if x E S if S is a cylinder, whereas an infinite number 
of observations is needed to verify if x E S if S is an infinite dimensional set. We 
proceed by making the following assumptions: 
(a.4) Tis not invertible. 
(a.5) The dynamical system (n,3,II, T) is stable. 
(a.6) The limits in (3) are known to all agents. 
Assumption (a.4) implies that any particular future evolution x' of the economy is not 
associated with a unique past T' x0 , such that a future x' may arise from many possible 
pasts. This assumption keeps the dynamics necessarily general. 
Assumption (a.5) makes no specific statement about the stationarity or non-stationarity of 
the system. It is the minimal condition needed to establish common learning of 
meaningful results about probabilities that also allows for the possibility of a stable non-
stationary dynamic system, which is an appropriate model for an economy with structural 
change within which econometric analysis can be carried out. This approach reflects the 
absence of a conclusive theoretical reason compelling agents to believe in a stationary 
economic environment. From a technical point of view this assumption requires . the 
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processes that show that agents can learn the causal structure of the economy on which 
they formulate their beliefs,. and hence II . However, in chapter 5 we show that the 
convergence of a particular learning rule to a particular unique solution .does not imply 
that learning behaviour will generally lead agents to the same solution. We shall therefore 
avoid making the assumption of structural knowledge by assuming that: 
(a.3) II is not known by any agent. 
An agent who observes the data takes the true probability space (0, S, II) as fixed, but 
does not know the true TI , and therefore will try to learn as much as possible about 
II using past data. This knowledge will be reflected in the agent's belief system; define 
T-n s = {x : T" x E s c n}' the .set s located n periods into the future such that Q(T-n s) 
represents the probability that event S occurs n periods later, where Q is the probabilistic 
expression of an agent's belief system. The agent therefore adopts the theory that the 
probability space is (n, S, Q). The theory of rational beliefs aims to characterise the set 
of all beliefs that is compatible with the available data. 
The objective outlined above is achieved in a natural way by studying the ergodic 
properties of the system (n, S, TI, T), which allows us to better understand the normal or 
average patterns of the dynamic system. The ergodic property of a dynamic system is 
defined as the existence of the limiting sample average of some function f, where 
. . . . . ~ . . 
f : Q ~ R . Specifically, ~ L J(T; x) = fn almost everywhere ( a.e.) when n ~ 00 • In this 
~o . . 






m" (six)=~ Lls(T1 x) (2) 
·;=O 
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5.2 The Theory of Rational Beliefs 
5.2.1 Derivation of the Set of Rational Beliefs. 
Consider an economy in which an agent can observe a finite number, k, of variables at 
each date t, t = 0,1,2, ... denoted by x1 = (x1t> ••• ,xkt)e X ~ Rk. Each variable in the state 
space represents information such as GNP, stock prices, earnings per share and climate 
conditions. We make the following assumption on the distribution of information in this 
economy: 
(a.1) Information is not asyffimetrically distributed, and all agents know x/'i/t, and 
(a.2) Xis bounded. 
Assumption ( a.1) means that heterogeneity of beliefs do not result from a diversity in 
agents' private information, and is therefore consistent with the rational expectations 
hypothesis (REH) in which prices make public all private information. 
Assumption (a.2) is a technical assumption that is not made in Kurz (1994a), which 
allows the set of rational beliefs to be bounded. This is not an onerous assumption as the 
information observed in an economy is by definition bounded. 
We hypothesize that the economic environment is represented by a dynamical system 
(n, 3, II, T) defined on the non-negative integers t ~ 0 , where: 
i. Q = X 00 ~ (Rk f; 
ii. 3 = o(Q 3') where 3' = a(x0 ,xp···,x, )t ~ 0; 
iii. II is a probability on measurable sets of infinite sequences in X 00 
iv. x1+1 = Tx', x' = (x, ,'x1+1, ••• ) where T is a shift transformation and x
1 identifies the 
random sequence from the perspective of time t ; 
A central assumption of the REH is that all agents know the causal structure of the 
economy. This assumption is usually supported by examples of dynamic learning 
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The analysis of the Kurz's theory of rational beliefs is concluded by characterising an 
agent's rational belief as a weighted average of the stationary measure generated by the 
agent's belief system and the agent's beliefs in structural change. 
The OLG model introduced in chapter 4 is extended to include both exogenous and 
endogenous uncertainty expressed through agents' rational beliefs of expected future 
endowments and prices. It is then shoWn that a· diversity of beliefs does -impact the price 
formation process, which is followed by a discussion of the conditions under which the 
impact of a change in expectations on equilibrium prices is unambiguous. 
Finally, the analysis concludes with a critique of the rational belief model reviewed here. 
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they can, however, learn the limiting stationary probability measure generated by the 
system. 
Because agents are assumed to have no structural knowledge of the dynamical system 
that generates the economic data, they do not necessarily adopt this stationary probability 
measure as their belief system. The analysis shows, however, that any stable dynamical 
system, which has for instance an agent's belief system as its generating probability, 
generates a stationary probability measure based on its underlying generating probability 
that is unrelated to the data generated by the dynamical system. A belief system is then 
defined as rational if the stationary measure generated by the belief system is equal to the 
stationary measure generated by the true dynamical system's true probability measure. 
In an important application of the theory of rational beliefs Kurz ( 1994) shows that agents 
can express their uncertainty about the true probability distribution that generates the data 
as uncertainty about the beliefs held by other market participants. This result has 
profound implications for agents trading in the market. Rather than only try and learn the 
true stationary probability measure generated by the economy, they may elect to learn the 
distribution of beliefs that determines market pricing at a point in time. 
The p~eceding result is however premised on the set of rational beliefs being closed in the 
topology of weak convergence. Nielsen (1996) shows that the set of rational beliefs is 
however not closed in the topology of weak convergence, defined as the limit points of 
all converging sequences of rational beliefs are all elements of the set of rational beliefs . 
• 
The development of the theory of rational beliefs then follows Nielsen (1996) by 
restricting the set of admissible rational beliefs such that; i) the relative frequencies with 
which events are observed to occur converge uniformly over the agent's finite investment 
horizon to the stationary measure generated by his belief system, and ii) the probability of 
any cylinder, i.e. a finite dimensional set, occurring is non-zero. Nielsen (1996) shows 
that rational beliefs restricted in this way are closed in the topology of weak convergence. 
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------------ - - - - - --
Chapter 5 - Rational Beliefs and Endogenous Uncertainty 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 explored the relationship between expectations and the intertemporal 
substitution effect within the framework of a simple exchange economy with money and 
no external uncertainty. The model employed relaxed the strict assumptions that underlie 
the rational expectations hypothesis. Specifically, agents are assumed to have diverse 
beliefs that result in expectations that are not necessarily self-fulfilling. The analysis did 
not attempt to characterise the conditions that permit this diversity of beliefs to arise. 
The key ideas with which this· part of the analysis is concerned is best explained with the 
aid of a simple example. Define the present value of future dividends payable by a stock 
oo _ k+I 
as P 1 = L A c 1 + k , where A. is constant discount factor and c, is the dividends 
k=O 
expected at time t. Agents who observe the data need to evaluate the risky prospect of p, . 
However, the agents do not know the true probability distribution of the random sequence 
c,. They do, however, have at their disposal a large amount of recorded past data. The 
agents then learn all they can from this data in order to form a conditional probability 
belief about the future sequence of random variables ct+k k > 0 . The analysis aims to 
establish criteria for determining whether an agent's probability belief is rational in the 
sense that it is consistent with the observed data. This will allow us to characterise the 
structure of all rational beliefs, which will enable a better understanding of the causes of 
diversity among agents' beliefs. 
Kurz (1994) made an.important contribution in characterising the conditions.that permit a 
diversity of beliefs to arise through his development of the theory of rational beliefs. 
Kurz postulates that agents formulate their beliefs by observing the history of data 
generated by the economy. The analysis shows, through an elegant application of ergodic 
theory to a stable dynamic system, how the frequencies with which events occur 
converge in the limit to a stationary probability measure. The basic argument is that 
agents cannot learn the true probability distribution that generates· the dynamic system; 
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=> Note that there is no real change in the constraints faced by the agent in equation 
( c" .1) compared to ( c' .1) when price expectations are unit elastic with respect to 
current prices if (x! , .. ., x;·) and (Nri! , ... , Nri;·) are solutions to ( c' .1 ), i.e.: 
homogeneity of degree 0 and that 17 a (,1p1 ; Am J = A,17 a (pl ; m J and therefore has 
homogeneity of degree 1; 
4.7.5 Derivation of Equations (3.4.a) and (3.4.b) 
=> (3.4.a) follows from adding the two inequalities, i.e. p 1c1 + m~ = p1e~ +ma and 
P2a (p, )c2 + m; = p20 (p1 )e~ + m~, and noting that m2 ~ 0. 
=> (3.4.b) follows from the fact that m1 ~ 0, this inequality represents the economy's 
liquidity constraint; 
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... ..,,. . 1.(0. I 0 I)> 1/__1 (1)0 1\ · . ..t .• t(O l 0 !·)> 1f_.1 0 I) ., ua Yra• Pr _ ua\Yra A, Pr ~ua Yra• Pr _ ua\Yra• Pr · 
N . h · I (0 I l) h'th I 0 ) . ~ ow c oose y,0 = xr0 ,mr0 sue at mr0 > mra. 
l (0 I 0 l') 'I/ _ _1 0 t) h" h · d' · 7 ua Yta' p, < ua \Y1a' p, ' w IC IS a contra ICtlon. 
=> This proofs that {i tc,
0 
}-7 oo when either p: -7 atJ.-1 or p: -7 R! \ tJ.-1 such that t&,0 is 
upper hemicontinuous. 
4.7.3 Proof of Theorem 1. 
Assumptions a.l to a.5 are the intertemporal equivalent of a'.1 to a'.5 for an exchange 
economy with money. 
Lemma 1 proves that the period 1 utility function is continuous, non-satiated and semi-
strict quasi-concave. 
Assumption a. 7 ensures that that aggregate excess demand function of some trader with a 
strictly positive initial endowment ?,~ > 0 is upper hemicontinuous, which is proved 
through lemma 2. 
Note that proposition 1 is easily extended to the case of an exchange economy with 
money by incorporating money into conditions c. l ,c.2 and c.3. Therefore, conditions c. l 
to c.3 are the intertemporal equivalent of c' .1 to c' .3, for the case of an exchange 
economy with money. 
Assumption a.6 prevents an agent from borrowing money,. which allows us to have a 
relatively weak assumption a.7 (see Grandmont (1983) for a fuller discussion of this 
issue). 
4.7.4 Proof.of Lemma 3. 
=> Consider a change of (p1;mJ to (1!p1;ArriJ and j520 (p1 ) to ]520 (/!pi) and call the 
new problem ( c" .1 ); 
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4.7.2 Proof of Lemma 2. 
~ We prove the result by contradiction and assume that the sequence {j 1l1a }-7°1l1a < oo 
when either p: -7 a~-1. or p: -7 R~ \ ~-1 • 
~ The continuity property of 1l1 implies that there must be some convergent sequence 
{jy:J-7°y:a such that {jllJ-7°1lt < 00 and11°Y:all< 00 • 
~ Also,fromthecompac~essof p,~ wehavethat P!ep:,.)-7p1~(0p:,.). 
~Use lemma 1 to show that for any y,ae Y,a i) u!{y:a/p:)-7u!{y:a,0p:) and ii) 
l(jljl) 1(0101) ua Y1a• P, -7 ua Y1a• P, · 
i. Consider the case wheri 0 p: E a~-I : 
7 ° pJ·0x:a +0m:a~0pg,~ + m,a > 0 since (,~ > 0. 
_,,_ Th 1 {o 1 o 1) > 1 ( 1 o 1) \-/ 1 Y.1 h th t o 1 1 + 1 <o 1 r1 + ---, us ua Y1a• p, - ua Y1a• Pt VYta E ta sue a p,x,a m,a-Pt~ta m,a. 
7 But we must have some good h for which 0 pJh = 0 ; 
7 This leads to a contradiction as the consumer can increase his demand for good h 
indefinitely withou~ violating Walras' law, i.e. lim0 pJ · (0xJa + Jhr)= 0. 
I r~~ 
W h c 'h I Y.1 hh 1(0101) 1/_JOI) 7 emustt ereiore. ave some Ytae ta sue tat ua Yia•Pi <ua'J'ta•Pt. 
u. Consider the case when_ p: -7 R~ \ ~-1 : 
L I (0 I I ) c b" I 7 et Yia = x,a, m,a ~or ar 1trary m,a . 
D fi j -
1 
p: s · 11 j 11- 1 h th t j 0 o 7 e me v, - 11 P:~ . mce v, - we ave a v, -7 v, > . 
_,,_ si·nce o 1 o 1 +o 1 <o 1r1 + - em st ha o 1 o 1 <o 1r1 --, p,·x,a m,a-:--Pi~ta m,a w u ve v1 ·xta_v1 ~ta· 
N • 0 1,1'1 Q h · ·I XI h h 0 I ·I 0 lj'l 7 ow, smce v1 ~ 1a > t ere exists x,a e ta sue t at v, · x,a < v1 ~ 1a. 
7 Define x:a(..t) = AX;a +{1-..t)0x;a and note that Y:a(..t) = (x:)..i),m:Je Y,!. 
_,,_ Also sm· ce o 1 o 1 ( 1)<0 1 r1 and o 1 > 1 th o 1 o 1 + 1 < o 1 r 1 + ---, ' Vt • Xia /L VI~ ta mta - m/a en PI • X ta m ta - PI ~ ta m ta • 
j I 0 I I j lj'l - c · 1 h 
7 p, · xta + mta < p, ~ta + m,a 1or J arge enoug . 
7 I (j I j I)> I /_.I (A) j I)~ I (0 I 0 I)> 1 / _ _1 (A) 0 I) ua Y1a•P1 _ua'J'1a •Pt ua Y1a•P1 -Ua'J'1a ,pt· 
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4. 7 Mathematical Appendix 
4.7.1 Proof of Lemma l. · 
i. u! is continuous on r;! x P,1. 
::::::> Pick (0y:0,0p:)e Y,!xP,1 and consider the sequence {1 y:0/p:}-7(0y:0,0p:), which 
follows from the compactness of r;! x P,1 • 




,.) is continuous on R+ xP,1 such that 
Ua (1 Y:a,.)-7 Ua (0 Y:a,.). 
::::::> From assumption (a'". 7) P! (1 p: )-7 P! ( 0 p:). 
::::::> From theorem a.3 in Grandmont (1972) we have u!(1 y:
0
/p: )-7 u!(0 y:
0
,
0p: ). · 
ii. Non-satiation of u! follows immediately from (a.3.2). 
iii. u! is semi-strict quasi-concave. 
S. I • • t d 1 11 d HJ h th . 11 HJ 1 d ::::::> mce u0 1s non-satta e we can se ect y,0 an y,0 sue at p1 = p1 = p1 an 
1 (_A_IJ 1) i (All . I) 
Ua\)'1a•P1 > ua Yta ,_p, . 
Le . AJJ1J · i<IJ ·(1 ) A#J C 0 1 ::::::> t Y1a = E.Y1a + - e Y1a 1or < e < . 
::::::> Let .x;; and .x:2 be possible second-period consumption vectors that ·maximise 
( ) "th · 11 I d ·11 I b" ~2 2 < ~2 J-2 1 ua Yta _Wl respect to Yta x p, an Yta x Pt SU ~ect to P1axta - Pra~ta + m,a. 
::::::> This yields u!(.Y;~,p:)= maxu).Y;~,.x;;) and u!(Y:1,p: )= maxu0 (Y:1,.x:2 ). 
Le AJJ12 AJ2 (1 )A#2 c 0 1 ::::::> t x,a = Ex,a + - e x,a 1or < e < . 
S
• • • • • h ( !'."1J A/f12) > ( _A_#J A62) ::::::> mce U0 IS sem1-str1ctquas1-concave we_ ave U0\)'10 ,X10 - U01)'10 ,X10 . 
::::::> But we have p1~x1~:::; p1~(1~ + m:0, which _combined with the definition of a 
• . . I (!'.ml 1) > ·( A.lf1J A.lf12) (!'."I AH2 )- I (_A.HJ J) maximum gives uaV'ta ,p, - ua Yta ,x,a > Ua\)'ta ,x,a - uaV'ta ,p, . 
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or b) structural changes, i.e. changes in the relative risk aversion of the trader. The 
argument is as follows; 
Let S
1 
0 be some dynamic function that is used by agents to choose between multiple 
equilibria at time t. At the next trading opportunity the agents select an equilibrium price 
which is sufficiently far from that at time t such that the market price "appears to snap" 
unexpectedly. Back testing may indicate that markets are more volatile than we would 
otherwise expect, but the presence of the kind of behaviour hypothesised here may render 
the result of the statistical test ethereal. 
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4.6 Summary R_emarks and Conclusion 
In section 4.3 we show that the existence of short-run Walrasian equilibrium is dependent 
on the existence of a sufficiently strong intertemporal substitution effect to offset or 
enhance the real balance effect. 
Section 4.5 shows that the existence of a sufficiently strong intertemporal substitution 
effect requires the existence of a trader who's expectations are relatively insensitive to 
variations of current prices. In the context of chapter 3 this means that the prospective fair 
value equity risk premium demanded by this trader is insensitive to both the observed 
level and variation in the current equity risk premium, such that the trader can act as a 
flywheel that stabilises the price formation process. 
We can then consider the issue of price stability in the presence of uncertainty by 
questioning the existence of this 'insensitive trader"; his expectations may become biased 
by recent experience, requiring him to project a lower/higher than normal equity risk 
premium (or price) in order to act as a stabilising flywheel and take the opposite trade. 
In chapter 3 we argued that the intertemporal substitution effect is indistinguishable from 
relative risk aversion given the assumption of additive utility. It is therefore difficult to 
judge whether unexpected volatility in market prices (or equity risk premium) is due to 
the absence of the insensitive trader or a change in the relative risk aversion of the trader. 
The practical implication of this is that it would be difficult to distinguish between market 
inefficiency and a structural change in asset pricing. 
Given that the family of additive utility functions are a subset of the more general class of 
utility functions, one may be able to make this statement in a more general context. 
Furthermore, theorem 1 states simply that an equilibrium solution exists for the OLG 
economy under very general assumptions. It does not state that this solution is unique. 
We need to caution against stating that price instability may be a function of either; a) 
market inefficiency, i.e. cases when the insensitive trader develops biased expectations, 
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Assume that the trader's expectations are biased downward at the endowment point 
(e1; e2 ) such that fr~ 8 u~ ((e2)) V p1• Since u~ and u; are dec~easing functi.ons we have 
P1 U1 e1 
that c1 < e1 for all values of p 1 • Now, if all traders expectations are biased downwards in 
this way an aggregate excess supply will exist on the good market at all values of the 
current price PP such that no short-run Walrasian equilibrium can exist in which money 
has positive value. 
Again, the phenomenon niay occur in the particular case where price expectations are 
unit elastic with respect to the current price. The real balance effect will then be the sole 
regulating mechanism of the economy, but will be too weak to bring the market into 
equilibrium. 
The results illustrated in examples 1 and 2 and the existence of an equilibrium solution 
for OLG economy are forn;i.alised in theorem 1 above. 
The proof of theorem 1 m,akes the importance of lemma 2 apparent. In order to use the 
Arrow and Debreu (1954) existence theorem 2 to prove the existence of equilibrium for 
the OLG economy specified in section 4.3 we need to have at least one agent with 
bounded expectations. This result does not imply that bounded expectations of such an 
agent will in any way influence the expectations of other agents or determine the market 
clearing price q . This result does imply that the bounded expectations of such an agent 




Assume that the trader's expectations are.biased upward at the endowment point (ei;e2) 
such that f!.2.;:::: o u~ ((e2)) V Pi·· Since u: and u; are decreasing functions we have that 
Pi U1 e1 . . 
Ci > e1 for all values of Pi. Now, if all .traders expectations are biased upwards in this 
way an aggregate excess demand will exist on the good market at alt values of the current 
price p 1, such that no short-run Walrasian equilibrium can ·exist in which money has 
positive value. 
This phenomenon may occur in the particular case where price expectations are unit 
elastic with respect to the current price, such that the ratio p 2 / p 1 is independent of Pi. 
The real balance effect will then be the sole regulating mechanism of the economy, but 
will be too weak to bring the market into equilibrium. Also note that this conclusion can 
be valid for a small expectational inflationary bias, since the ratio p 2 / p 1 need not be very 
large. 
Example 2: Persistent Excess Supply under Deflationary Expectations 
This example is the compljment to that described above and will not be illustrated for the 
sake of brevity. 
Note that that c1 < e1 if and only if the slope of the normal to the intertemporal budget 
"ime a~ (i.e. p 2 /Pi ) is less than the marginal rate of substitution (i.e. u; /u;) at point a, 
i.e. p 1 / p 2 < u; /u; at point a. If we assume that the utility function has the form 
u1 (c1 )+ bU2 (cJ, where u1 and u2 is strictly concave and differentiable, and o is the 
period discount factor such that 0 < o < l, then we have: 
'( +-;) 
C1 -el <0 if and only if P2 <OU2 e2 I ma P2 
Pi U1 (e1) 
(3.7) 
Again, we use this result to construct plausible examples where there is a persistent 
disequilibrium in the goods market for all values' of the current price. 
75 
We will illustrate our point more precisely by considering a relatively simple case where 





Example 1: Persistent Excess Demand under Inflationary Expectations 
From figure 3 it is clear that c1 > e1 if and only if the slope of the normal to the 
' 
intertemporal budget line ~~ (i.e. p 2 / p 1 ) exceeds the marginal rate of substitution (i.e. 
u; /u~) at point a, i.e. p 1 / p 2 > u; /u~ at point a. If we assume that the utility function 
has the form u1 {c1 ) + Ou2 (c 2 ), where u1 and u2 is strictly concave and differentiable, 
and o is the period discoun~ factor such that 0 < O < 1, then we have: 
c -e >0 if and only if ih >ou;(e2 +maf P2 ) 
I I . '( ) 




We shall use this result 'to construct plausible examples where there 
disequilibrium in the good~ market for all values of the current price. 
(3.6) 





4.5 The Role of Intertemporal Substitution in Short-Run Walrasian 
Monetary Equilibrium 
A short-run Walrasian monetary equilibrium in period 1 exists when the current price p 1 
clears both the aggregate demand for goods and the aggregate deinand for money, i.e. 
ii'=O. 
At this stage one may reasonably question the relevance of the real balance effect versus 
the intertemporal substitution effect to the equilibrating process. Grandmont (1983) 
points out that neoclassical macroeconomists tend to focus on the real balance effect and 
eliminate the intertemporal substitution effect by assuming that price expectations are 
unit elastic. We shall therefore consider two examples to illustrate that the real balance 
effect may be too weak, and that it must be reinforced by a strong intertemporal 
substitution effect if one wishes to equilibrate the market. We shall conclude this section 
by proving that this essentially requires that the price expectations of at least one agent be 




We can use figure 1 to illustrate the absence of money illusion. Consider a change of 
iii
0
, Pi, p 2 ·to Aina, Api ,Ap2 , which leaves unaltered the coordinates of points a and p. 
Figure 2 decomposes the impact of an increase in p 1 between the real balance effect and 
the intertemporal substitution effect: 
• If price expectations are unit elastic, an increase in Pi causes lines ap and PX to 
move towards the left and become a'P' and P'x', the slopes of the lines being 
unchanged. This generates the real balance effect. 
• If price expectations are not unit elastic, there is an additional rotation of the 
intertemporal budget line a'P' around the point P', i.e. downward if elasticity exceeds 
1 and upward if eiasticity is less than 1. This generates the intertemporal substitution 
effect. 
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Equation (3.3.b) represents the variation in excess demand that results from the change of 
expected prices from A/520 (p1 ) to their true_ values p20 (,1p1 ), with the current price being 
kept at the level Ap1 • We shall call (3.3.b) the intertemporal substitution effect as it 
measures the consequence of the modification of expected prices relative to the current 
price. Note that &~ = 0 when price expectations have unit elasticity. However, in general 
we have that the elasticity of price expectations relative to current prices differ from 
unity. We consider two cases by way of explanation: 
• Elasticity of price expectations > 1. This implies that expected prices 
p20 (,1p1) > p20 (p1), such that the intertemporal substitution effect will likely favour 
current consumption and thus counteract the real balance effect. 
• Elasticity of price expectations < 1. This implies that expected prices 
p20 (,1p1) < p20 (p1 ), such that the intertemporal substitution effect will likely favour 
increased saving and thus reinforce the real balance effect. 
In order to illustrate the properties of short-run demand functions we consider the simple 
case where there is only one real good, i.e. l = 1. Trader a's budget constraints therefore 
become p 1x! + m! ·= p1 (~ + m0 and p2x~ = p 2(} + m!, where p 2 represents expected 
prices. 
These budget constraints can be written as (see mathematical appendix for derivation): 
l + 2 < f'l + f'2 + - (3 4 ) ~~~~-~~a ~~a~ .i 
(3.4.b). 
Trader a's opportunity set described by the constraints (3.4.a) and (3.4.b), as well as the 
result of the utility maximization, is shown in figure 1 below. Note that notation has been 
simplified as follows: c, = x~ '\/ i and e1 = (~ '\/ i 
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This formulation allows us to make precise the impact of a change in current price on a 
trader's excess demand z a • We shall consider the case where there is only one good in 
the economy, i.e. l = 1. This allows us to ignore complications that arise from the 
possible modification of relative current prices and/or relative expected prices. Consider a 
variation of current prices. from p 1 to Ap1 , which induces the following change on the 
agent's excess demand for the good: 
where; 





Equation (3.3.a) represents the variation in excess demand that would occur if current 
prices change from p 1 to .Ap1 and if the trader's expected prices move proportionally 
from p2a to lfi2a , which is equivalent to assuming that price expectations are unit elastic 
with respect to current prices, we call this the real balance effect. The solution to equation 
( c. l) displays straightfo~ard homogeneity properties under this latter assumption that 
are summarised in lemma 3 (see appendix for proof). 
Lemma 3. The functions za(p1;mJ and 7la(p1;mJ are homogenous of degree 0 and 1, 
respectively, with respect to (p 1; ma), if expected prices are unit elastic with respect to 
current prices, i.e. p2a = AP2a for every p 1 and At= 2, ... , na. 
The property summarised in lemma 3 is also called "the absence of money illusion" 
property. The absence of money illusion property gives rise to the real balance effect, 
meaning: multiplying current and expected prices by A., ma being fixed, has the same 
effect on excess demand of the current good as dividing the initial money balance ma by 
'A, current and expected prices being kept at their initial level. Therefore, when the good 
is not inferior an increase of p 1 generates, through the real balance effect, a decrease in 
demand for the current good. 
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Lemma 2 gives us a stro~ger assumption (a.7): 
(a.7) There exist at least one trader with either (,~ > 0 or m,
0 
> 0 for which the mapping 
p~ : p: -7 p~2 ,/J~2 )) is continuous and compact. 
. ' 
Let q1 = (p:;1) and define condition c.3, where q, = (p:;1) and ti1 denote~ the equilibrium 
.Price and aggregate excess demand respectively, i.e.: 
(c.3) ti, ~ 0, q1.ic1 = 0. 
The maximization problem stated in ( c.l) can then be written as an abstract economy 
denoted by E~LG = [Y,:, ... , Y,~, 41 (y:1  ... , 4AY~ 1 P,1], where: 
I. y~ E {Y,: x ... x YJ_1 x YJ+1 x ... x Y,~ x P,1} represents the· strategies chosen by all agents 
other thanj, and 
.. A f ~1 )-{ 111 yt I I l < lj"I ~ } • th d · · fi h" h · n. J"l.i\Y!f - y!ly!IE Jt'p1x10 +m10 _p1 ~ 10 +m10 . IS e omam rom w IC agent] can 
. 4 • • 
.. select his strategies given the strategies chosen by other agents. 
~ . . 
The notation defmed above allows us to define a competitive equilibrium fot this OLG 
economy as the set of vectors (y:1, ... ,y:d;p:) that' satisfies condition~ c.l, c.2 and c.3, 
which is summarised in theorem 1. 
·Theorem 1. A short-run Walrasian monetary equilibrium exists if assumptions a.1 to a.7 
hold. 
4.4 The Intertemporal Substitution Effect 
The solution to equation ( c.1) will yield agent a's excess demand for goods, i.e. z0 , and 
demand for money 17
0 
, which are expressed by the agent on the market in response to p 1 • 
. ' ' . . . 
The functional forms of these solutions depend explicitly on the initial money stock m0 
and current prices p 1 , and irriplicitly on .01 as well as on current and future endowments 
of goods. 
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17 .B.2 for a proof of these results. It follows that z
0 
is continuous everywhere except at 
boundary point of the unit simplex. 





; 1710 ), where z10 = xJ0 - s'/o and 17,0 = mJ0 - m,0 • Aggregate excess demand for the 




). The compactness, convexity and continuity of 1&10 
when pJ e 8-1 follow from the compactness and convexity of y:
0 
E Y,~ i = 1,2 and the 
properties of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function summarised in lemma 1. To 
prove that property v hold in this OLG model, and hence that 1&
10 
is upper 
hemicontinuous, observe that we would expect: 
. A I "'.'\Al-I 0 h n . h d d c . h th d 1. s p, ~oil st. Pn ~ t at z, ~ 00 , 1.e. t e excess eman 1or t e n goo 
increases indefinitely as its price approaches zero due to lemma 1 part iii. 
ii. As pJ ~ R~ \ 1:1-1 that 171 ~ oo, i.e. the excess demand for money increases 
indefinitely when the price level tends to infinity due to lemma 1 part iii. 
Lemma i follows from Grandmont (1974), which states a necessary condition for the 
above boundary conditions to hold. 
Lemma 2. If the set of functions {p,~ {pJ ~p,' e 1:1-1} is compact in the topology of weak 
convergence and (,~ > 0 then 1&, ~ oo if either pJ ~ atJ..-1 or pJ ~ R~ \ 1:1-1 • 
Proof. See Mathematical Appendix for details 
In the proof of existence of temporary equilibria found in Arrow and Hahn (1971) the 
existence of the period 1 utility function is assumed. Lemma 2 shows that this 
assumption is equivalent to assuming that at least one agent with a positive endowment of 
all goods have bounded expectations. The requirement that expectations be bounded 
means that the range of variation in this trader's expectations must not be too large when 
pJ varies in tS.-1 • Furthermore, the requirement (/
0 
> 0 ensures that the agent can trade 
when pJ E atJ..-l. Finally, observe that the upper hemicontinuity of 1&,a follows from 
lemma2. 
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A convenient approach to solving th~ agent's maximization problem involves converting 
it to a two-stage problem. For any y:
0 
e Y,! given some p; e P,2 maximize 
(!'. (_.1 2)) 'h A2 b' 2A2 < 2,.2 I Th . d 1 ua\Yra\Yta•Pt Wit respect to x,a SU ~ect to p,x,a -P1~1a+m,a. e per10 
conditional ·utility function is then u1 '- 1 lp2)- maxu (_A_ 1-1 p2 )~ subiect to a\)'ta t - a\Y1a\Yta• t ') J 
p;x,~ $; p;(,~ + m:
0
• The conditionality in the period-1 utility function is removed by 
defining the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility, the properties of which is summarised in 
lemma 1: 
Ju! &:a1P; ~Pt~ (p: ,p;) 
pf 
Lemma 1. u! , for a = 1, ... , d, has the following properties: 
1. u! is continuous on Y,! x P/ . 
2. Given p: e 11-1 , u! is non-satiated. 
3. Given p: e 11-1 , u! is semi-strict quasi-concave. 
Proof. See Mathematical Appendix for details 
.. I >O 11. m,a -
... I l + I < lt'l + -
111. p,x,a m,a - P1~1a m,a 
Given the Artow and Debreu (1954) framework used here, this maximisation exists for 
all p: e 11-1 where the aggregate excess demand function is continuous. Consider the 
aggregate excess demand function of agent a in the p~e exchange economy considered 
in section 4.2 above, i.e. z
0
: R1 ~ R. It can be shown that for any regular trader with 
pe i:J,-1 that z
0 
is; i) compact, ii) convex, iii) upper hemicontinuous, iv) p · z0 = O'dp 
and v) if p ~ 'dt1~1 then z
0 
~ oo. Note that al1-1 .and i:J.-1 represents the boundary and 
interior of the unit simplex respectively. See for example Mas-Colell (1995) proposition 
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(a.6) Let m,a ;;:: 0 such that the total money stock M = Im,a > 0. 
a 
For each p: E 1:!..1- 1 the trader's expectation will take the form of a probability measure 
defined on P,2 • This idea is represented by the map P! : p: -7 p(P,2 ,/J~2 )) where: 
i. fJ(P, 2 ) is the Borel cr-algebra of P,2 , 
u. p(P,2 , fJ(P,2 )) is the set of probability measures on the measure space (P,2 , fJ(P,2 )). 
The definition of the agent's expectation function is completed by letting p!(p: ,p;) 
denote the probability assigned by agent a of p,2 E P,2 occurring in period t+ 1 given p: 
in the current period. This leads to the following assumption: 
(a' .7) The mapping P! : p: -7 p(P,2 ,/J~2 )) is contin~ous. 
Consider the maximization problem of agents with na = 2 . Let a denote such an agent 
and note that he must choose his current consumption of goods x:a ~ 0 , current money 
holdings m:a ~ 0 , and to plan future consumptions x! ~ 0 and money holdings m! ;;:: 0 
subject to the budget constraints: 
(b 1) l l + I < IJ"I + - d · . p,x,a m,a - P1 1:ua m,a, an 
Set m?2 = 0 Va & t. This is justified, as there is no bequeath in this OLG model. 
For any Y:a E Y,! given some p 12 E P,2 define the set of feasible consumption vectors for 
agent a's as: 
Y,a {y:a, P?) = {(x:a, x! ~x! E X1!, P? x! ~ p,2 ?1! + m:a}. 
It follows from (a.1) that ~! is a closed convex subset of R1+1 which is bounded and 
therefore compact and convex. 
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Sirice there is no production in this intertemporal pure exchange economy the analogue to 
assumptions (a.l) to (a.6) is: 
(a.1) Xta is a closed convex subset of R1x2 which is bounded from below, i.e. 
(a.2) For some x:a e x:a, x:a ~ St~, 'r:/ a & i. 
At time t an agent makes a decisions about the triple x:a,m:a,x!. Define agents a's 
·· d 1 · · 1 Y.1 x 1 R per10 - action set as Yia e ta = ta X + where and let 
(a.3) ua' for a= 1, .. . ,d' has the following properties: 
1. u a is a continuous C 1 function on Yta e Yia 'r:/ a 
2. For every Yta E Yia' there is an Y:a E xta such that ua(Y:a )> ua(ytJ. 
Assumption (a.3.2) extends the static equivalent by ensuring that non-satiation exists 
between time periods as well as within the same period for agents ·with life expectancy 
greater than one year. Without this assumption agents would have no demand fo·r money 
in period one and the period two optimisation problem would be equivalent to that of a 
pure exchange economy without money. 
(a.4) Let Xt = Ix,a and St= LSia then there exists x, e X, such that xt <St• 'r:/ t. 
a a 
(a.5) Let 0 11 be the positive unit vector of the h1h axis in R1• Then, for any A> 0' 
' . 
x:a + A.oh represents an increase of A in the amount of the h th commodity over x:a, with all 
other commodities remaining unchanged in consumption. ·Let H be the set of 
commodities such that for every a & i= 1,2, x:a e r;~ and he H , then there exists. A. > 0 
such that x:a +A.oh e x:aand ua(x:a +A.oh ,.,x! +A-oh)> uJx:a,.,x!), 'r:/ a & i. 
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v. The agent's initial money stock is denoted by m1a, which is the result of past saving 
and consumption decisions. Denote the money stock at the end of period i that results 
from agent a's savings and consumption decisions by m:a. 
From iii above it is clear that we have made the simplifying assumption that the agent's 
real income is fixed in each period in the form of an exogenously given endowment of 
consumption goods. These endowments cannot be stored, and must be traded and 
consumed within the period during which they are available. Paper money is the only 
store of value, and its stock is constant over time. The trader therefore comes to the 
market at each date with his endowment of goods and non-negative cash balances carriea 
over from the past. The short-run competitive equilibrium of the markets at that date will 
determine the Walrasian money prices of goods pJ = {pJl' ... ,p;, )e t:f.-1, the consumers' 
net trades in the good markets and the non-negative money balances they will hold until 
the next period. Formally, redefine condition (c'.2) to represent the current period price 
system in the OLG model, i.e.: 
(c.2) P/ ={p: IPJ e R1,p; ~o.tp:h =I}. 
In order to specify the traders short-run behaviour it is necessary to specify how future 
price expectations are formed. We assume that the agent's expectations are a function of 
his information on past history and on the current state of the economy, which in period t 
is represented by the set n, . Furthermore, we assume that the only information an agent 
has on the current state of the economy is described by the current price system p:. 
Agent a's price expectations for period 2 is expressed as a continuous function of current 
price, i.e. p1! = 'P1! {pJ) where P,2 = {p; e R'-1 jp; ~ 0} if na = 2. This definition does not 
make the influence of Q 1 explicit as past history is fixed in the short-run and cannot be 
altered by current events. Expected prices are therefore independent of the agent's own 
actions, which is warranted in a large competitive economy where every agent can only 
have a negligible influence on market prices by varying his own decisions. 
64 
of interest from the·· perspective. of· time t, ·e.g. x,: indicates· the second period 
consumption plan of agent a at time t. 
Consider an infinite horizon overlapping generations economy without bequest consisting 
of a successive number of generations at discrete points in time, i.e. t = 0, 1, ... , oo • There 
are l consumption goods available in each period. 
The analysis is concerned with the short-run properties of the model in a: given period t. 
We therefore only have to know the characteristics of every agent a, a= 1, .. .,d, living in 
.the period under examination, they are: 
J; . The number n
0 
= [1,2] of remaining periods for which the agent is going to live, 
including the current one. In each period t there ared: new agents born and d/_1 old 
agents such that d, = d: + d:_1 • The population is assumed to be constant over time 
such that the number of old equals the number of newborn, i.e. d ::::: d, Vt. 
ii. The set of all consumption vectors available to agent a in period i = 1,2 is denoted 
x:
0





x X~. Let the set of possible consumption allocations for the economy be 
denoted by ·x,::: x: xX,2 where x:'=xx:a i = 1,2. 
a 
iii. The agent's .Preferences, represented by the utilitY function u0 which depends upon . ' . 
current and future consumption x:
0 
, i ::: 1,2, where x:
0 
is a vector with l nonnegative 
components. 
iv. The agent's endowment of consumption goods, ( :
0 
, in every remaining period of his 
or her life, i = 1,2 . Let the set of possible 2-period endowment vectors for household 
a be denoted (,a = (,~ x (,! and let the set of possible endowment allocations for the 
economy be denoted by (, = x ( 10 • 
a 
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the simpler version in this analysis . too ease exposition. The results of the analysis are 
however not influenced in any way by this simplification. 
The basis of the proof found in Arrow and Debreu (1954) is to show that an economic 
model satisfying assumptions (a'l) to (a'5) is equivalent to the abstract economy 
EA&D = [Xp .. .,Xd,u1' ... ,ud,A1 (x1 ), ••• ,AAxd ),P] where: 
i. Xi Vi is a compact and convex space of possible strategies, 
ii. u1 is continuous on Xi and quasiconcave in xi for every xi, 
m. xi e {X1 x ... xX1_1 xXi+1 x ... xXH xP} represents the strategies chosen by all agents 
other than i, and 
iv. A, (xi) = {x1 Jxi e X1, p · x1 s; p · ( 1} is a continuous function whose graph is a closed set, 
and for every x1, the set A1 (x1) is convex and non-empty. A1 (x1) is the domain from 
which agent i can select his strategies given the strategies chosen by other agents. 
In order to prove existence of equilibrium for this abstract economy Arrow and Debreu 
(1954) use a generalization of Nash's theorem on the existence of equilibrium points for 
games (see N·ash (1951). The generalised result will not be illustrated here. The interested 
reader is refereed to Arrow and Debreu (1954) pp 273 to 274 for a precise definition and 
discussion: 
4.3 Model Specification 
We consider the short-run properties of an infinite horizon overlapping generation model 
in which agents only live for two periods. This specification allows one to apply general 
equilibrium analysis to a sequence of markets, where at each date each economic unit 
makes decisions according to his expectations of the future. This allows one to explicitly 
study the impact of each agent's expectations on the competitive equilibrium. 
Before developing the model a brief elaboration on the notation adopted is required. The 
current time period is indicated by subscript t whilst the superscript i indicates the period 
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(c'.l) Maximise uJxJ with respect to 'Xa over the set xa I xa E xa,P•Xa ~ P.?a 
The price system of the economy is represented by the set: 
(c'.2) P={pjpe R1 ,p~o.±p,, 7"1}. 
h=l 
Note that the price vector p has been normalised such that the sum of its coordinates 
equal I. The set P is therefore equivalent to the unit simplex !:!.1- 1 • This does not affect the 
generality of the result, as all relations are homogenous of degree 1 in p. Also, c'.2 
implies that P is compact and convex. 
The market for any commodity is in equilibrium when total supply for that commodity 
equals the total demand; however, allowance must be made for the possibility that at a 
zero price, supply will exceed demand. Condition c.3 deals with this issue: 
(c'.3) z* ~ 0, p * .z* = 0, 
where p* and z* denotes equilibrium price and aggregate excess demand respectively. 
Condition c' .3 above captures the dynamics of the law of supply and demand in a static 
function, i.e. prices rise if demand exceeds supply, and fall if supply exceeds demand. 
Obser\re that eq~ilibrium is incompatible with excess demand, since prices would simply 
rise, which gives rise to the first part of condition c'.3. If we have excess supply of 
commodity h, V he {1, .. ., l} then observe that p *,, cannot fall below zero, such that 
either z *,, = 0 or z *,, < 0 and p *,, = 0 in order for the second part of condition c' .3 to 
hold. 
A set of vector (x1*,.._.,xd*,p*) is a competitive equilibrium if it satisfies conditions 
c'. l, c'.2 and c'.3. 
Proposition 1. A competitive equilibrium exists for any economic system satisfying 
assumptions a'.1 to a'.5. 
The economy described above is the pure exchange equivalent to the more general case 
that includes production considered by Arrow and Debreu (1954). I have chosen to use 
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(a' .2) The agent's preferences are described by the utility function u
0 
for a= 1, .. . ,d, 
which has the following properties: 
1. ua is a continuous function on xa; 
2. For every xa E xa' there is an x: E xa such that ua (x:) > ua (xa); 
a' .2.2 assumes that there is no point of saturation, i.e. there is no consumption vector that 
the individual would prefer to all others. a' .2.3 assumes that the indifference surfaces are 
convex in the sense that the set{xa I xa E xanua(xJ ~ a}'ef ae Risa convex set. 
(a' .3) Let the agent's endowment of consumption goods be denoted by (
0 
E R1 for 
a= 1, ... 'd' then for some xa E xa' xa $;(a . This assumption states that every individual 




and (=L(a then there exists xeX such that x<(. This 
a a 
assumption states that . it is possible to arrange the economic system so that an excess 
supply of all commodities can be achieved by choosing an appropriate consumption 
vector. 
(a' .5) Let <Jh be the positive unit vector of the h1h axis in R1• Then, for any IL> 0, 
x
0 
+ A-<51' represents an increase of 'A in the amount of the h1h com~odity over x
0
, with all 
other commodities remaining unchanged in consumption. Let H be the set of 




and h E H , then there exists IL > 0 such that 
xa +Joh E xa and ua(xa + Mh )> ua(xJ. The set His not empty. H represents the set of 
all commodities that are always desired by every consumer. 
The basic economic motivation of agents in the economy is that of maximising utility 
among all consumption vectors that satisfy their budget constraint. This principal is 
captured in the following condition: 
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in the real world. Specifically, the rational expectations hypothesis ignores a priori the 
short-run rigidities in expectations that niay result from traders' learning processes in the 
real world. 
Finally, all mathematical proofs have been relegated to the mathematical appendix to 
facilitate reading. 
4.2 . . The Arrow and Debreu Existence Theorem 
The core idea behind the· proof of the existence theorem (i.e. theorem 1) for the model 
specified in section 4.3 is the observation that at least one trader has bounded 
expectations. This observation is proved by examining the behaviour of the aggregate 
excess demand function in the context of the Arrow and Debreu existence theorem 2 
(1954). Specifically, the behaviour of excess demand functions are examined when prices 
approach the boundary of the unit simplex that represents the set of admissible prices. 
Theorem 2 of Arrow and Debreu (1954) is restated as proposition 1 below, along with the 
assumptions and conditions that underlie their existence theorem; the interested reader is 
. . 
referred to the classic paper by Arrow and Debreu (1954) for a proof of the result. This 
approach may appear overly pedantic, but allows the technical reader to appreciate the 
evolution of assW:nptions needed to support the general existence theorem for .the static 
economy in theorem 2 of Arrow and Debreu (1954) to the assumptions needed to support 
the general existence theorem for the OLG economy specified in section 4.3. 
A brief note on notation is required before proceeding. If x & ye Rn then x ~ y means 
xn ~ Yn "i/n and xn > Yn for some n, and x > y means xn :> Yn "i/n. 
Consider an economy that consists of a == 1, ... , d agents that can trade in l consumption 
' . 
goods for which the following assumptions hold: 
(a' .1) X 
0 
denotes the set of all consumption vectors available to agent a, a = 1, ... , d , 
where· X
0 
is a closed convex subset of R1 which is bounded from below, i.e. 
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Chapter 4 - Short-run Equilibrium Under Uncertainty 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 showed that greater risk aversion does not necessarily imply a larger risk 
premium in an overlapping generations model. The reason for this phenomenon is related 
to the relative curvature of the utility function that gives rise to the income and 
substitution effects that are possible in the OLG model. This result means that changes in 
relative risk aversion do not necessarily explain the excess market volatility observed by 
some authors (see chapter 2) if an OLG model is used to price assets. 
This chapter investigates the intertemporal substitution effect further within the 
framework of an exchange economy. This analysis is conducted by establishing, under 
very general conditions, the existence of a short-run equilibrium in an infinite horizon 
overlapping generations economy in which agents have diverse expectations. This is 
achieved by first outlining the Arrow and Debreu existence theorem in section 4.2. 
Section 4.3 then analyses the conditions needed for this theorem to apply to an exchange 
economy in which agents have diverse expectations. 
Although the existence theorem proved in section 4.3 is very general, its implications are 
illustrated through a series of simple examples. Section 4.4 illustrates the intertemporal 
substitution effect for a simple one good economy. Section 4.5 illustrates that a strong 
intertemporal substitution effect 1s a prerequisite for the existence of a short-run 
Walrasion monetary equilibrium in a. simple one good economy. It shows that this 
equilibriating mechanism requires that the price expectations of at least one agent are 
insensitive to current prices. 
The model and results used in this chapter can be found in chapter 1 of Grandmont 
(1983) and in Grandmont (1974). The results shown here differ from Grandmont's 
original work to the extent that a more general existence theorem is developed that does 
not exclude the boundary points of the simplex of prices that characterise the economy. 
The. basic thrust of the argument is the same; the results obtained here can be used to 
question the ability of the rational expectations hypothesis to describe investor behaviour 
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where: 
R/:.~c (k,; .41 ) = J R;,~c (k,; .41; .41+1)dF(.4t+i) 
E 
=> Rearranging and simplifying yields: 
















3.7.5 Derivation of Equation (7.b) 
=>Note that 1+R0LG(k ·}., ·}., )= Pz(k,+i;A,+i) 
m,t t • t' t+I · (k . A ) 
P1 1+1• t+l 
=> Rewriting equation ( 4) yields: 
1 = Js~w (1 + R(k, ;.41 ;.41+1 ))dF(.41+1) 
E 
=> Expanding equation ( 6) yields: 
I·= [Y"' dF(A,., )]x[J(l + R~'; (k, ;A,;A,., )}JF(A,., )] + cov[s7"' ;R~'{' (k,; A,; A,., >l(k,; A,)] 
=> Substituting in equation (5.b) yields: 
-ow ( ) 
l+Rmt k,;.4, . r OLG OLG I( )] 
;LG( . ) =1-COVLS 1 ;Rm,t (k1 ;.41 ;.41+1) k1;.41 
1 + Rrf . k1 ,.41 
where: 
R~;G (k,;.4,) = JR~~G (k,;.4,;.4,+1)dF(A1+1.) 
E 
=> Rearranging and simplifying yields: 
llOLG (k,;.4,) = ~ + R~LG (k, ;.4, )]xcovF-s~LG ;R~~G (k,;.4,;.4,+1)l(k,;.4, )] (7.b) 
where: 
.llOLG (k . A ) = "j[OLG (k . A )- R0 LG (k . A ) I ' I . m,I I ' . I rf . I ' I 
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Case 2: f0 ~ w0 
Note the /\ notation is dropped in this section for notational expediency. 




< 00 ~0<w0 < 00 we have Pfv'(i 0 A.iq'(i0 ))x[A.iq'(i0 )]xdF(Ai)>O; 
E 
iii. Since 0 < k
0 
< oo ~ 0 < w0 < oo we have - oo < q"(w0 ) < 0 by assumption 2, thus we 
have - 00 < P J v'(i 0 Aiq'(i0 ))x [i0 A.iq"(i0 )]xdF(Ai) < 0 smce lim v'(iq'(i)) > 0 by l-4W 
E 
assumption 4; 
By combining i to iii above we see that the L.H.S of ajlaio = 0 becomes negative as 
=> By the continuity property of all the partial derivatives we se that the solution to 
(P .b.3 ), denote it f0 (Ila), satisfies 0 < f0 (,.i0 ) < w0 ; 
=> When f
0 
is determined, we have k, = f0 • Hence the next periods wage 
w1 = Ai q(ki)-A.i k1 q'(fi) is given after observing the production shock A-1. and the 
same process will yields k2 = i, ; 
=> This way we construct step by step the competitive equilibrium; 
3.7.4 Derivation of Equation (7.a) 
=>Note that l+Rwc(k ·A, ·A, )= p,(k1+1;.:i1+1) 
m,t t' t' t+I (k . A ) 
P; 1+1' 1+1 
=> Expanding equation (6) yields: 
I = [Vue dF( A,.,) l x [J{i + R:;~c ( k,; A,; A,..) }JF(A,., ) l + cov[s ;uc ; R':( ( k,; A,; A.+,) l(k, ; A,)] · 
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=> We will solve the problem for the young generation at time t =. 0 for given 
0 < k0 < oo; 
=> The first order condition for (P.b.3) is: 
i:)liio = 0 ~ -u'(wo -io )+ p Jv'(i 0 ltiq'(io))x [ltiq'lfo)+ i0 1Liq 11(~ )]x dF(lti) = 0 
E . 
=> Before proceeding we need to show that 0 < k0 < 00 ~ 0 < w0 < 00 
°' We use the fact that w0 ~ c~ + i0 = .1uq(f0 )-.1Lof0q'(f0 ); 
-> Consider the ratio qt~), from assumption 2 we have that; i) lim q(k,) = O 
q' k
0 
ko-+o• q'(k0 ) ' 
and· ii) . lim q(ko) = oo 
' ko-+~ q'(ko) 
-? . Thus we have that q < k0 < oo ~ 0 < w0 < oo; 
=> We now consider the behaviour of the l.h.s. of () V ~. = 0 when i0 ~ 0 and i0 ~ w0 · /d10 
Case 1: i0 ~ 0 
Note the/\ notation is dropped in this.section for notational expediency. 
1. If limiq'(i) = 0 then lim v'(iq'(i)) = oo by assumpti~n 4; 
1-+0 ·1-+0 
n. If limiq'(i):t=O then limv'(iq'(i))>O by assumption 4, but note that 
1-+0 1-+0 
lim v'(iq'(i))x q'(i) = oo by assumption 2; 
i-+0 
iii. Since 0 < k0 < oo ~ 0 < Wo < oo we have - 00 < -u~( Wo) < 0 by assumption 4; 
iv. Note that 1imiq11(i) :t: --oo for q(.) a s~ooth contin~ous fun~tion, we therefore have 
1-+0 
that - oo < lim iq"(i) < 0; 
1-+0 
By combining i to iv abo~e we see that the L.H.S of i:)Jiio == 0 becomes positive as 
~. i~. 55 
~ a51a1, =O~&ip,(k,;A-J=&2; 
~ dYaz, =O~&ip,(k1 ;A-J=&3 ; 
3.7.3 Proof of Theorem 1 
~ From section 3.3.1 we have that in equilibrium: i) firm profits will be zero, ii) 
individuals will supply one unit of labour inelastically and iii) individuals will supply 
k, units of capital inelastically such that 
C: + C; + f1 = q(k, ~I, Where/\ denotes equilibrium quantities; 
·~Note that c;+1 =p,(k1+1 ;A-1+1 ~1+1 =A-1+1 q'{fi)';, which follows from (f.2) and from 
individuals supplying k,+1 = l, units of capital inelastically in equilibrium; 






) as the equilibrium wage paid to the young at 
time t; 
~ We can use the above to rewrite the equilibrium problem in the following format: 




~ By substituting constraint i and ii into the maximization problem and noting that 
0 :::; l, :::; w, as a result of iii, we get the following simplification: 
(P.b.3) 
subject to 0:::; ~ :::; w, fort= 0,1,2 ... 
~ We have reduced the problem to finding the sequence {l, }:
0 
that maximises the 
above problem. Thus, the existence of a competitive equilibrium follows from a 
sequence of generational optimisation problems. 
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3. 7 Mathematical Appendix 
3.7.1 Derivation of the First Order Conditions for Problem (P.a) 
=> Form the following Lagrangian: 
L = {pc{k,;2, )c, + P;(k,;2, )i, - Pz(k,;2, )z, - p1(k,;2J!J+ tJ{c, + i, -l,q(z,j/i)2,} 
=> Now solve iJL = 0 for each element of y,; 
=> ()% =O~p· (k·2)=iJ· dC c t> I ' 
I 
=> ()Yai, =O ~ p,(k,;,.\)=iJ; 
=>.()Lia =0~pz(k,;2,)=iJ2,q'(z,/l,); /dz, . 
=> 0Yaz, = 0 ~· p, (k,; 2,) = iJ2, [q(z, /11 )-(z, /!, )q'(z,/l, )] 
=> Solving for iJ yields: 
i. Pc(k,;,.\) = P;(k,;2,) 
11. Pz.(k,;2,) = 2,pc(k1 ;A1 )q'(t1 /l1) 
m. p1 (k,;21 ) = 2,pc (k, ;2i>(q(z, /!J-(z, /!Jq'(z, /1i)] 
3. 7.2 Derivatjon of the First Order Conditions for Problem (P .b) 
=> Form the following Lagrangian: 
L = u{c: )+ P J v(p z(k1+1; ,.\+1 )z,+1 )dF(21+1) 
E ' 
+ z?i(pz(k,;2Jz, + p1(k1;2,)l1 - Pc(k,;2,)c, - P;(k,;A,)tJ 
+ &2(1-!J+ iJ3(k1 -zJ 
=> Now solve oL = 0 for each element of y,; 
=> aYac, = 0 ~ u'(c:) = z?ip Jk,; 2J; 
=> oL~i =0·~ /3 f v'(pz(k1+ 1 ;2,+1 )z1+JPz(kt+ 1 ;2,~ 1 )dF(2,+i)= ~P;(k;;A,), since /d, E 
z1+1 ~ k,+1 = i,, and z,+1 = k,+1 = i, in equilibrium; · 
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learning process that aims to show how agents learn what they know when formulating 
their rational expectations. We explore this issue in chapter 7 where we show that these 
results have to be interpreted with care, as the convergence of a particular learning 
process to a particular unique solution does not guarantee that learning behaviour will 
generally lead agents to the same solution. 
Finally, scrutiny of the OLG asset-pricing model used in this chapter shows that the 
intertemporal substitution effect is also influenced by an investor's expectations. The role 
of expectations in the intertemporal substitution effect, and hence the price formation 
process, is explored further in chapter 4. 
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3.6 , Summary Remarks and Conclusion 
In this chapter we have shown that greater risk aversion does not necessarily imply a 
larger risk premia in an overlapping generations model. We showed that the reason for 
this phenomenon is related to the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution and relative 
curvature of the utility function that gives rise to the income and substitution effects 
which are possible in the OLG model, but ruled out in the infinite-lived Lucas asset-
pricing model by it's construction. This result means that changes in relative risk aversion 
do not necessarily explain the excess market volatility observed by some authors (see 
chapter 2) if an OLG model is used to price assets. It is acknowledged in chapter 2 that 
the issue of excessive market volatility has not been conclusively dealt with for reasons 
discussed in the analysis. 
Both the Lucas and the OLG asset-pricing models used in this chapter determine prices 
on the basis of consumer preference, initial endowments and production sets. These 
factors (i.e. preference, endowments and production sets) represent the intrinsic structure 
of the economy. Price uncertainty within this framework is a reflection of randomness in 
the underlying intrinsic structure itself, and is not affected by events unrelated to 
economic fundamentals. 
In chapter 6 we extend the basic general equilibrium model introduced in this chapter to 
one with random prices and no intrinsic uncertainty. Price randomness in this extension 
of the model will be entirely due to the views and beliefs held by individuals about their 
environment. These views and beliefs refer to a variety of events or psychological factors 
that are unrelated to the intrinsic structure of the economy, yet, which influence the 
forecasts and actions of economic decision-makers. 
The analysis of this chapter is based on the rational expectations hypothesis. This 
hypothesis is based on the premise that agents know a great deal about their environment. 
Agents are assumed to have knowledge about demand and supply functions, how to 
extract present and future general equilibrium prices and about the stochastic law of 
motion of the economy over time. In practice it is hard to conceive how agents come to 
posses all this knowledge. Recent literature has focused on formulating a dynamic 
51 
and these two effects cannot be separated. We therefore examine how t&LUc (k,; IL,) and 
!&ow (k,; IL,) behaves when the level of relative risk aversion changes by considering the 
effect of a change in IL,+1 on (7 .a) and (7. b ). 
Both R;~c andR~~G are increasing functions in IL1+1 since (f.1) and (f.2) must hold in 
equilibrium. 
In section 3.5.2 we established that s;uc is a decreasing function in IL,+1 • We therefore 
have that t&LUc (k,; IL,) increases when the level of relative risk aversion increases. 
In section 3.4 we established that s~w can be either an increasing or a decreasing 
function in IL,+1 • It is therefore possible for the risk premia to become small or even 
negative in an OLG model when the level of relative risk aversion exceeds one and 
increases. One possible explanation for this is that young agents can substitute between 
random consumption tomorrow to non-random consumption today by varying savings 
and hence the proportion of fixed output that they can consume. This means that young 
consumers with a high second period relative risk aversion (greater than one) may require 
a lower rate of return to be induced to purchase the security. 
The difference between the two asset pricing models implies that observed values of risk 
premia may correspond to vastly different estimates of parameters, which include an 
analysis of investors' expectations that are imbedded in the intertemporal substitution 
effect found in the OLG model, but absent from the intertemporal substitution effect 
found in the Lucas model. A consequence of the analysis is a deeper understanding of the 
often heard premise that asset prices are volatile because investors have an inconsistent 
risk appetite, an observation that is rooted in the behavioural finance literature. The 
analysis does not assert that investors do not have an inconsistent risk appetite, a fact 
implicitly assumed in competitive equilibrium analysis. It does, however, indicate a need 
for a deeper analysis of investor expectations embedded in asset prices. 
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Equilibrium at each point in ti.me in a deterministic, infinitely lived, representative agent 
model requires that c, = x, ' where x, is the current, exogenously determined, per capita 
real output. Thus, u'(c,) is constant at time t. Therefore, s;uc fluctuates in response to 
changes in u'(c,+1) only, such that as;uc /ax,+1 = P u"(x,+1 )/u'(x,). Since uO is concave 
we have that as;uc /ax,+1 < 0 "f;/ A-;+ 1 • This. holds whether or not there is uncertainty in next 
period's output. 
The aggregate conditional risk premium Jrwc(k,;Ai) is (see Mathematical Appendix for 
derivation): 
Jrwc (k,;A-,) = [1 + R~uc (k,;A-1 )]x cov[- s,wc ;R1:n~c (k, ;A-,;A-1+1)j(k,;A-1 )] (7.a) 
where: 
i. JrLUC(k. A )=}i_LUC(k. A )-RLUC(k. A) t• l m,t t• t 1f t• l 
ii. li,;,~c(k;;i,)~ fR,!;~c(k,;A-,;~+1 )dF(A-1+1 ) 
. . . E 
3.5.3 Risk Premia in a OLG Model 




) = b + R~w (ki;A, )]xcov[-s~w ;R~~o (k1 ;A-,;A-1+1)i(k,;A-, )] (7.b) 
where: 
l. 1r0 LG (k,;A-,) = R~1;° (k,;A-, )-R~LG (k,;A-,) 
11. R~~0 (k,;A-,) = fR~~0 (k,;A-,;A,+1)dF(A-t+J, 
E 
3.5.4 A Comparison of the Two Models 
We wish to establish how Jrwc (k,; A-
1
) and 1r0w (k;; A-J behaves when the level of 
relative risk aversion changes. The relative curvature of the utility functions measures 
both relative risk aversion and intertemporal substitution when preferences are additive 
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i. ~ is the period discount factor such that 0 < ~ < 1; 
ii. s;uc is the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution in the Lucas type model; 
Define R~uc (k,; Ai) as the period risk free return corresponding to the Lucas type model: 
1 + Rwc(k. A,)= Pc(k,~1;A-,+1) =[/lfu'(c,+1)dF(A- )l-1 =[Js~ucdF(A- )l-1 
rf t' I LVC(k·/i,) '() l+l I 1+1 Pr1 ,, I E u c, E 
(5.a) 
This result follows by using an argument analogous to (f.l), which is derived under the 
Lucas type asset-pricing regime (see Donaldson and Mehra (1984)). 
We can find R~LG(k,;Ai), the risk free return in the OLG model, by using an argument 
equivalent to that used to derive (5.a) above: 
(5.b) 
3.5.2 Risk Premia in a Lucas Type Model 
We consider a simple version of the Lucas asset-prising model with one asset and 
independently identically distributed output shocks (see Donaldson and Mehra (1984)). 
The first order conditions are: 
I=/JJu'(c,+1)xpz(k1+i;A,+1)dF(A, )= Jswcx(l+Rwc(k·kA, ))xdF(). ) (6) '( ) (k . 1 ) l+l I m,I t • 1' t+I l+l 
E u c, Pi 1+1•/1..1+1 E 
Brock and Mirman (1971) show that a one good neoclassical model incorporating 
uncertainty in the production technology behaves analogously to the deterministic 
formulation of the model. Specifically, they show that optimal saving and consumption 
policies exist that are a function of existing capital . stock only. The remainder of this 
subsection will therefore analyse the properties of s,wc in the context of a deterministic 
model, i.e. a model with no uncertainty in the production technology. 
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3.5 Risk Premia 
In this section we show that the risk premia generated by an overlapping generations 
(OLG) model are fundamentally different from the risk premia determined within an 
infinitely lived representative consumer model. This difference arises because of the 
ambiguity resulting from income and substitution effects in an OLG model that is absent 
in an infinitely-lived, representative agent model such as the asset-prising model of 
Lucas. 
Since we shall be dealing with a single asset in each case, the return on the asset is also 
the return on the market, which we denote R;~c O and R~~a (·) respectively. 
3.5.1 The Risk Free Asset 
We introduce a financial instrument market where a riskless asset is traded, this asset 
being in zero net supply. Since we consider a single consumer economy and the net 
demand for this asset must be zero in equilibrium (it being in zero net. supply), its 
existence does not affect the equilibrium as long as price is obtained in the usual way 
from first order conditions of the single consumer. Since the Lucas model and the OLG 
model are fundamentally different we need to consider the pricing of the risk free asset 
for each asset-pricing regime. Let dp~UC(ki;l,) be the Lucas price at time t of a security 
which pays one unit of consumption next period when the state of nature is between 
Ai+i and ).,1+1 + dAi+i, then in equilibrium: 
dp~uc (k,; 2,) = ,Bu'(c,+1 (k,+1; A1+1))x prob[le (21+1; 2,+1 + dAi+Jll,] 
The price of the risk free security that pays a unit of consumption in every state next 
period _is therefore: 
p~uc (k,; A,)= pf u'\("~ dF( A,.,)= f s;"" dF(A,.,) 
E U c, E 
where: 
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the utility functions measures both risk aversion and intertemporal substitution when 
preferences are additive and that the two effects can not be separated. 
From equation 4 we write the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution in equilibrium 
as: s~LG(21 ;A,1+J= /Jv'(c;+J/u'(c:), where; 
} (A ) A ii. c, = w k,;Ai -ii 
Condition ii and iii above follow from the proof of theorem 1. By substituting conditions 
i to iii above into the equation representing the marginal rate of substitution we get: 
Sow (A ·,IL)= /Jv'(Ai+1i,q'Vi )) 
/ 1-J• I 1{A ~J u ,w-z, 
From the above we have that aas~LG = /J~{v'(c.~J.q'{i,)- v'~~Y··(c:l-i-(1-q'(i))}· 
A1+1 u \C1 I u c1 A1+1 
To understand the behaviour of this partial derivative consider the case as~w = O, i.e.: 
a21+1 
1 1_ u'(c:) v"k
2
+1) 1 _ '(· )- s: 
-,-(·)- -J'-2\X--:Hl'".J'fX/i..l+I -at+! ~q z, -ut+I 
q ll v \C1+1/ u \Ct I 
From this we see that if: 
i. q'(il) < ~+I then as~LG /aAi+t > 0 . The income effect of an increase in Ai+1 dominates 
the substitution effect and corresponds to a relative risk aversion coefficient greater' 
than one, i.e. v'(c;+i )/ u'(c:) > 1. This means the young are willing to save more by 
delaying consumption at time t, thereby accept more risk in terms of uncertain future 
consumption at time t+ 1. 
ii. q'(il) > 81+1 then as~LG /aAi+1 < 0 . The income effect of an increase in Ai+t is 
dominated by the substitution effect and corresponds to a relative risk aversion 
coefficient less than one, i.e. v'(c;+1 )/ u'(c:) < 1. This means the young are willing to 
save less and consume more at time t, thereby accept less risk in terms of uncertain 
future consumption at time t+ 1. 
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(c.4) 
Since i.9i, p1(k1;A.1 ) and p,(k,;Ai) are all positive, we have t.?2 > 0 and ~ > 0. Hence 
/ 1 = 1 and z, = k, ; individuals supply one unit of labour and kr units of capital 
inelastically. 
Again note that we can set pc (k,; A.1 ) = 1 without loss of generality: 
u'(c: )p, (k,; A.,)= P Jv'(c?+i )p 2 (k1+1; A.1+1 )dF(A.1+1) (4) 
E 
Equation (4) is the fundamental equation for the pricing of assets. It equates the loss of 
utility associated with carrying one additional unit of capital to the discounted expected 
utility of the resulting additional consumption next period. 
3.3.3 The Existence Theorem 
Theorem 1. Assuming assumptions 1 ~o 4 hold, there exists a competitive equilibrium 
solution to the p~oblem specified in section 3 .2.3 for each initial k0 > 0 . 
The proof of this theorem can be found in section 3.5.3 of the mathematical appendix. 
The proof of the existence theorem for a competitive equilibrium for an infinite-lived 
agent analogue. to tJ:ie _OLG model studied above follows along the same lines as that of 
theorem 1. 
3.4 The Marginal Rate of Intertemporal Substitution 
To understand the behaviour of the risk premium implied by this model relative to the 
risk premium of a Lucas asset-pricing model we need to examine the interrelationship 
between: i) the effect on saving of a change in the perceived riskiness of the environment, 
. and ii) the substitution of current non-stochastic consumption for future stochastic 
consumption. We examine this relationship by considering the effect of a change in A,+1 
oil the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution and note that the relative curvature of 
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P.(k,;A.1 ) = A.1q'(k1 ) 
p1 (k,; A.,) = A.1 [q(k, )-(k, )q'(k, )] 
c, =A.1q(k1 )-i1 
d, = A.,k,q'(k, )- i, 
3.3.2 The Decision Problem of the Representative Individual 
Section 3.2.3 expressed the individual's maximization problem as follows: 
V(k0 ;-1o)= max{u{c: )+fl E1lv(c?+1)D subject to: 
I. x, E Y(A.,) rt X(k,) 






Note that the individual's consumption in old age is a function of the amount of capital 
purchased by the firm in period t+ 1 and the price paid by the firm for the capital, i.e. 
c;+t = p,(k,+1; Ai+1)z,+1• The functional form of the individual's optimisation problem can 
therefore be written as: 
V (k,; A, ) = max { u(c: )+ p J v(p, (k,.,; A,., )z ,., )dF(A,.,)} subject to: 
1. Pc(k,;Ai)c, + P;(k1;A.Ji1 = P.(k,;Ai)z, + p1(k,;A.,)I;; 
iv. /1 ~1; 
(P.b.2) 
The first order conditions for a maximum are (see the Mathematical Appendix for proof): 
u'{c: )= Pc(k,;1,}z~; (c.l) 
'( i)P;(k,;1,) -pf'( 2 ) (k . 1 )d'v(1 )· u c, ( ) - V C1+1 'P z 1+1 • /1-1+1 r /1-1+1 ' 




3.3 Establishing the Existence of Equilibria 
We shall first examine the decision problem faced by the firm (section 3.3.1) and the 
individual (section 3.3.2) separately before establishing the existence of a competitive 
equilibrium (section 3.3.3). 
3.3.1 The Decision Problem of the Representative Firm 
The firm faces the static problem of maximiiing profits each period, i.e.: 
max{p(k,;ILJy,}= max{pc(k,;~)c, + P;(k1;1L;)i1 - p.(ic,;ILJz, - p1(k,;IL),} (P.a) 
The first order conditions for a maximum are (see the Mathematical Appendix for proof): 
i. p/k,;~) = P;(k,;~) 
ii. p,(k,;IL,) = IL1p.(k1;1L1 )q'(z1 /l1 ) 
iii .. p1 (k,; IL,)= 2,pc (k,; IL, )[q(z,/!1 )-{z, /!1 )q'(z,/!1 )] 
Since firms produce using a constant returns to scale technology we have that 
. max{p(k,;IL,)y,}=0, which yields p.(k1 ;~)c1 +p1 (k1 ;1LJ1. - p,(k1;1L1 )z1 - p1 (k1 ;~)!1 =0. 
This equation can be restated as follows: 
=> Pc(k,;~k = p1 (k1 ;~)!1 +{p,(k1 ;~)z1 - p1 (k1 ;~)i,}; 
::::> i.e. aggregate consumption is equal to wage plus dividend, where the value of the 
dividend equals d, = p,(k,;IL,)z, - p1(k1;1L)1 ; 
=> Substituting constraints i, ii and iii into this equation yields: 
=> Pc (k, ;IL, )c, = IL,pc (k, ;IL,)[q(z, /!, )-(z, /!Jq'(z 1 /l, )]+ 2,pc (k, ;J.1 )q'(z1 /l1 )--'Pc (k, ;21 )i, 
Note that we can set Pc(k,;2,)=1 without loss of generality. From section 3.3.2 below we 
. . 
know that in equilibirium one unit of labour and k, units of capital are supplied 
inelastically, i.e. /
1 




3.2.3 Defining Equilibrium 
Since the structure of the economy is invariant, economic agents solve a similar problem 
each period. All relevant information for decision-making in period t can be characterised 
by the double (k1;A,). 





), labour p1(k1;A,1 ), consumption pJk1;Ai) and investment goods P;(k,;A,J 
Consumers maximize their expected utility of consumption over feasible plans subject to 
their budget constraint. Expectations are assumed to be rational: prices and price 
distributions on which economic agents base their consumption/investment/production 
decisions are exactly the same as those that result as a consequence of their decisions 
through market clearing. 





), the law of motion of capital stock k,+1 =g(k,;Ai) and the 
conditional shock distribution function F(A,1 ) is sufficient for forming predictive 
distributions of future prices and selecting optimal current actions. 
From the above we can summarise the problem faced by the individual as; 
V(k0 ;Ao)= max{u(c: )+ P E1lv(c12+1)ll subject to: 
i. x, e Y(A,1 )nX(k1 ) 
11. k1+1 = i1 for all t and ko and Ao given. 
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3.2.2 Preferences 
The young at time t maximize a two period time additive utility function 
µ(c:;c;)= u(c:)-f- P E1lvk2+i)J (2) 
by deciding how much to consume and how much to save from their current period 
wages. Notation is defined as follows: 
1. E, denotes the expectations operator conditional on information at time t, denoted Q1; 
ii. ~ is the period discount factor such that 0 < ~ < 1; 
Note that capital purchased by firms, Zr. is constrained by capital held by the old, k1• Thus 
the young's period t consumption possibility set is defined by: 
(3) 
In each period the young selects a commodity vector x = (c;-l;-z;i) from X(k,) such 
that the two period utility function defined above is maximized. Note that the amount of 
capital held by the old, k1+J. at the beginning of the next sale period equals the amount of 
new investment/saving made during youth, i1, such ~at k1+1 ~ i, specifies how capital 
holdings depend upon the prior period's decision. Furthermore, consumption in old age, 
c;+1 , depends entirely on the amount of capital demanded by the firm, z1+1, and the price 
obtained on the sale of capital to the firm. 
Assumption 4. The following conditions on uO and v(.) hold: i) u'(c) > 0 and v'(c) > 0, 
ii) u"(c) < 0 and v"(c) < 0, iii) u and v three times continuously, iv) limu'(c) = oo and 
c-+0 
limv'(c)=ooandv) limu'(c)=O and limv'(c)::::o·. 




= c: + c; represents the aggregate consumption at time t such that c: and 
c;+I denotes consumption in youth and old age respectively. 
Assumption 2. The function q(.) is. homogenous across all firms, increasing 
(i.e. q'(.) > 0 ), strictly concave (i.e. q"(.) < 0 ), and twice continuous differentiable and 
bounded with q(O) = 0. We also have that: i) limq'(z) = oo , and ii) limq'(z) = 0. To 
z~O z~~ 
clarify notation note that k1 denotes capital held by the old and available for sale to firms 
in period t, while z1 denotes the capital firms actually choose to purchase in period t. In 
equilibrium we must have that kr = z1. 
Assumption 3. The production shock A, is independently and identically distributed each 
period over a finite positive range E = I&; 2 J where & > 0 and 2 < oo. The cumulative 
distribution function of F(.) of A. is stationary and satisfies: i) F(A.) ~ 0 A, s; & , and 
ii)F(A.)=1 ,.t,;:::2. 
The firm has already observed the production shock A, at the time the production decision 
is made. 
The firm's static problem is therefore solved by choosing a commodity vector 
y = (c;-l;-z;i) from Y(A.) to maximise period profits. Since firms produce using a 
constant returns to scale technology they have zero profits and therefore zero value in 
equilibrium. It is however possible to relate the firm's value to those observed in the 
capital markets by defining the value of the capital purchased at the beginning of the 
period by the firm to be its pre-dividend value, denoted VF;,.-a;v, and the value of the 
capital sold after production to be the ex-dividend value of the firm, denoted VF~-a;v. The 
period dividend is therefore denoted VF;re-div.- VF.~-a;v. 
Since firms liquidate at the end of each period there is no capital accumulation such that 
period t production will not affect future production possibilities. 
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The economy is assumed .to produce only two goods: 1) a non-storable consumption 
good, and 2) an investment (capital) good. Af the beginning of each period t firms 
observe the shock to productivity A., , and purchase capital and labour from individuals at 
competitively determined rates. Both capital and labour are used to produce the two 
output goods. The firm is assumed to liquidate at the end of each period, and therefore 
faces a static problem - maximise period profits. 
For every t ~ 0 there exists a new fixed-size population of identical individuals who live 
for two periods and die at the end of t + 1. Each generation can only produce in their 
youth (i.e. in period t) whilst consuming in both their youth and old age (i.e. in period t 
and t+ 1 ). The young do not own any capital. The. young use their wages to buy the 
consumption good c, and the investment good i, at the end of the first period whilst the 
investment good is used as capital k1+1 available for sale to firms in their old age. !he old 
use the proceeds from the sale of the investment good to buy the consumption good Ct+ I· 
An old generation is assumed to exist at time t = 0 that is endowed with 0 < k; < oo units 
of capital. 
3.2.l Technology 
The model uses a simplifying assumption for_ the production technology that can easily be 
relaxed: 
~.ssumption 1. Firms ~e assumed to produce under stochastic constant returns to scale. 
This assumption is usually not satisfied when a factor such as land is owned rather than 
rented by the firm and therefore not included in the commodity vector. In general, a 
factor can be added to the technology vector. such that the resulting technology set 
displays constant returns to scale. See Mas-Colell (1995) p134 proposition 5.b.2. 
The firm's production possibility set Y(A.) is defined by: 
Y(A.) = {(c,;-1,;-z,;iJe R4 : c,,l,,z,~i, ~ O;c, +i,::; l,q(z,/l,)A.,} (1) 
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at the time of the trade (the unborn future and expired past generations). We shall see that 
this market friction plays an important role in the behaviour of the OLG asset pricing 
model relative to the frictionless Lucas asset-pricing model. 
Another advantage of using an OLG model is that it allows one to better model 
intertemporal production and consumption for agents with a finite life expectancy. This is 
an important benefit as infinitely lived agents can take advantage of any price 
discrepancy by simply waiting long enough. By introducing death into the model one 
restricts the extent to which this strategy applies, i.e. death limits the scope for arbitrage . 
. We avoid the issue of asset bubbles by constructing a model economy in which 
L1+
1 
= L, 'fi/ t. An asset bubble occurs when the price of an asset is not equal to its market 
fundamental. Tirole (1985) shows that a bubble cannot occur on the stock market price 
within an OLG framework if lim L,+1 / L, :::;; 1. We impose this constraint on our analysis 
t--+oo 
as we are concerned with relatively short-tenn volatility, rather than asset-mispricing that 
result from the demographics of the model economy. 
3.2 Model Specification 
The economy introduced in this section has a single nonstorable consumption good and 
no capital accumulation. An agent can· provide for future consumption only through the 
purchase of an asset today .. The model presented here is the overlapping generations 
analogue of the Lucas asset-pricing model studied by Donaldson and Mehra (1984). The 
model by Donaldson and Mehra (1984) fonns the basis of the Lucas asset-pricing model 
studied here. Donaldson and Mehra (1984) provide an existence theorem for a very 
general class of infinite-lived agent economies with correlated stochastic production 
shocks. In this chapter we study a simple case where production shocks are independently 
arid identically distributed. 
Consider an infinite horizon competitive economy consisting of a successive number of 
generations at discrete points in time, i.e. t = 0, 1, ... , = . 
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beliefs held by other market participants. This result has profound implications for agents 
trading in the market. Rather than only try and learn m, they may elect to learn what the 
distribution of beliefs is that determines market pricing at a point in time. 
5.2.4 The Axioms of Rationality 
For notational convenience we define the set Bt = {Qe 9t(II)n ~ >1< (e): SE 3,Q(S)> o}. 
We are now in a position to specify the axioms that a rational choice of q must satisfy: 
Axiom 1: (Compatibility with the data) An agent forms belief q with 9t(Il)n~*(e) as 
its support. 
Axiom 2: (Continuity with respect to the data) If SE 3 and m(S) > 0 then q(B;) > 0. 
Axiom 1 requires that an agent form a belief q that places probability 1 on 
9t(Il) n ~ * (e). Axiom 2 further restricts the allowable q's in 9t(Il) n ~ * {e) to those 
with positive probability when SE 3 and m(S) > 0. Axiom 2 ensures that if a finite 
dimensional event S is observed infinitely often, thereby generating positive relative 
frequency; then one cannot be certain that S cannot occur from today's perspective. This 
prevents the degeneracy of beliefs to a single probability mass point when m gives the 
point a non-zero probability. 
Whilst axiom 1 states that agents can hold diverse beliefs that are consistent with the 
.data; axiom 2 ensures that beliefs are uncertain by excluding beliefs that can be 
represented as a single probability mass point. By combining axioms 1 and 2 we find that 
the theory of Rational Beliefs (RB) ensures that agents can hold diverse beliefs and that 
uncertainty exits over the beliefs held by agents, i.e. agents do not know the demand and 
supply functions of all other agents. 
We can conclude that since 1) agents do not know the true probability law II, 2) the 
dynamic system (.n,3,Il,T) is stable and not ·stationary and 3) agents do not know the 
demand and supply functions of all other agents it follows that RB theory does not 
generally lead to a Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE). 
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As a consequence of axiom's 1 and 2 we find that endogenous uncertainty, defined as the 
price volatility caused by the distribution of agents' beliefs, is non-negligible. The 
existence of endogenous uncertainty is confirmed in section 5.3.2 through an application 
of the implicit function theorem. We therefore conclude that the price-formation process 
of an RB economy is necessarily more volatile than in an RE economy. This follows 
from the fact that in an RB economy uncertainty results from both endogenous and 
exogenous phenomena, with endogenous uncertainty ensured to exist by axiom 2, whilst 
in an RE economy uncertainty results only from exogenous phenomena. 
5.2.5 The Main Theorem 
Theorem 6. Given a dynamical system (n, g, TI, T), let an agent form a rational belief q 
that satisfies axioms 1 and 2. Then q e <P(~(TI) n rp * (t: )) and there exists a probability 
Qe ~(II)nrp*(e), which .is the expectation under q in the sense of equation (8). 
Further, there exists probabilities Qm and Q0 on (n,.s3) and a constant 0<Ag:::;1 such 
that: 
1. Q has a unique representation Q = A,QQm + (1- A.g }Q0 where Q"' and m are 
equivalent while Q0 and m are singular; 
ii. (n, .s3, Qm, T) and (n, .s3, Q0 , T) are stable with stationary measures Q"' and Q 0 that 
have the property that; 1) Qm and m are equivalent, 2) Q 0 << m, i.e. Q 0 is 
absolutely continuous with respect to m, and 3) Q"' and Q 0 are weakly uniform 
stable probability measures; 
m. There exits regular versions of the conditional probabilities Q,, m, and Q1° and 
densities 
dm dQO 
l//m = dQ 'lfo = dQ that . satisfy m a.e. for Se.s3' 
Q, (SJI,).,. A.Qm, (sJI, )l!f m (11 ) + (1-A.g }Q,0 (SJI, )1//0 (I,); (9) 
Note that Q1 (sjI,) represents the probability of event S occurring at time t 
conditional on the history 11 up to time t 
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Conversely, for any Q, Qm and Q0 satisfying conditions i to iii there exists a rational 
belief q e <P(9t(TI) n rp * (e)) th~t represents Q. 
Proof. See the Mathematical Appendix for details. 
We use the conditional probability representation of RB, i.e. equation (9), in theorem 6 to 
show both why and how agents using the same data end-up with different RB. From 
theorem 1 we see that in trying to learn TI , agents learn m , which is an empirically 
derived stationary probability measure. From theorem 6 we have that Q0 is a weakly 
uniform stable probability measures and not stationary, which is compatible with the 
stationary measure m. The singular measure Q0 may therefore represent agents' beliefs 
in structural changes. An agent's level of confidence in m, given the agent's belief in the 
possibility of a structural change measured by Q0 , is measured by the subjective 
parameter A,Q • This means that the less confident an agent is in the nature of the world 
measured by stationary probability m, the more weight is put on the agent's belief in 
structural change which is represented by Q0 • 
The practical implication of theorem 6 is that we can select beliefs that are biased in the 
short-run relative to the stationary probability generated by the data. However, the 
rationality requirement implies that these biases average out over the agent's investment 
horizon. This idea reflects the fact that the timing of events matters in terms of the 
probabilities that are attached to the events in non-stationary systems. 
5.2.6 A Note on Ergodic Dynamical Systems 
For . the sake of generality the analysis has assumed that the true dynamic system 
(n., 3, TI, T) is not necessarily ergodic. However, in the case where the dynamical system 
is ergodic we find that the limits of the relative frequencies are independent of x. This 
result is summarised in Corollary 1 
Corollary 1. If (0.,3,TI, T) is ergodic then for all Se 3 we have m(Slx)= m(S) = mn(S) 
TI and mn a.e .. 
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Proof. See the Mathematical Appendix for details. 
If (n, 3, II, T) is ergodic then it follows from definition 2 that the dynamic system 
(n, 3, II, T) is SAMS. We then apply the Ergodic Decomposition Theorem 7.4.1 of Gray 
(2001) and observe that limiting sample averages will behave as if they were produced by 
a stationary and ergodic dynamic system. Thus, (n, 3, m(. Ix), T) is stationary and ergodic 
mn a.e. if (n, 3, II, T) is ergodic. 
Central to the above analysis is the implicit assumption that agents can observe only one 
realization of the dynamical system. The Ergodic Decomposition Theorem used above 
then states that even if (n, 3, II, T) is not ergodic, the single realization x and all its 
iterates rn x will belong to one ergodic component of Q which is an invariant set. This 
means that we might as well restrict the space Q to the ergodic component that contains 
the single observed realization x, denoted F. The observed dynamical system is then 
(F,SF,IIF,T),where SF restricts the space g toFand ITF restricts fl to SF. We then 
have that the observed dynamical system (F,SF,IIF, T) is ergodic. 
From the above we see that if the observed .data is a single realisation of the dynamical 
system then we can assume that the system is ergodic such that m(Slx) = m(S) and 
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5.3 Endogenous Uncertainty in a Short-run Walrasian Monetary 
Equilibrium Model 
5.3.1 Model Specification and Existence. 
In chapter 4 section 4.3 we specified a short-run Walrasian monetary equilibrium model 
in which equilibrium is a function of an agent's 1) money stock, 2) endowment of 
consumption goods and 3) future price expectations: In chapter 3 we did not address the 
issue of how price expectations are formulated as the analysis of this mooel was primarily 
concerned with the Intertemporal Substitution effect. We now extend our analysis to 
proving the existence of endogenous uncertainfy. The remainder of this chapter will use a 
·modified version of the model specified in chapter 4 sections 4.3. We use the same 
notation for convenience. 
The model is extended to the more general case where agents trade in current spot 
markets based on their beliefs of future prices and endowments of consumption goods. 
This means that agents form expectations about: 
i. The endowment of consumption goods that will be received in the next period, i.e. 
k! L1 d , which is a function of current and past endowments, and 
11. The future price of consumption goods, i.e. {p,! (p: )L1 · d, which is a function of 
current and past market clearing prices. 
Let the vector of exogenous variables be denoted by e, E E c R1d ' where e, = (S-/1, ... 'sid) 
and denote the vector of endogenous variables by p: e !1-1 • Observe that we make the 
simplifying assumption that each agent observes the endowment of every agent in the 
economy. This is a benign assumption; an agent can glean no additional information from 
knowing the current and past endowments of other agents, which is reflected in the 
market-clearing price. 
Each agent holds a rational belief q
0
e q:>(9t(TI)ntp*(e)), which is expressed as a 
conditional probability denoted Q10 by using theorem 6 part iii. 
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The explicit statement of an agent's belief system allows us to write an agent's period 
two expectations as i) (,~ : Q10 ~ ( c R
1 and ii) 'P? : Q,0 ~ 1:1-1 , where ( represents the 
space of possible endowments. This is more general than the assumption that future price 
expectations only depend on current prices adopted in chapter 3. It is necessary to 
demonstrate that the existence theorem formulated in chapter 3 still applies to the 
extension of the OLG model used here. 
Let W = Ex Y c Rk and define the joint dynamical system (w~, p(w~ 1 II, T). In the 
relatively simple OLG model used here we have that: 
i. Each agent's past consumption and savings decisions are represented in aggregate by 
his time t stock of money, i.e. {m:
0
1=1 , and 
ii. Each agent's belief system {Q,J~=I influences current pnces p, through his 
expectation of future prices and endowments, since uncertainty with respect to current 
prices is resolved by trading in the current spot market. 
This observation implies that the current realisation of this dynamical system, denoted by 
w, , is a sufficient statistic for describing equilibrium in this system. We are now in a 
position to specify the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility of agent a, which expresses his 
beliefs of the future: 
u! &:a, w, ) = Ju! &:a jwt+l )dQ,0 ( w,, W1+1) . 
Notation is clarified as follows: 
. 1(.11 ) {!'{_.1 )' b" 2A2< 2j'2 I h"h 1. U0 \)'10 W 1+I =maxua\J'ta\J'ta•Wt+I) SU~ect to p1 x10 _p1 ~ 10 +m10 , W lC represents 
the period-1 utility conditional on the realisation w,+1 in the next period, 
ii. Q,)w,, w1+1) is the probability of realising w,+1 given the agent observes w, in the 
current period, and 
••• If •• I ) 
111. U a \J'1a' W, is the expected period- I utility if an agent observes w, in the current 
period. 
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Now,. from· theorem 5 ·show that· for any q
0
·e <P(9t(II)n~*(c)) there exists 
Q
0 
e 9t(Il) n ·~ * (£), which is compact in the topology of weak convergence by 
proposition 1. Since Q10 c Q0 , it follows that Q0 is compact in the topology of weak 
convergence. This means that the introduction of beliefs formulated along the lines 
developed in section 5.2 allows us to drop assumption (a.7). This then also shows one of 
the biggest flaws in the development of the Kurz framework of rational beliefs; each 
agent holds beliefs that give rise to bounded expectations, which means that the range of 
variation in each trader's expectations cannot be too large when p: varies in !1-1 • 
The formulation above specified the following conditional maximisation problem: 
( c.1) Maximise u! {y:
0
, w1) subject to: 
m1 >O· 11. ta - ' 
( 3) . < 0 ... -0 c. . Jr, _ , q,z, - . 
The maximization problem stated in (c.1) can then be written as· .an abstract' economy 
denoted by E~LG = [r;:,. .. , r;~, 41 (y,\ ~ .. ., 4A.Yf J P,1], where: 
i. ji~ e {r;: x ... x YJ_1 x YJ+z x ... x Y,~ x P,1} represents the strategies chosen by all agents 
other thanj, and 
,1 (,,-,l) { 11 1 yz 1 1 l < lj"I ~ } • h d ' C. h' h ' 11. L'1J V'tJ = ytJ ytJ e j/'p1x10 + m10 - Pi•:ua + m10 IS t e omam.1rom w IC agent J can 
select his strategies given the strategies chosen by other agents .. 
Existence then follows in the usual way by applying the Arrow and Debreu (1954) 
existence proof to this abstract economy. 
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5.3.2 Existence of Endogenous Uncertainty. 
The existence of a short-run Walrasian monetary equilibrium implies that we have Jt = 0, 
where Jt = (z,7]) = (0,0) = 0 with i =:~::>a and 7] = L17a representing aggregate excess 
a a 
demand for goods and money respectively in equilibrium. We therefore have the 
following system of equations in equilibrium {za(p:; t9, )1=1' (10) 
where ~ = ( t9i,, .. . , t9h,) denotes the set of parameters for the system 
and ~a= {m~,?!,Q,J:=1 denotes the set of parameters of agent a at time t. The system 
represented by (10) is therefore a system with d equations, l-1 endogenous price variables 
and 3 x d parameters. 
In order to show that changes in agent's beliefs generate endogenous uncertainty we use 
Sard's theorem (see Debreu 1970) combined with the Implicit Function Theorem. The 
Implicit Function Theorem used here is from Mas-Colell p941. 
Let U c Ra such that U is open and let F : U ~ Rb , where F is a continuously 
differentiable function. Sard's theorem reads as follows: 
Proposition 3. (Sard's Theorem) If all the partial derivatives of F to the c1h order 
included, where c > max( 0, a - b), exist and are continuous, then the set elements of Rb 
for which the Jacobian of F vanishes has Lebesque measure zero in Rb . 
Note that in the context of the model used here we have that a= l -1 since p: E t:J.-1 , Fis 
equivalent to the aggregate excess demand for goods denoted z and b = 1 . We now 
introduce assumption (a.7): 
(a. 7) The partial derivatives of z to the cth order included, where c > max( 0, l -1), exist 
and are continuous. 
This is a simplifying assumption made to get round the technicalities surrounding the 




The combination of assumption (a.7) and proposition 3 allow us to invoke the implicit 
function the'orem, which 'states that: 
i. There exist l-1 continuously differentiable implicitly, defined functions such that 
vn(i9)=p1n Vn=l, ... ,/-1,where P1n denotesthen1helementof p 1 ,and 
ii. The first order effe9ts of the parameters on the equilibrium point. p, are given by 
This shows that endogenous uncertainty does indeed exist and influences current price 
p: . At this point it is clear that one cannot say tnuch more about the implications of· 
endogenous uncertainty for the price formation process unless very specific assumptions 
are made about the period-1 utility function u!O or z
0
• 
5.3.3 Correlated Price Expectations. 
Of interest is the impact of a change in period-2 price expectations on the period-1 price 
p: . The analysis of the intertemporal substitution effect in chapter 4 shows that this 
impact is ambiguous because the income and substitution effects will be working against 
each other (see also Grandmont (1985)). this ambiguity is resolved by considering the 
concavity of an agent's utility function. Consider the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative 





represents the period-1 savings of agent a, and 
II. u:1 and u;1 are the first and second order derivatives of the period-I utility function. 
Arrow (1970) proves that the boundedness of the utility function is maintained if 
rR (s:
0
) = 1 when s:
0 
~ oo or s:
0 
~ 0. This means that the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion should broadly be around 1, with rR(s:J< 1 for low wealth arid rR(s:J> 1 for 
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high wealth. Grandmont (1985) proves that an agent's period-1 excess demand is a 
decreasing function of his period-2 price expectations if rR(s:J:s; 1, i.e. the substitution 
effect dominates. This is equivalent to the "own-price-effect" dominating the "diagonal-
price-effect", i.e.: 
I. ~I is the effect of a change in the price of good i On the demand for good i > and 
dP1 
ii. :X1 is the effect of a change in the price of good} on the demand for good i. 
0PJ 
Again, this is nothing other than the law of demand, i.e. tip · !lx < 0 where 
p = (Pw . .,pJ and x = (xw . .,xJ (Mas-Colell p32). 
In short; specific assumptions about the concavity of agents' utility functions are needed 
in order to show how changes in peiod-2 price expectations affect period-1 prices. 
However, note that in the short-run there is no income effect in financial markets such 
that the impact of a change in period-2 price expectations on period-1 prices can be 
analysed in a direct way. 
The idea of correlated expectations is illustrated through two examples set within the 
framework of the simple exchange economy defined above. 
Example 1. 
Consider a generation for which period-2 price expectations instantaneously change as 
follows, all else being equal: 
1. Expectations are initially pair wise uncorrelated such that 1 p,~ :t='p~ Vi :t= j . 
2. Agents then decide that period-2 prices will be higher than their initial expectation 
h h 2-2 1-2 \-J• sue t at p,; >> Pti v z • 
Observe that an equilibrium price exists for each set of expectations, denoted 1 P: and 
2 P: respectively. It follows that 1p: <<2P: if rR(s:J::;; 1 Va. 
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Example 2. · 
Consider a generation for which period-2 price expectations instantaneously change as 
follows, all else being equal: . 
3. Expectations are initially pair wise uncorrelated such that 1 p,;=¢: 1p~ Vi# j. 
4. Agents then decide that period-2 prices will be different from their initial expectation 
h h 1 2~2 1~21 o~· sue t at p,;-Pi; > v z. 
Let the equilibrium price associated with each set of expectations be 1 ft: and 2 ·I p, 
respectively. In this case nothing can be said about the impact of the change in 
expectations because they do not change in a correlated way either up or down, even if 
rR (sJa) ~ 1 Va . 
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5.4 Summary Remarks and Consolation 
The research of Kurz (1994) reviewed here contains several important achievements. The 
first is technical. By showing that stability is a necessary condition for a dynamic system 
to have the W AMS property, Kurz is able to prove the following set of results: 
i. the frequencies with which events occur in a stable dynamic system converge in the 
limit to a stationary probability measure, 
ii. a stable dynamic system has the W AMS property such that the arithmetic means of a 
sequence of probability measures converges in the limit, and most importantly, 
iii. the stationary probability measure derived from the data is equivalent to the stationary 
probability measure derived from the W AMS property, which is unrelated to the data. 
An important achievement is the insight that agents can express their uncertainty about 
the true probability distribution that generates the data as uncertainty about the beliefs 
held by other market participants. This is a powerful concept: an agent can compare the 
distribution of beliefs that currently influence the price formation process with his own. 
He will trade if the observed distribution of beliefs is correlated in a way that is 
significantly biased relative to his beliefs. This means that he will only act when he 
perceives that observed beliefs are correlated and biased relative to his own in an extreme 
way, as uncorrelated beliefs have an ambiguous effect on the price formation process. 
The theory of rational beliefs ensures that the range of variation in each trader's 
expectations is not too large when w, varies in W , as each trader selects his rational 
belief from a compact set. Whilst this deals with the technicalities associated with 
proving the existence of the short-run Walrasian equilibrium in an elegant way, it does 
rule out the possibility of biased expectations impacting the current price formation 
process in a significant way. However, axiom's 1 and 2 ensure that agents can hold 
diverse beliefs and that uncertainty exits over the beliefs held by agents. A consequence 
of this is that endogenous uncertainty is non-negligible, which leads to the conclusion 
that the price-formation process of a rational belief economy is necessarily more volatile 
than in a rational expectations economy. 
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Finally, the compactness of the . set of· rational beliefs follows from two restrictions, 
specifically: 
i. Agents are required to assign a non-zero probability to all combinations of events that 
may conceivably occur over his investment horizon, 
n. Such that the biases inherent in an agent's belief system average out over his 
investment horizon. 
It is plausible that a rational agent will learn from the mistakes implied by biased beliefs 
in such a way that he will compensate for them. However, requiring him to express a 
view, which is unbiased on average, on all combinations of events that may conceivably 
occur over his investment horizon is a tall order. Presented in this way one may conclude 
that the requirements of the theory of rational beliefs is as onerous, as that of the rational 
expectations framework. 
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5.5 Mathematical Appendix 
5.5.1 Proof of Theorem 1. 
=> Define the set s E g as s =Ax fI x = ~E nl(xo; ... ;xr)E xr+1,xj ERK for j > t} for 
r+I 
t;::: O; 
::::> Observe that A is a measurable rectangle, i.e. a rectangle with rational endpoints, and 
that AE gr; 
::::> Let 5r denote the countable collection of all such sets in gr and gr= a(5r ); 
::::>Define the field 5=(Qgr)={F;;i=l,2, ... } as the collection of all subsets gr en, 
and note that the field 5 is a semi-algebra; 
::::> From the construction of 5 we have that g = a(5 ); 
::::> There must exist C; E g such that i) IT ( C;) = 1 and ii) m(F; Ix) exists IT a.e. 
~ 
=> Now define C = n C; . It follows that IT( C) = 1 since all the sets C are necessarily 
i=I 
independent such that m(F;lx) exists IT a.e. V XE C, F; E 5; 
=> Let An E 5Vn=1,2, ... such that An+! c ~; 
::::> Observe that the ~ are measurable rectangles and that dim(An+i) <dim( An) such that 
i) lim~ =0 and ii) n ~ =0; 
n~oo n 
::::> We can then use theorems 0.2 and 0.4 of Walter (1982) pages 4 and 5 to show that 
there exists a unique extension of m(· Ix) , denoted m(· Ix), on (n; g) where m(· Ix) is a 
countably additive probability measure on the a-field g for each xE C; 
=> From the definition of stability we have lim mn (six)= m(Slx) IT a.e. v x E c' s E g 
n->~ 
such that m(r-1Slx)= m(Slx) IT a.e. V xE C, SE 5; 
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=> This property is inherited by m(·lx) such that the dynamic.system (3;3;m(.jx~T) is 
measure preserving and hence stationary (see Petersen p7); 
5.5.2 Proof of Theorem 2 
Part 1: Show that a Stable System is WAMS 
=> Let Se 3 be a cylinder; 
D fi 1 (Tk )-{1 if xe r-ks => e me s x - k o if xe r- s 
n-1 n-1 n-1 
=> ~ In(r-ts)=; L f1s(rkx)rr(dx)= ff~)s(Tkx)n(dx)= f mn(sjx)rr(dx); 
k=O k=O '1 '1 k=O '1 . 
·=> Taking limits on both sides yields f m(Sjx)n(dx) = mn (S); 
'1 
=> Stability implies W AMS;. 
Part 2: Show W AMS implies Stability 
=> Assume that (Q;3;Il;T) is W AMS; 
=> Note that if a system is stable we have that inf mn(sjx)= supmn(slx)= mn(slx) in the 
limit (see definition 1); 
n~ -~ 
=> Define i) g (x)= liminf ;In{r-ks) and ii) gs(x)= limsup;In{r-ks); 
-S n-+co n~oo 
k=O k=O 
=> Since we have that i) g (x) ~ g s(x) and ii) g (x) ~ 0 it is sufficient to show that 
-S -S 
g (x)~ g8(x)I1 a.e.; -S 
n-1 
=> W AMS implies that lim ~LIT (r-k S) = mn (S) exists; 
n-+~ k=O 
=> Sufficient to show that fgs(x)IT(dx)~ mn(S)~ fKs(x)IT(dx); 
'1 '1 
n-1 
=> Since gs (x) ~ 1, for any given e > 0 there exits n such that ; L n(r-k S) ~gs (x )- e ; 
k=O 
=> Let !'.!(x) be the smallest integer for which this holds; 





::::> Since t!(x) < oo there exits N such that rr({x: t!(x) > N }) = Irr({x: t!(x) = k }) ::;; £, 
k=N+I 
~ 
where the inequality follows from the fact that lim Irr({x: t!(x) = k }) = 0; (3) 
N->~k=N+I . 
::::> Observe that although t!(x) is chosen to be the smallest n for which (1) holds there 
may be {x} such that !:!(x) ~ oo and the RHS of (2) becomes unbounded. We collect 
all such bad sets in the set B where B = {x : !:!(x) > N}; 
=> By construction of equations (1) and (2) we have thatx determines t!(x), such that if 
XE Be then TkxE B0 k=l,2, .. .,!:!(x)-1; 
::::> To handle the case where x E B we define: 
i) ~(x)= {1.(x) . if xe B and 
1 if XE B 
.. ) ~( ) {!:!(x) if xe B 
11 n x = · 
- 1 if XE B ' 
=> Now, if XE B then g
8




=> Now, if xe B then equation (5) is equivalent to (2) since 
x&TkxE Be k=l,2, ... ,!:!(x)-1; 
=> Chose L such that 1f: < £ ; 
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~ Define nk (x) inductively such that i) n0 (x) = 0 and ii) nk (x) = nk-i (x) + ff(rnk-1 (x)x) 
and let k(x) be the largest k such that nk (x) ~ L- l; 
(6) 
~ Applying the bound in (5) to each of the k(x) blocks in the inner sum in (6) yields 
~Note that LE (nk(x},nk+1(x)] since nk+1(x)=nk(x)+ff(rk(x)x) and that ff(x)=[l;N] 
such that L-nk(x)~ nk+1 (x)-nk(x)~ N -l; 
L-1 
~ g8 (x)~l~ L gs(T1x)~N-l; 
l=ndx) 
~ Now, summing the right hand bound of the inner sum in equation (7) yields: 
~nk-1 (x)-1 k(x) nk-1 (x)-1 k(x) 
L L g8 (T1x)~ L L ~(T1x)+ l:[nk(x)-nk_1(x)]c 
k=ll=nk_1(x) k=I l=nk-1(x) k=I 
nk-I (x)-1 
= L ~(T1x)+LE 
l=l 
nk-l (x)-1 
~ L ~(T1x)+Le 
1=0 
~ Combining (8), (9) and ( 6) we get 
L-1 nk-I (x)-1 L-1 
:Li,(T1x)~ L Is(T1x)+Le+(N-l) ~ L Is(T1x)+Le+(N -1); 
l=O 1=0 1=0 
~ Take expectation w.r.t. non both sides of inequality (10) yields: 
L-1 L-1 
L fg,(T1x)n(dx)~L Jis(T1x)n(dx)+Le+(N-l); 
l=O n l=O n 
~ By applying (4.a) and (3) to ~(x)n(dx)= ~(x)n(dx)+ ~(x)n(dx) we get: 







J1s(x)TI(d.x)= J1s(x)TI(d.x)+ J1s(x)TI(dx)= J18 (x)TI(dx)+ J1n(dx) 
Q B B' B' B 
~ fl8 (x)TI(d.x)+ TI(B) 
Q 
(12) 




~ Inserting (12) into (13) gives L fg,(r1x)n(dx)~In(r1x)+2Le+(N-l); (13) 
1=0 Q 1=0 
~ Since gs (x) is invariant and lf: < £ , by dividing ( 13) by L we get: 
L-l 
fg, (x )n(dx) ~ ± In(r1x)+3e 
Q 1=0 
~ Since S is a cylinder and (Q;5;TI;T) is WAMS by assumption we have that 
fg,(x)TI(dx)~m0 (x); 
Q 
~ We can show that m0 (S) ~ J~8 (x)TI(dx) by using a proof similar to that used above; 
Q 
~ Thus we have shown that if (Q;5;TI;T) is WAMS then (Q;5;TI;T) is stable; 
5.5.3 Proof of Theorem 3. 
Part 1: We first proof part ii of theorem 3. 
(14) 
~ Note that the sets rk S have the following properties: i) rk S c Q and ii) 
rjsnr;S=O; 
~ m0 is an countably additive probability measure on fs ; 
~ We use the Caratheodory extension theorem to uniquely extend m0 to a measure m0 
on (n;5); 
~ Define for SE g m(S)= Jm(Slx)n(dx), which is a finitely additive measure on g; 
Q 
~ Define for SE 5 m(S) = Jm(Slx )n(dx) which is a countably additive measure on 5; 
Q 
~ From proposition 2 we have that m(S)= mn(S)= mn(s)vs E g; 
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=> Since the extension mil is unique we have .m(S) = Jm(Sjx)n(dx) = mll(s) vs E 3; 
Q 
=> From the defmition of W AMS we have that mil is invariant w.r.t. T, i.e~ 
mll(T-kS)=mll(S). This property is inherited by mil such that {0.;3;mll;T) is 
stationary; 
=> Observe that m( C) = 1 since: 
1. m(S)= fm(Sjx)n(dx)VSe: 3; 
Q 
1i. m(Sjx) = 0 for x e C and Se 3 ; 
111. m(njx) = 1 V x, which follows from a) m(Cjx) = 1 for x e C and b) ii above; 
=> From proposition 2 it follows that mil (C)= 1 such that ll(C) = m(C) = mll(C)= 1; 
=>From part 1 of the proof of proposition 1 we have that Jm(Sjx)n(dx)=mll(S). We 
Q 
will now show that this relation holds using mil instead ofll; 
7 Since mil is invariant in T we have that mil (r-k S) = mil (s) \7' Se 3 ; 
7 Since m(· Ix) is a unique extension of m( Ix) we can rewrite the above relation-as 
=> mll(S)=m(S)= fm(Sjx)mll(dx); 
Q 
Part~: We now proofpart i of theorem 3. 
=> mil is strong asymptotically mean stationary since mil (S) is stationary for Se 3; 
=> From proposition 2 it follows that (0.;3;mll;T) is strongly stable; 
=> limmn(slx) exits mil a.e. VSe 3; 
n->~ 
=> limmn(Slx)=m(Sjx) exits mil a.e. VSe 3 since m(Slx) is a unique extension on 
n->~ 
{0.;3) of m(Sjx); 
=> Denote by mn (SI S')(x) the conditional probability of mil given the . a-field of 
invariant events; 
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=> By theorem 6.6.l of Gray (2001) we have that mn (s I s)(x) = m(Slx) mn a.e. 
VSe3; 
5.5.4 Proof of Theorem 4. 
=> Since Q is a complete and separable metric space (see Gray 2001 p 52-53 for 
definition) we have that P(n,3) is closed in the topology of weak convergence (see 
definition 4 and Gray 2001 p 6-7); 
=> We show that this property is not inherited by 9t(IT) by showing that there exists Q 
such that Q ~ 9t(fl) and lim Qn = Q ; 
n-+oo 
=> By lemma 3 .2.4 of Gray 2001 we have that P(Q) is a complete and separable metric 
space; 
=> Let mn be defined as in theorem 3; 
=> Let H(n,3,mn) denote the set of stable measuresµ such that 11 = mn, where 11 is 
the stationary measure associated withµ (see definition 2); 
=> Let v be another probability measure on (n,3) which need not be stable or belong to 
H(Q,3,Jr); 
=> Define for n E N the truncated probability measure vn on (x n, O'(X n ) ) such that 
vn(A) = v(AxQ) for Ae O'(Xn ); 
=> Define the composite probability measure v n on (n, 3) to be the unique probability 
measure on (n,3) such that vJE)=vn(A)µ(B) for any rectangle E=AXB such 
that Ae O'(X") and Be 3; 
=> Now, for any cylinder Sand observe that vn is stable and that vn = mn: 
7 Concentrating on the second summation we let E; = r; S = {x : T; x e S} Vi ~ n ; 
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7 Write E; =An x B;:..n and observe that if we .Jet B;-~ = r 1+n ={x: T'"'.'.n x e S} then 
there exists a convergence set for rn S, such that An e a(Xn) and vn (~) = 1, see 
proof of theorem 1 and theorem 3; 
7 -J ~vn(r;S)=-;!;-[~vJr-;s)+ m%µ(T~1s)] m-+- µ(S)=7r(S) 
~ For any cylinder S we have Jim VJS) = V(S); n-+-
~ By corollary 8.2.2. of Gray (2002) we have that Vn converges to Vweakly; 
~ Now if we pick V which is not stable then we have proved that H(O,S,7r) is not 
closed in the topology of weak convergence; 
5.5.5 Proof of Theorem 5. 
Part 1: Let q e P(9t(Il) n q;i * (e )) : 
~ First we need to prove that Q is a probability, we proceed as follows: 
7 If S=Q then /n(µ)=µ(Q)=l; 
7 If S = 0 then /2l-(µ)= µ(0)= 0; 
- . 
7 If S =LJS; with S; nSj =0 "i/i-:t; j then fs(µ)= limµ(SJ= lim/s1 (µ), which 
n->oo n-+oo 
i=I 
exit q a.e.; 
7 By the bounded convergence theorem (see Billingsley 1978 Theorem 16.5) we 
have Q(S)= !~ J /s' (µ)q(dµ)= fQ(S;); 
· 91(Il)nq:i(e) l=I 
7 This proves the Q is a probability; 
~ We now need to show that Q e 9\(Il) n qJ * (e) . Let S be a cylinder and proceed as 
follows: 
n-1 n-1 
7 But from (7) we have that lim~ Lfr-ks(µ)= Jim~ :Lµ(rks)= m(S) q a.e.; n-+- k=O n-+- k=O 
7 Applying the bounded convergence theorem again we have that: 
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!~*IQ(r-ks)= J (!~*I!r-ks(µ)\,(dµ) 
k=O 9l(n}l"\tp{e) . k=O ! 
= !~ J (*Ifr-ts(µ)\,(dµ) 
9l{n)l"\1p(e) k=O J 
=m(S) 
7 Wethushaveshownthat Qe9t(TI)nrp*(e); 
Part2:Let Qe9t(TI)nrp*(e): 
~ First show that 9t(TI) n rp * (e) is a convex, compact subset of P(Q, g): 
7 Convexity follows from the stability assumption (a.5); 
7 Boundedness follows from (a.2): 
• If we let X be the closure of X, then P(n, g) is compact in the topology of 





• rp * (e) is therefore a closed subset of compact set, and hence compact; 
• Nielsen (1996) shows that ( a.2) is necessary for the compactness of rp * (e); 
7 Compactness follows from the fact that 9t(Il) n rp * (e) is closed and bounded; 
~ We now refer to the Choquet integral representation theorem (see Walters (1982) 
p 153) which states that there exits q e P(9t(TI) n rp * (e )) such that q represents Q and 
the support of q is the set of extreme points in 9t(TI) n rp * (e); 
5.5.6 Proof of Theorem 6. 
Part 1: Let q be a rational belief. By axiom 1 q e P(9t(TI) n rp * (e )) and by theorem 5 
there exists Q e 9t(TI) n rp * (e) which represents q: 
i. From the Lebesque Decomposition Theorem (see Gray (2002) theorem 5.6.2 p 107) 
there exists probabilities Qm and Q0 on (n, g), sets A c Q. and B = Q - A , and a 
117 
constant 0~Ag~1 such that Q = A.gQm + V -.A.g){t where .Qm << m, Q0 J_ m, 
Ag =Q(A), m(A)=l and m(B)=O; 
~ By axiom 2, m(A) = 1 implies Q(A) > 0 such that 0 <Ag ~ 1; 
~ Now show that Qm and m are equivalent. Since we already have that Qm << m , 
we need to show that m << Qm. Assume m << Qm is false; 
7 Let Se 3 such that Qm(s) = 0 ·and m(S) > 0; 
7 From axiom 2 it follows that Q(S)> 0 such that 
0 < Q(S) = AgQm(S)+ (1-A.g)Q0 (S)= (l-Ag)Q0 (S) 
0 < m(S)= m(S nA)+m(S nB)= m(S nA) 
7 Let S =Sn A . Now S c S implies Qm (s) = 0 and S c A implies that 
Q0 (s )= 0 since Q0 J_ m; 
7 Thus Q(s) = 0 which contradicts axiom 2; 
n-1 n-1 n-1 
n. From i above we have that *L:Q(rks)= A.g*L:Qm(rks)+V-A.g)* L:Q0 (rks); 
k=O k=O k=O 
~ Since Q e ~(II) n rp * (e) the L.H.S converges to m(S) for all cylind~rs Se 3 ; 
~ Since Qm << m . and m is stationary we apply theorem 4 and theorem 2 of Gray 
and Kieffer (1980) to show that Qm is strong asymptotically mean stationary; 
n-1 
~ -Therefore, lim* L Qm (rk s) = Q m exits vs E 3; 
' ' n-+~ k=O 
· n-1 • 
~ It follows that lim-!; L Q0 (rk S) = Q 0 exits for all cylinders Se 3 ; 
n~ k=O 
~ Now extend i2° to a measure Q0 on (n,3), and it follows that 
m(S)=A-gQm(s)+{l-ILg)Q 0 (S) VSe3, which shows that (n,3,Qm,T) and 
(n, 3, Q0 , T) are stable with stationary measures Q m and Q 0 ; 
~ We now need to show that Qm and m is equivalent. Since we already have that 
Qm << m, we need to show that m << Qm; 
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7 Assume m << Qm and select SE 5 with Qm(S)= 0 and m(S)> 0; 
7 Since Qm is equivalent to m, Qm (S) > 0; 
7 Define S = rlLJ(r-kS)= limsup(r-ks); 
k~oo 
n=Ok=n 
7 Now, from the continuity of probability it follows that 
7 Since S is an invariant set and Qm is strong asymptotically mean stationary it 
follows form lemma 6.3 .1 of Gray (2001) that Q m (s) = Qm (s) = O; 
7 Since Qm is equivalent to m it follows that m(S )= 0; 
7 Since m(s )> -oo we can apply Fatou's lemma to derive the following 
m(s)= m~~sup(r-ks))~ !~sup m(r-ks)= m(S)> o; 
7 This is a contradiction, which proofs that m << Qm; 
~ Since Q e 9t(IT) n <p * (£) we have that Q is a weakly uniform stable probability 
measure; 
7 9t(IT) n <p * (e) is a convex, compact subset of P(Q, 5), see Proof of Theorem 
5; 
7 It therefore follows that Qm and Q0 are weakly uniform stable probability 
measures; 
iii. This part of the proof uses a result from Blackwell and Dubins (1962) which reads: 
Since m and Qm are probability measures on (n,5) and Qm << m, then for each t 
and every regular conditional probability m
1 
there exists a corresponding conditional 
probability Q,m such that "If SE 51 m
1 
(SII1 ),,,, Q,m (Sil,) a.e. Qm and m ; 
~ By definition we have that Q(S n I,)= f Q, (Sil, ~Q; 
I, 
~ Applying the Lebesque Decomposition Theorem we have that 
Q(S n 1
1
)= A-QQm(s nl,)+ (1-A-Q)Q0 (S nl1 ) 
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=> Since Qm << m we can apply the Randon-Nikodym Theorem to Qm(s nl1) and 
get JQ1(Sl()dQ = AQ JQ1m(sl1Jtm + (t-A-Q) JQ1°(Sl1JlQ
0
; 
11 11 11 
=> Qt (Sll1 )dQ = \Q1m (Sll1 )dm + (t - AQ )Q1° (Sll1 )dQ0 
=> Q(Sjl, )= AQQ,m(Sll1 }i;!m + (1-JQ)Q,
0 (Sll,)i;,0 
=> Q,(Sll}:• AQm,(Sll,}i;!m +(t-JQ)Q,0 (Sll,)v,0 a.e. Qm and m; 
Part 2: Let Q,Qm ,Q0 and AQ be defined as in i to iii. 
=> Q is weakly uniform stable, hence Q E 9\(TI) n rp * {e); 
=> It follows from theorem 5 that there exits q E P(9\(TI) n rp * {e )) such that q 
represents Q, which proofs axiom 1; 
=> Now choose SE 3 such that m(S) > 0; 
=> Since Qm << m and m << Qm it follows that Qm{s) > 0; 
=> Since AQ > 0 it follows that Q(S) > 0; 
=> . q(Bs) > 0, which proofs axiom 2; 
5.5. 7 Proof of Corollary 1. 
=> We proceed by showing that if (n,3,TI, T) is ergodic then m(Slx) is independent of x 
TI a.e. V SE .S; 
=> Let SE .S and define: 
1) Ac ={xE Q: m(Slx)= mn(S)} 
2) ~ ={xE Q:m(Slx)>mn(S)} 
3) ~ ={xE Q:m(Slx)<m0 (S)} 
=> Observe that all three sets are invariant in T and since (n, 3, TI, T) is ergodic we have 
that TI(Ac)=O or TI(Ac)=l (seeGray(2001)p147); 
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=> From theorem 3 we have that m(S)= fm(Sjx)n(dx)=m0 (S) VSe g, it therefore 
n 
follows that we must have that Il(Ac) = 1 if we do not want to contradict the fact that 
m is a unique extension of m ; 
=> As a consequence of the above we have n(~ )= n(A~ )= 0; 
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Chapter 6 - General Equilibrium Under Uncertainty 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 discussed how agents could formulate diverse beliefs by observing the data 
generated by the stochastic process that underlies the economy. It was shown that 
correlation of agent's beliefs could impact the price formation process thereby causing 
speculative fluctuations in markets. Chapter 6 explores this issue further by considering 
the effect of extrinsic uncertainty that is perfectly correlated with the rational 
expectations of agents on the price formation process. 
We begin in section 6.1 by considering the properties of a simplified general equilibrium 
model within the context of an overlapping generations (OLG) model. Models ofrational 
expectations typically determine prices on the basis of consumer preference, initial 
endowments and production sets. These factors (i.e. preference, endowments and 
production sets) represent the intrinsic structure of the economy. Price uncertainty within 
this framework is a reflection of randomness in the underlying intrinsic structure itself, 
and is not affected by events unrelated to economic fundamentals. 
Section 6.3 sets the scene by extending the basic general equilibrium model introduced in 
section 6.2 to one with random prices and no intrinsic uncertainty. Price randomness in 
this extension of the model will be entirely due to the views and beliefs held by 
individuals about their environment. A sunspot equilibrium occurs when these beliefs and 
views are widely held by consumers such that price randomness may become self-
fulfilling. Under these conditions price randomness will not necessarily dissipate, even 
asymptotically, as individuals accumulate more observations. 
It is worthwhile expanding on the meaning of sunspots. In the context of market 
equilibrium one can view sunspots as a variety of events or psychological factors that are 
unrelated to the intrinsic structure of the economy, yet, which influence the forecasts and 
actions of economic decision-makers. Examples of these psychological factors include 
the animal spirits referred to by Keynes, fears and Bayesian learning theories. 
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The notion of periodicity is important in this analysis. In particular; the sequence of 
prices {p 1 }:1 is a periodic competitive equilibrium of order k (or k-cycle) if Pt = Pt+k for 
t= 1,2, ... and k~ 2 while p 1 t:. Pt+J '\/ je [O;k]. 
Section 6.4 establishes a sufficient condition for the existence of a stationary sunspot 
equilibrium (SSE), thereby describing a class of economies for which sunspot equilibria 
exist. This condition is related to the stochastic characteristics of extrinsic uncertainty and 
affects the shape of the savings function. Section 6.5 describes how the stationary 
equilibria bifurcate to sunspot equilibria, where bifurcation can approximately be defined 
as the passage through zero of the derivative of a continuous function. Section 6.6 
establishes the connection between SSE and a deterministic periodic equilibrium of order 
two. 
Section 6.7 rounds up this chapter by considering a very perplexing fact; stationary 
sunspot equilibria may exist in theory, but this does not answer the key question as to 
why investors initially should believe in them to the extent that they should influence 
equilibrium prices. This question will be addressed in chapter 7. 
The results derived in this chapter are based on previous work in this area by Costas 
Azariadis (1981, 1986), Roger Guesnerie (1986) and David Cass and Karl Shell (1983). 
The interested reader will find all proofs of results derived in the main body of the text in 
the appendix. 
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6.2 A Simplified Overlapping Generations Model Under Perfect 
Foresight 
Consider an infinite horizon economy consisting of a successive number of generations at 
discrete points in time, i.e. t = 0, 1, ... , oo • 
For every t:?: 1 there exists a new fixed-size population of identical individuals who live 
for two periods and die at the end of t + 1. Each generation can only produce in their 
youth (i.e. in period t) whilst consuming only in old age (i.e. in period t+ 1 ). Let e = ( e1, 
e2) >> 0 represent each generation's endowment vector, where e1 represents units of 
divisible leisure in youth and e2 units of a single, perishable consumption good in old age. 
The initial generation of period t = 0 is already old and endowed with e2 units of the 
consumption good and one unit of fiat money, an intrinsically worthless paper asset, 
which is the sole store of value in the economy. 
Each member of the young generation may use a constant returns to scale technology to 
transform n e [O;e1] units of his own leisure into n :::; y of the perishable consumption 
good in excess of e2• The entire stock of fiat money is owned by the old generation at 
period t :?: 0, provided it has positive value. All individuals are price takers and possess 
perfect foresight about future prices. 
Individuals have preferences over intertemporal bundles that are represented by a utility 
function denoted· by u(Ct+1; y1), assumed to be monotone, twice continuously 
differentiable and strictly concave. Note that the utility of an individual born at time t 
depends upon: 1) the leisure (denoted by e1) he gives up at time t, or, equivalently upon 
the amount of goods he offers (denoted by Yi) and 2) his consumption Ct+ 1 in period t+ 1. 
Two additional assumptions need to be made to complete the description of this simple 
economy: 1) consumption and leisure are strictly normal goods, and 2) young individuals 
choose positive savings if confronted with a zero real rate of interest. 
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Let D(p1, Pi+i) represent the aggregate excess demand function at time t (i.e. for the old 
and young alive at that time). The excess demand of the old at time t equals the 
purchasing power of the fiat money, i.e. 1/ p, , whilst the excess demand of the young 
equals - s(R), where s(R) is the young's saving function, from this it follows that: 
D(Pt>P1+1) = 1/ p, -s(p1 / P1+1) (1) 
s(R)=maxu(w2 +Ry,y) where ye [o,e1] and R= PJPi+t (2) 
A competitive equilibrium with perfect foresight is defined as: 
1) a sequence {p, }:
0 
of non-negative prices that satisfy D(p,, Pi+i) = 0 Vt, or 
2) a sequence {1/m,}:
0 
of real money balances that satisfy D(ljm1 ,ljm,+1 )=0 where 
ljm, = p,, Vt 
To find equilibria with perfect foresight one needs to solve the difference equation 
D(p,, Pi+i) = 0 either: l) backwards, where the solution has the form m, = J(m1+1), or; 
2) forwards, where the solution has the form m1+1 = r/J(m,), where f and r/J are known 
maps such that r/J = 1-1 • 
To establish sufficient conditions for the existence of SSE, we first need to establish 
under what conditions a stationary equilibrium under perfect foresight exists. 
Proposition 1. If the individual's indifference map satisfies standard boundary 
assumptions and if consumption and leisure are normal goods, then a backward-looking 
competitive equilibrium exists and it is unique. Further, if the current price is not too 
small, a forward-looking competitive equilibrium exists as well, but it is not necessarily 
unique. 
Section 6.3 introduces uncertainty in the form of a two state transition probability matrix 
to model the occurrence of sunspot activity or the absence thereof through a Markov 
process. This introduces the notion of periodicity, which is important in establishing 
sufficient conditions for the existence of a two-state SSE. More formally, the sequence 
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{p1 }:0 is a periodic competitive equilibrium of order k, i.e. a k-cycle, if p 1 = pt+k fort= 
0,1,2, ... and k 2:: 2 while p 1 "*Pi+; V j e (O;k). This leads us to proposition 2. 
Proposition 2. If the monetary stationary equilibrium is locally dynamically stable, then 
a 2 cycle exists. 
Proposition 2 is from Grandmont (1985), the proof of which is left until later when it is 
restated and proved as corollary 2. Figure 1 a & b illustrates proposition 1 and 2. Panel a 
represents the sequence (p1, p2, p3, ••• ) as a competitive equilibrium. Panel b represents a 










The simplistic structure of the economy described above deserves some comments as it is 
represented by successive generations of identical consumers that use a constant returns 
to scale technology to produce a single physical commodity. A more generalised 
framework will be considered in section 6.7. 
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6.3 Properties of Stationary Sunspot Equilibria 
Sunspot equilibria are rational expectations equilibria that are perfectly correlated with 
extraneous events (i.e. with events that preclude the preferences, endowments and 
production sets of individuals in the economy). These equilibria are not necessarily 
stationary and there may be many different extraneous events that are perfectly correlated 
with rational expectations equilibria. Let us consider a set of S events, the occurrence of 
which is governed by a Markov process with the following transition probability matrix; 
1r1,1 1r;,1 1rs.1 
Ils= trl,i Jri,I 1rs,1 (3.a) 
1r1,s 1r1,s 1rs,s 
Where tr; ; is the probability that sunspot activity will be i tomorrow given that it is j 
today. 
We will initially establish the existence of a very limited class of sunspot equilibria, i.e. a 
two-state stationary sunspot equilibrium (SSE) characterised as follows: either the 
existence of sunspot activity (state 1 ), or t~e absence of sunspot activity (state 2), which 
will establish how the set of stationary equilibria is enlarged by the sunspot hypothesis. 
Given (3.a), we can represent a two-event Markov process with the following transition 
probability matrix; 
(3.b) 
Furthermore, we confine the analysis to the stationary case because: 1) stable beliefs are 
likely to be the asymptotic outcome of many well defined learning processes; and 2) 
understanding stationary sunspot equilibria is a prerequisite to understanding transitory 
sunspot equilibria. 
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Since SSE are rational expectations equilibria that are perfectly correlated with 
extraneous events other than the intrinsic structure of the economy we have that forecast 
price behaviour is validated by actual price behaviour. This allows us to define the 
forecast of future prices to be Pi= <j>(i), for i = (1,2), if state i occurs tomorrow. 
Let z(R, 1l) be the rational expectations counterpart of the perfect-foresight savings 
function s, the properties of which are summarised under lemma 1 and 2. 
Lemma 1. The function z{R,1t) has the following properties; 
i. z(R,1l')= max{.nu(e2 +y,y)+(l-1l')u(e2 +Ry,y)}; 
ye(O.e1] 
11. z(R, 1l) is single-valued and continuous; 
iii. z(R,O) = s(R) for all R; 
iv. z(l,1l) = s(l) for all tr, 
v. z(R,1l) lies between s(R) and s(l) for all Rand tr, 
vi. z(R,fi") lies betweenz(R,O) andz(R,1l) iffi" < 1l'; 
Lemma 2. Let 17(R;1l') be the wage elasticity of saving under stochastic beliefs w.r.t. the 
real wage R, evaluated at {R;1t). Then 17(R;1l') = (1-1l' )e(l) for al 1t, where E(R) is the 
corresponding elasticity of saving under perfect foresight. 
Lemma 1 and 2 allows us to present a formal definition for a stationary sunspot 
equilibrium, i.e.; 
Definition 1. A SSE is a vector (p1 p 2 1l'11 1l' 22 ) of positive numbers such that; 
i. 1l'
11 
and 1l'22 e (0;1), where 1t11and1t22 are the diagonal elements of the matrix n 
defined in equation 3.b; 
ii. p, '* p
2 
(Note that this restriction is necessary to avoid the SSE degenerating to a 
stationary equilibrium where the sequence {p, }:0 follows a golden rule path), and; 
iii. the excess demand function is zero for each state, i.e. 
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Di = 1/ - z(P1 / . tr ) = 0 
I Pi I P2' 11 
D 2 = 1/ -z(P2 / ·tr ) = 0 I P2 I Pi' 22 
(4.a) 
(4.b) 
It can be seen that this definition is equivalent to the one given earlier as the prices Pi = 
<l>(i), for i = (1,2) are self-fulfilling since by equation 4.a. we have that p1 is the 
equilibrium price if state 1 occurs in the present period, and by equation 4.b. we have that 
p2 is the equilibrium price if state 2 occurs in the present period. 
It is worthwhile considering the special case in which transitions along the diagonal of 
matrix TI is ruled out, i.e. when 7t11 = 0 and 1t22 = 0. In this case the equilibrium prices p1 
and P2 will necessarily succeed each other. This leads us to corollary 1: 
Corollary 1. A deterministic two-cycle is the limiting sunspot equilibrium associated 
with a 2x2 degenerate matrix TI for which 1t11 = 0 and 1t22 = 0. 
Proof. The proof follows easily by combining property iii of lemma 1 with equations 
(4.a) and (4.b). 
Corollary 1 allows us to establish a weak relationship between sunspots and cycles in the 
following theorem. 
Theorem 1.a. In an economy that admits a periodic equilibrium of order two, there is 
generally a subset v(TI) c TI , where TI is defined as before, such that a SSE of order two 
exists w.r.t. every TI e v(TI). 
Throughout this chapter I shall only consider sunspots of order 2. However, it is worth 
considering whether one can extend theorem 1.a to include sunspots of a higher order, 
say a sunspot of order m > 2. Before we proceed with an analysis of this problem it is 
necessary to extend definition 1 to the more general class of sunspot equilibria. 
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Definition 2. A SSE of order m is a vector of positive numbers (p; 1t1;.. • ; 1tm) such that 
the excess demand function J(p;Jr1; ... ;Jrm)=O, or for notational efficiency 
j(p;IIJ= 0, where: 
1. p = (p
1
; ••• ; Pm) where pj is the future price if state j occurs tomorrow. such that 
P; :t:. p/'if i :t:. j; 
ii. Jr
1
=(K11 ;Jr12 ; ... ;Jr1J'v'j=1; ... ;m such that LJZ'Jm = 1 'v' j where K1; is the 
m 
probability that sunspot activity will be j tomorrow given that it is i today; 
m. The excess demand function J(p; II m) is defined as follows; 
Definition 2 allows us to explore a possible extension to theorem l .a in the form of 
theorem l.b. Theorem l.b relies on two mathematical results summarised in lemmas 3 
and 4 respectively. 
Lemma 3. Let DP/ be the 11 = m x m derivative of the excess demand function/w.r.t. 
Pm· Then Df(pm)P~ = 0 where Df(pJ is the derivative of/evaluated at pm. 
This result is represented graphically in figure 2 below for the simple case where 








Lemma 4. Let B be a MxK matrix with a non zero entry in every row. Then by 
perturbing only the nonzero entries of B, we can find a nearby matrix B' such that if B 'q 
= 0 has a solution q >> 0, then rank B' = M. 
Lemma 3 is from Hall pp 317 and lemrn.a 4 is from Mas-Colell (1985) pp 339. Theorem 
l.b. follows directly. 
Theorem 1.b. Assume that the system has (at least) one stationary equilibrium. To every 
m-1 sunspot equilibrium which is not a bifurcation point of the mapping defining m-1 
sunspot equilibria (an extension tom> 2 ofF(.) defined in section 6.4), one can associate 
(an infinity of) m-sunspot equilibrium. 
Note that theorem l.b does not imply that the existence of an SSE of order 2 implies the 
existence of an SSE of order m > 2, as in the limit when m increases to an arbitrary large 
number one will exhaust the subset of Ilm for which the implicit function theorem holds, 
i.e. for which J(pm;Ilm) = 0. 
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6.4 Establishing the Existence of SSE 
By solving equations 4.a and 4.b simultaneously we can define a single valued function 
FO that can be used to represent the existence of a SSE as defined in definition 1 above. 
The properties ofF(·) is summarised in Lemma 5. 
Lemma 5. The function F(·) has the following properties: 
i. F( w,JZ"11 ,1l"22 ) = wx z(w,JZ"11 )- z(ljw ,1l"2i) 
11. A SSE exists if and only if F has a positive root w :;t 1 for some .1Z'11 E (0,1) and 
JZ"11 E (0,1); 
m. F(l,1l"1p1l"22 ) = 0 
iv. F ~ oo as w ~ oo 
v. F(w,1l"11 ,1l"22 ) < 0 for w small enough; 
vi. If w is a root of F( w,JZ"11 ,JZ'22 ), then w = 1/ w is a root of F( w, 1l"22 , .1Z'11 ); 
Theorem 2 uses the results derived so far to establish sufficient conditions for the 
existence of a two-state SSE. 
Theorem 2. If the utility function satisfies regularity assumptions on differentiability, 
concavity and boundary behaviour, then a sufficient condition for the existence of 
sunspot equilibrium with respect to a given Markov transition probability matrix n is 
1 
e(l) < 0 and 1l"11 + .1Z'22 < 2- le(l)I " 
This result can be used to prove proposition 2, i.e. a 2 cycle exists if the monetary 
stationary equilibrium is locally dynamically stable. 
Corollary 2. If e(l) < -t then there exists a periodic equilibrium of order 2; 
An intuitive explanation of these results is in order. Corollary 2 states that a two-cycle 
will exist, when for any given wage rate, the income effect of a wage change outweighs 
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the substitution effect by a sufficient margin (i.e. by more than 2:1). Theorem 2 states 
that if e(l)< 0 and we reduce the size of the diagonal elements in IT sufficiently, i.e. only 
consider a subset of IT, we strengthen the income effect of a: wage change· relative to the 
substitution effect and facilitate the existence of a SSE. This subset is shown as the 
shaded area in figure 3, where the complete set of matrices coincide with the Unit square, 







6.5 The Bifurcation of Stationary Equilibria to SSE 
In this section we show how detenninistic equilibria bifurcate into sunspot equilibria. To 
understand this process we assume firstly that t:(l) < 0, and consider a one-dimensional 
path P on the ( 7t11; 7t22) plane that crosses transversely the line Jr11 + Jr 22 < K (where 
K = 2-1/le(l~) at some point G. Note that the qualitative features of this graph is the 
same along a diagonal path P with 7Z'11 = Jr22 , this is shown in figure 4.a. Area ABC in 
figure 4.a represent the subset of TI for which SSE exist. From theorem 2 it is clear that as 
1t11+1t22 decreases and passes through K = 2-1/le(q, a,.,F evaluated at w = 1 is at first 
strictly positive, then vanishes and becomes strictly negative thereafter. Figure 4.b 
represents the single equilibrium solution of function F with respect to w when 
lZ'u + Jr22 ~ K. There must exist two additional roots arbitrarily close to w = 1 when 
Jrll + Jr22 < K, this is represented in figure 4.c. From lemma 5 we know that these two 
additional roots are symmetric around w = 1. Thom's classification theorem applies: we 
have a cusp catastrophe of the pitchfork type since the additional roots are symmetrical 
and the equilibrium point w = 1 is invariant. We therefore have that the graph of 
w = p 1 / p 2 as a function of the curvilinear abscissa along P has the shape of a pitchfork 
bifurcation, with only one equilibrium before point G and three thereafter. The pitchfork 













One limitation of theorem 2 is that it does not assert that the existence of SSE depends on 
1t11 + 1t22, i.e. theorem 2 only derives a sufficient condition for the existence of SSE, not 
a necessary and sufficient condition. Theorem 3 shows that this claim can only be made 
strictly on the borderline of the subset shaded in Figure 2, and approximately in the 
neighbourhood of that borderline. 
Theorem 3. Degenerate transition probability matrices of the form n11 = n22 = 0 admit 
sunspot equilibria in the neighbourhood of the deterministic stationary state if that 
stationary state possesses borderline dynamic stability. 
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From corollary 2 we observe that a two cycle requires that, for a given level of wage, the 
income effect of a wage change should outweigh the substitution effect by a sufficient 
margin. Theorem 3 takes this one step further by proving that transition probability 
matrices with infinitesimal diagonal elements do not alter by much the relative strength 
of substitution and income effects. This means that the saving behaviour remains 
unchanged and that a SSE exists whenever a two-cycle does. 
6.6 The Relationship Between SSE and Cycles 
It is however possible to derive a stronger relationship between a two-state SSE and a 
deterministic periodic equilibrium of order two. This result is derived in theorem 4. 
Theorem 4. Given standard assumptions on preferences and strict normal goods, a two-
state stationary sunspot equilibrium exists if, and only if, a regular determinist periodic 
equilibrium of order two exists. 
6. 7 Summary Comments and Conclusions 
The key results derived in this chapter are summarised in figure 2 below. Each panel in 





, which represents the transition probability matrix TI. It must be noted that 
this one-dimensional characterization of the transition probability matrices wastes some 
information on the set of matrices compactable with stationary sunspot equilibria. 
Theorem 1.a, illustrated in panel a, states that the two broken lines exist for any two-
cycle. Theorem l .a was shown to hold for the simplistic economy outlined in this 
chapter. The use of the standard transversality theorem in the proof should allow the 
extension of the proof to a more general case; i.e. that of an n-commodity economy in 
which expectations look one period forward and for cycles of any order k. 
Theorem 2, illustrated in panel b, shows that the graph is non-empty above the thick line 
drawn in panel b. The argument based on the slope of the tangent is a one-dimensional 
' 
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version of the Poincare'-Hopf theorem. Guesnerie (1985) generalized the sufficient 
condition derived in theorem 2 to n-dimensional systems. 
Panel c demonstrates the bifurcation studied in section 6.5. The generalizations 
mentioned above will not be pursued here, but can be the topic of future research. 
In this chapter we have shown that competitive equilibria may possess sunspot equilibria, 
otherwise known as rational expectations equilibria, in which purely extrinsic uncertainty 
affects equilibrium prices and allocations. This means that market participants do not 
have to be irrational for competitive markets to be subject to speculative fluctuations, 
which are driven by expectations .. 
The mere fact that sunspot equilibria exist as a solution to a system of market clearing 
conditions is not a sufficient justification to assert that competitive markets with rational 
participants could be subject to speculative instability. Farmer (1991) points out that there 
are many ways in which agents could form beliefs, each of which may be self-fulfilling, 
in any rational expectations model with multiple equilibria. In order to understand this 
issue better one needs to compare the properties of alternative forecasting rules in the 
face of an unforeseeable switch in the sunspot variable discussed in this chapter. Chapter 
7 will explore this issue by examining an example by Duffy (1993) of an adaptive 
learning rule that converges to a nonstationary sunspot equilibrium that is locally stable. 
The methodology used here imposed a particular expectation formation process on the 
consumer, with no consideration given as to why this should in fact hold in practice. This 
is not dissimilar to the rational expectations hypothesis used in general equilibrium 
analysis, since there is no explanation given as to how agents should come to possess the 
information required by this assumption. It is worth repeating a point made in the 
conclusion to chapter 4: the rational expectations hypothesis is based on the premise that 
agents know a great deal about their environment. · Agents are assumed to .. have 
knowledge about demand and supply functions, how to extract present and future general 
equilibrium prices and about the stochastic law of motion of the economy over time. In 
practice it is hard to· conceive how agents come to possess all this knowledge. Recent 
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literature has focused on formulating a dynamic learning process that aims to show how 
agents learn what they know when formulating their rational expectations. We explore 
this issue in chapter 7 where we show that these results have to be interpreted with care, 
as the convergence of a particular learning process to a particular unique solution does 
not guarantee that learning behaviour will generally lead agents to the same solution. 
In chapter 4 we have seen that expectations play a role in price formation. The 
representative consumer assumption can be relaxed in order to develop a more general 
framework within which to consider the role of expectations in the price formation 
process. In this setting it hard to believe that consumers will en-mass believe in the 
validity of sunspot phenomena without a credible theory on how beliefs are formed. This 
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6.8 Mathematical Appendix 
6.8.1 Proof of Lemma 1. 
~ Define 1t = probability that sunspot activity occurs, i.e. 1& = (1&11 ;1&21 ) given the 
framework defined above, in which case p 1 = p i+i and R = 1; 
~ Now it follows that (1 - 1t) = probability that sunspot activity does not occur, i.e. 
1& = (1& 12 ; 1& 22 ) given the framework defined above, in which case p 1 :;t: p t+I and 
~ From equation (1) it follows that z(R,1&) = max{nu(e2 + y,y)+ (l-1&)u(e2 + Ry,y )}; 
ye(O,e1J 
~ Property ii follows directly form the assumption that u(c1+1;yJ is monotone and 
strictly concave; 
~ Now from property i it follows that z(R,O) =max u(e2 + Ry,y) = s(R); 
ye(O,e1J 
~ Now from property i it follows that z(l,1&) =max u(e2 + y,y) = s(l); 
ye[O,e1] 
~ To prove properties v and vi we again note that u(c1+1;yi} is assumed to be 
monotone, twice continuously differentiable and strictly concave, where 
c,+1 = e. +Ry, where R > 1 or R < 1 ; 
~ Consider the case where R < 1, i.e. Pt< P1+1: 
7 :u > 0 ~ s(R) < s(l), which follows from the strict concavity assumption; 
!)', 
7 maxu(e2 +Ry,y)< maxu(e2 +y,y). Now, by multiplying by (1-1t) on both 
ye[O,e1] ye[O,e1J 
sides and then adding max nu(e2 + y,y) on both sides yields; 
ye[O,e1J 
7 max{(l-1&)u(e2 +Ry,y)+nu(e2 + y,y)}< max{(l-1&)u(e2 + y,y)+nu(e2 + y,y)} 
ye[O,e1] ye(O,e1] 
7 Now, s(R)= max u(e2 +Ry,y)= max{nu(e2 +Ry,y)+(l-1&)u(e2 +Ry,y)} 
ye(O,e1] ye(O,e1] . 
7 Since s(R) < s(l) ~ max u(e2 + Ry,y) < max u(e2 + y,y), we have that; ye(O,e1] ye(O,e1] 
7 s(R)< max{nu(e2 +Ry,y)+(l-1&)u(e2 + y,y)} 
ye(O,e1J 
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7 s(R) < z(R;!l") < s(l); 
=> Consider the case where R > 1, i.e. Pt> Pt+1: 
7 ~u > 0 -7 s(R) > s(l), which follows from the strict concavity assumption; 
oyt 
7 Using a similar procedure we can show that s(R) > z(R;!l") > s(l); 
=> Combining the above means that z(R;1t) lies between s(R) and s(l) for Rand 7t; 
:::::>To prove property vi we note that z(R,0)= max u(e2 +Ry,y)= s(R), where R<l or ye[O,e1] 
R>l; 
=> Consider the case where R < 1 -7 s(R) < s(l); 
7 z(R,0)= max{ku(e2 +Ry,y)+(l-fr)u(e2 +Ry,y)} 
ye[O,e1J 
< max{.1lu(e2 +Ry,y)+(l-fr)u(e2 + y,y)} 
ye[O,e1] 
=z(R;fr) 
7 Similarly we have that z(R;O) < z(R; 1l"); 
7 We have that ~ = max {u( e2 + y, y )- u( e2 + Ry, y)}, such that dz > 0 if! R < 1 d!l" ye[O,e1] d!l" . 
and ~ < 0 if! R > 1, since u() is assumed to be strictly concave; 
d!l" 
7 z(R;O) < z(R;fr) < z(R;!l"); 
=> We can use a similar technique to show that z(R;O) > z(R; fr)> z(R; 1l") if 
R > 1 and fr < 1l" 
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6.8.2 Proof of Lemma 2. 
as R , R 
=> We have that e(R)=-X-( ) = max{u (e2 +Ry,y)xy}x-( )aR s R ye[o;e,] s R 
=> e(l)= max{u'(e2 + y,y)xy}x-(
1
) 
ye[O;e1] S 1 
=> It follows that T/(R;K) = max{(l-K)xyxu'(e2 + Ry,y)}x ( R ) ; 
ye[O;e1] Z R;K 
=> T!(l;K) = max{(l-K)xyxu'(e2 +y,y)}x-(
1 
) 
ye[O;e,] Z l;K 
=> But by iv oflemma 1 we have thatz(l,~ = s(J) for all :e, 
=> T!(l;K)= max{(l-K)xyxu'(e2 + y,y)}x-(
1
) = (1-K)xe(l) 
ye[O;e,] S 1 
6.8.3 Proof of Theorem 1.a. 
=> We can interpret equations (4.a) and (4.b) as a system of M=2 equations with N=2 
unknowns, represented by p = (p1, p2 ), with S=2 parameters represented by 
ff = (K11 , K 22 ) , such that for every ff we have a system of equations f (p; ff) = 0 ; 
=> The Transversality Theorem states that if the Mx(N+S) matrix Df(p; ff) has rank M 
whenever j(p;ff) = 0, then for almost every ff, the MxN matrix DPf(p;ff) has 
rank M whenever f(p;ff) = 0; 
::::> By corollary 1 it follows that if ff= ( 0,0) the 2x4 matrix Df(p; ff) has rank 2, as the 
vector of unknowns, i.e. p, has exactly one solution; 
=> Applying the transversality theorem stated above it follows that DPf(p;ff) has rank 
2 whenever f(p;ff) = 0 for almost every ff. 
=> The set of feasible ff can be represented by the subset v(IT) c IT ; 
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6.8.4 Proof of Lemma 3. 
:::::> We can interpret the gradient off at Pm as Df (pm ) . The reason being: The derivative 
of/ is a linear function in R11 and the gradient is a vector in R11• Also, linear functions 
can be represented by vectors, and the representation of the derivative has the same · 
components as the gradient; 
:::::> Therefore, Df(Pm)P~ represents the dot product of Pm with the Jacobian matrix 
Df(p m ) , which will be a maximum when Pm points in the same direction as Df(p m ) ; 
:::::> The gradient vector point in the direction in which/is increasing most; 
:::::> Since Pm is chosen such that J(p m ) ,,;, 0 , we define the surface 
Q = {x E R" : !(Pm)= 0 }, then the value of the function f(pm) is constant along the 
surface Q; 
:::::> Thus, the derivative of f (pm ) in a direction tangent to the surface Q should be zero 
as the function does not change in that direction; 
:::::> Formally: Let p: be a point on the surface Q ·such that f(p:) = 0 ; 
:::::> Note that the linear map J{p: )+ DJ(p: )(pm - p: )approximates the nonlinear map 
J(p m ) near Xm; 
:::::> Let Q' be the linear approximation to Q for !Pm - p:I::;; E: 
:::::> Thus, p- p: is orthogonal to the gradient of/at p:; 
6.8.5 Proof of Lemma 4. 
:::::> Let B satisfy the hypothesis of the lemma; 
:::::> Define B to be an open neighbourhood of B constituted by admissible matrices (i.e. 
zero entries of Bare kept equal to zero); 
:::::> Define E : Bx R;+ ~ RM by E(B; q) = Bq ; 
:::::> Assume that E(B; q) = 0 ; 
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::::> Now, a blj E( B; q) = q je1 :;t 0 and every row has a nonzero entry we deduce that rank 
a0 E(B;q)=M; 
::::> Applying the transversality theorem we have that there is B' near li such that 
En.(q) = 0 implies rank a B'E(q) = M; 
::::> But a
9
E0 .(q)= B', and so B' is as we wanted .. 
6.8.6 Proof of Theorem l.b. 
::::> Let p m-i = (p1; ••. ; p m-l) be the equilibrium prices of a SSE of order m-1 with a 
transition probability matrix Ilm-1; 
::::> Let p* be the equilibrium price of the stationary equilibrium which exists by 
assumption; 
::::> Now assume that event m exist such that ll mj = 0 'fl j = 1, ... , m -1 and Jl mm = 1 such 
that 11 m = [ 11 ~-t ~] , where the bar-sign indicates the degenerate case constructed; 
::::> By applying p: = (p1 ; ••• ; p m-l ; p *) and 11 m to definition 2 we see that (p:; 11 m ) 
represents a degenerate SSE of order m; 
::::> If D pf(p m; 11 m) has full rank m, then any arbitrary perturbation of 11 m will break us 
away from the degenerate solution such that an SSE of order m exists; 
::::> By combining lemma 3 and 4 we have that rank DPf(pm;Ilm) = m for every Ilm 
when f(pm;I1J= O; 
::::> Note that that the existence of DPf(pm;Ilm) is guaranteed as we are using a SSE of 
order m-1 which is not a bifurcation point; 
::::> By continuity off we can perturb 11 such that f(p m; 11 J = 0 to find true SSE of 
orderm; 
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6.8. 7 Proof of Lemma S.· · ' . · ..... 
~ Solving equations 4.a and 4.b simultaneously yields: 
P1 xz(p1/P2 ;1l'u)= P2 xz(p2/P1 ;1l'22); 
~ lfweset w=pifp2 --?wxz(w;1Z'11 )-z(1/w;1l'2i)=O; 
~ This allows us to define the function F(w,1l'11 ,1l'22 ) = wxz(w,1l'11 )- z(lf w,1l'22 ); 
~ From the above simultaneous solution and by definition 1 it is clear that a SSE will 
existifandonlyif F(w,1l'11 ,1l'22 )=0and w:;a!:l; 
~ For property ii we have that F(l,1l'u ,1l'22 ) = z(l,1l'1J- z(l,1l'22 ); 
.7 By property iv of lemma 1 we have thatz(J,J;) = s(l) 
7 F(l,1l'11 ,1l'22 )=s(l)-s(l)=O 
~ To prove property iii note that lim z(l/w;1l'22 ) = z(0;1l'22 ) < 00 ; 
w--+oo 
7 From property v of lemma 1 we have that z(w;7t) lies between s(l) and s(W), and, 
specifically we have that s(l) < z(w;1l') < s(w) if w > 1 (see proof above); 
7 ws(l) < wz(w;1l') < ws(w) if w > 1 
7 · ·Now since ws(l) -4 oo as w ---? oo we have that F ---? oo as w ---? oo; 
7 Note that Azariades and Guesnerie assumed that ws( w) ---? oo as w -4 ·oo in· their 
original paper. This assumption is however not required as it is sufficient to note 
that ws(l) < wz(w;1l') < ws(w) ifw > 1 and ws(l)--? oo as w ~ oo; 
~ To prove property iv note that F(w,1l'1p1l'22 ) = w{z(w,1l'u )-1/w z(lf w ,1l'i2 )}; 
7 Note that by property iii above we have 
z(w,1l'11 )-1/w z(lf w,1l'22 )---? -oo as w---? 0; 
7 F ---? ~oo as w ---? 0 ---? F < 0 for w sufficiently small; 
~ Finally, ifw is a root off(.), then we have that F(w,1l'u,1l'22 )= 0; 






; . . 1 . z(w;1l'2i) · z(l/w;.1l'22 ) A 1 
7 But his 1s eqmva ent to wntmg -:.:- = A H w = . ~ w = - ; 
w z(ljw;.1l'11 ) z(w;.1l'11 ) w 
6.8.8 Proof of Theorem 2. 
=> Given property iii of Lemma 5 we have that F has a root at w = 1; 
=> Given that F ~ oo as w ~ oo and F ~ -oo as w ~ 0 (i.e. property iv and v of 
Lemma 5) one will not be guaranteed of at least one other pair of roots at w = 1 if 
()Fl 0 . 'f F . . . fu . 1 - > , i.e. 1 1s an mcreasmg nction at w = ; 
aw w=l 
=> However, if we can show that iJFI < 0, then there must be at least one other pair of 
aw w=l 
root that satisfy the properties ofF summarised under Lemma 5; 
=> iJF = l_{wz(w;.1l'11 )-wz(w;.1l'22 )}= z(w;.1l'u )+ wz'(w;.1l'11 )-z'(w;.1Z'22 ); aw aw 
=> z'(w;.1l)= ! z(w;.1l')=-.nyu'(e2 +wy;y); 
=> If we evaluate the derivative of z'( w; .1l') at w = 1, then by lemma 2 we have that 
z'(l;.1l') = s(l)x 17(1;.?l') = s(1Xl-.1l' )e(l); 
=> Thus using this we get ~lw=l = s(l)+ s(l)x17(1;1l'11 )-s(l)x17(1;.1l'2J; 
=> Simplifying yields ¥w1F _ ( ){ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )} ".'\ - s 1 1 + 1-1l'u e 1 :--- 1-1l'22 e 1 
OW w=I 
=s(1){1+{2-1l'11 -1l'22}e(l)} 
=>Now, - <0 1f {2-.1l'11 -.1l'22 }e(l)<-1 or {1Z'11 +1l'22 -2}x(-l)xe(l)<-1; ~1 . . 
iJW w=I 
=> If e(l) > 0 th~n (-l)xe(l) < 0; 
7 But {1Z'11 +1l'22 -2}<0since 1l'11 and1l'22 e [0;1]; 
7 {1l11 +.1Z'22 -2}x(-l)xe(l)>O, and hence we find that the required condition is 
violated; 
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=> We can use a similar method to show that .the required condition is not violated if 
e(l)<O; 
=> Also note that {n-11 +1l'22 -2}x(-l)xe(l)<-1f-t1l'11 +1l'22 < 2-le~l~; 
6.8.9 Proof of Corollary 2. 
=> The proof of theorem 2 uses the fact that 1l'11 and 1l'22 E [0;1]; 
=> Corollary 1 states that a deterministic two cycle if 7t11 = 0 and 7t22 = O; 
=> Thus when 7t11 = 0 and 7t22 = 0 the occurrence of state-1 ensures the occurrence of 
state-2 next, and vice-versa; 
=> Thus a periodic equilibrium of order two exists when e(l) < -t; 
6.8.10 Proof of Theorem 3. 
=> Equation 1 writes the excess demand function as D(p 1 , p t+i ) = 1/ p 1 - s(p 1 / p i+i ) ; 
=> Use Taylor's theorem to expand the excess demand function around the equilibrium 
. . 
pnce p; 
7 Note that his is similar to expanding the excess demand function around R = 1, 
wh.ere R = pif Pi+i ; 
7 Now,D'(R)=-
1 
2 - max{u'(e2 +Ry;y)}; 
P R ye[O;e1] ~I . . 
7 Evaluating at R=l yields: D'(R = 0) = -~ - s(l)e(l); 
p 
7 Now, applying Taylor's theorem and assuming derivatives of order two and 
higher evaluate to approximately zero, i.e. D"(R = 1)""' 0, D"'(R = 1);,,. 0, yields: 
D(R) = li/ p • - s(1)J-l1/ p • + s(l)e(l)Jx [R-1] = 0; 
7 By definition we have that D(R = 1) = 0 for a stationary price equilibrh~m, which 
means that 1/ p • = s(l); 
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7 D(R)=o-l1/p· +s(l)c(1)Jx[R-l]=[l+c(l)]-[l+c(l)]R=O; 
7 Now use the property that under stationarity I= p • / p • = p • / P1+i ; 
7 D(R)=[p·/pt+1 +c(1)]-[1+c(l)]xp1/p1+1 =0; 
7 D(R)=c(I)p,+I -[l+c(l)]p, + p' +lc(l)p' -c(l)p0 ]=0; 
7 D(R) = c(l)x l/i,+1 - p· J-[1 +c(l)]x I/;, - p• J= 0; 
=> We can therefore write the perfect foresight excess demand function as approximately 
c(l)x[p,+1 -p·]-[l+c(l)]xl/;, -p']=O; 
=> By corollary 2 we know that local dynamic stability corresponds to c(l) < -t; 
=> To generalize this result to the rational expectation case write x, = x1 = p 1 - p • and 
=> We can make the same linear approximation for equations 4.a and 4.b by noting that 
1 - 7t11 = 7t12 and I - 7t22 = 7t21 and by using lemma 2, i.e.: . 
(1-Jr11 )c(l)x2 -(1 + (1-.?ru )c(l)]x1 = 0 ~ (1 + .7r12C(l)]x1 -Jr12c(l)x2 = 0; and (5.a) 
(l-1z'22 )c(l)x1 -[l+(l-Jr22 )c(l)]x2 =0 ~ Jr21c(l)x1 -[l+Jr21c(l)]x2 =0; (5.b) 
=> The trivial solution to equations 5.a and 5.b are x1 = 0 and x2 = 0, i.e. the stationary 
equilibrium price p*; 
=> A SSE is obtained "".hen x1 * 0 and x2 * 0 and equations 5.a and 5.b are solved; 
.7r12£(1) _ 1 + Jr21£(1) . => l+Jr12£(1)- .?r21C(l) ' 
1 
=> 1r12+1Z"21 = -lc(q; 
=> This equation was derived assuming local dynamic stability, i.e. we must have 
c(l) = -t if this equation is to hold; 
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6.8.11 Proof of Theorem 4. 
=> If we assume that a regular deterministic equilibrium of order two exists, then 
theorem 1.a holds and we have that a two-state SSE exists. 
=> This then proves the first part of theorem 4, we now need to show that the reciprocal 
holds, i.e. the existence of a two-state SSE implies the existence of a regular 
deterministic equilibrium of order two; 
=> Assume that a two-state SSE exists defined by ( w; 1l'u; 1l' 22 ), such that: 
7 1t11 < 1 and 1t11 < 1; 
7 F(w)=wz(w;1l'11 )-z{Yw;1l'22 )=0; 
7 Q 1 = [wis(w) ~ s(l)] and Q 2 = [wis(w) ~ s(l)]; 
=> The remainder of the proof will be broke down into five smaller steps, the first four of 
which will derive results that will be drawn together in step 5; 
=> Step 1. Show that vr(w) = z(w;ll') < s(l) for w < 1; 
7 By lemma 1 Q 1 => s(w) ~ z(w;ll') ~ s(l) and Q 2 => s(w)~ z(w;Jl') ~ s(l); 
7 Consider, WE Q 2 =>s(w)~z(w;1l')~s(l)=>ws(w)~wz(w;1l')~ws(l)<s(l); 
7 ThuswE Q2 => vr(w) = wz(w;Jl') < s(l); 
7 Also consider, WE Q 1 => s(l)~ z(w;ll')~ s(w)=> vr(w)= wz(w;ll')~ ws(w); 
7 By applying standard boundary assumptions on individual behaviour we have that 
ws(w)-7 oo as w -7 oo; 
7 We therefore have that ws(w) is an increasing function such thatws(w) < s(l); 
7 WE Q 1 => lfl(w) < s(l) for W < 1; 
7 Combining the above gives vr(w)=z(w;ll')<s(l) forw< 1; 
=> Step 2. Now> 1 exists such that WE Q 1 and F(w) = 0; 
7 Note that F(w) = 0 => z(w;1l'11 ) = Ywz(w;1l'22 ); 
7 w>l=>l/wz(X,;1l'22 )<s(l) by step 1 above; 
7 z(w;1l'22 )<s(l)=>s(w)<s(l) by lemma 1; 
7 Note however that this can not happen for any w E Q 1 given the definition of Q 1; 
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=> Step 3. Now> 1 exists such that X:,e 0 2 and F(w}= 0; 
7 This proof is similar to that of step 2, and is left for the interested reader; 
=> Step4.Showthatif F(w}=Oforsome w>l then ws(w}-{s(~)}s:o: 
7 By applying the result of step 2 it follows that we 0 2 : 
=> s(w) < z(w;K}which follows from lemma 1; 
=> ws(w) < wz(w;.n-}; 
7 By applying the result of step 3 it follows that Yw e 0 2 : 
· => z(Yw;K}< s(,Vw)which follows from lemma 1; 
=> -z(Yw;.n-} > -s(,Vw); 
7 Using the fact that F(w}= wz(w;.n-}-z(Yw;.n-}=> 0 > ws(w}-s(Yw}; 
-=> Step 5. 
7 Property vi of Lemma 5 we have that root are symmetrical; 
7 We can therefore assume that w > 1 ~ithout loss of generality; 
7 Ifw > 1 we have that ws(w }-s(Yw} < 0; 
7 But ws(w }-s(Yw}-7 oo as w -7 oo; 
7 Which means that at least one finite root greater than unity exist; 
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Chapter 7 - Adaptive Learning Behaviour · 
7.1 Introduction 
Standard versions of OLG models with fiat money may be characterized by a continuum 
of rational expectations solution paths, each of which may be a valid description of the 
economy, that are indexed by different initial price levels. These OLG models generally 
have two steady states: 1) an autarkic steady state in which real money balances have 
zero value, and 2) a monetary steady state in which real money balances are positively 
valued. All but one of the solution paths discussed above are characterised by an ever 
increasing price level which converges asymptotically to the autarkic steady state, the 
exception being the solution path characterised with an initial price level equal to the 
monetary steady state. 
The monetary steady state is therefore a determinate steady state as it has a locally unique 
solution path, whereas the autarkic steady state is an indeterminate steady state as it does 
not have a locally unique solution path, i.e. within an arbitrary small neighbourhood of 
the autarkic steady state there exist many other solution paths that are uniformly close to 
the autarkic steady state. 
Indeterminacy of equilibria means that standard comparative static analysis cannot be 
performed as one has difficulty isolating the effect of small changes in parameters, as 
there are many solution paths arbitrarily close to the one being examined. This problem is 
exaggerated when one considers stationary sunspot equilibrium of order-s, which has s 
indeterminate equilibria. 
Various authors have used disequilibrium learning analysis as a tool to isolate locally 
unique rational expectations equilibria in which only fundamentals matter. Lucas (1986) 
shows that the dynamics of a Samuelson-type overlapping generations model are 
reversed if a simple adaptive learning rule is used in place of rational expectations 
forecasts. Under rational expectations the indeterminate autarkic steady state is the 
attractor for almost all initial price levels. In the Lucas model, which uses a simple 
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adaptive learning rule, the monetary steady state is the attractor for almost all initial price 
levels. 
This chapter will concentrate on an alternative learning process by Duffy (1994) that is 
expectationally stable and that leads agents to believe in a continuum of solution paths 
converging to an indeterminate steady state of an OLG model. This model is very useful 
for two very important and unrelated reasons: 
1. It causes one to question the usefulness of disequilibrium learning analysis as a 
selection criterion for isolating rational expectations equilibria, as it implies that the 
convergence of a particular learning process to a particular unique solution does not 
guarantee that disequilibirium learning behaviour will generally lead agents to the 
same solution. 
2. The model presented by Duffy allows agents to adjust quantity first in response to a 
monetary disturbance, whilst the learning rule allows price to adjust more slowly such 
that it converges only asymptotically to the new monetary steady state. 
The second feature of the model is particularly useful as it allows one to build a model 
that better reflects the sluggishness observed in the adjustment of the price level to 
monetary disturbances, e.g. Sims (1989). This has potential benefits in modelling asset 
price behaviour, as there is much research that indicates that asset prices adjust only 
slowly to new information that adjusts return expectations. 
Woodford (1990) presents a learning model that leads agents to believe in an equilibrium 
that is driven by purely self-fulfilling beliefs. Although the model presented by Woodford 
achieves the same results as that of Duffy, as discussed here, it does not make use of a 
dynamic function that adjusts either price or quantity to arrive at new market clearing 
conditions in response to new information. Moreover, the model imposes a rational 
expectations equilibrium market clearing condition, as per Azariadis (1981) and 
Azariadis & Guesnerie (1986), on a disequilibrium learning process, a methodology that 
presents conceptual problems for this author. 
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7.2 Model Specification 
The OLG model used in this chapter is based on work by Farmer (1991) and Duffy 
(1993). Two goods are_ traded in the economy; 1) fiat money, and 2) a non-storable 
consumption good. The aggregate production function is derived from the individual 
firm's production function, i.e. y: = maxlipn:_1; ¢n: J, and is described by the equation: 
Yr = 'lh11-1 +</Jn, 
Where, 
7 Yt is the aggregate production function at time t; 
7 nt is labour input at time t, and; 
7 ~ > 0 and ¢ ~ 0 ; 
(1) 
In this model both labour demand and supply are sensitive to intertemporal prices as it 
takes two periods to produce the consumption good Yt· Agents in this economy can 
consume during each of the two periods for which they live, but they can only work in 
the first period. A representative agent born at -time t face two budget decisions, one for 
each period of life: 
(2.a) 
d m, z > 0 




7 COt denotes the reai wage; 
7 n; denotes labour supply which is restricted to the interval 0 ~ n: ~ Yi , with Yi equal 
to the endowment of leisure time; 
7 n1 denotes labour demand; 
" 
7 c: and c?+i denote the quantities of the consumption good conslimed in each period; 
7 m1 is the agents demand for real money balances; 
7 Pt is the price of the consumption good in terms of money; and. 
7 z:+i is the expectation at date t of the inflation factor Z1+1 = Pr+i / p, . 
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An intuitive discussion of these budget constraints is in order. The first budget constraint 
(equation 2.a) states that net real wage income (i.e. real wage income from supplying 
labour to the production process, less the cost of labour used in the production process) 
plus inventories built up from engaging in the production process in period 1 must at least 
exceed the quantity of the good consumed in period one plus the demand for real money 
balances in period one. The second budget constraint (equation 2.b) states that the 
inventories built up by the young in period one from engaging in the production process 
plus the expected value of the real money balances in period two must at least exceed the 
quantity of the good consumed in period two. 
An agent can store wealth between the two periods by either holding money or by setting 
up a firm, demanding labour and holding inventories of goods in process. The rates of 
return from holding money and from holding inventories must be equal to ensure that 
both means of storing wealth are present in equilibrium. Therefore, since agents earn zero 
interest from holding money they must earn zero profits from holding inventories. By 
combining this equilibrium condition with the two budget constraint one easily finds that 
labour demand, and hence demand for money balanc.es, are maximized when 
(3) 
The aggregate supply and demand functions that reflect an agents' rational choices are: 
7 n: = n(m,) (4) 
7 c: = c(m,n:) (5) 
7 s d I r/Jnd m, = 011n1 - 011n1 - c, + / (6) 
m 
7 c2 ·=-' +l/fl'ld (7) t+I e I 
lt+I 
where nO and cO are continuous, increasing, and differentiable functions. It is important 
to note that these functions are not generated by any explicit utility maximization 
problem. However, since equations (4) to (7) are all continuous and satisfy Walras' Law, 
it follows that there exists an economy with at most four agents in every generation 
which generates these functions as a result of utility maximization behaviour. 
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In this economy we assume that the government finances a fixed level of real expenditure 
g through seigniorage and that government expenditure does not yield agents any 
additional utility and therefore do not affect agents' decisions: 
(8) 
Given the information provided above, it is possible to characterise all equilibrium 
solutions for this economy by the following first difference equation, i.e.: 
s(wJ 
lt+I = ( ) 
S {t)t+I - g 
(9) 
where s() is the net demand for real money balances as a store of wealth. 
Without loss of generality we shall consider equilibrium solutions where g = 0 for the 
remainder of this section. In the next section we shall consider possible equilibrium 
solutions that result from learning behaviour as a result of a one-time macroeconomic 
disturbance, e.g. government decides to increase the stock of money. Furthermore, using 
3 it is possible to write the real wage w, in terms of the expected inflation at date t, i.e. z;. 
Equation (9) then becomes: 
(10) 
If we assume perfect foresight such that 1; = 11 , then the model with g = 0 has a single 
steady state: l = 1. This steady state will have positively valued fiat money, e.g. m, > 0, 
if ¢n(1) > c: [ z x n(z )], which is derived by evaluating ( 6) in equilibrium (i.e. labour 
demand equals labour supply) with m, > 0. The rest of the paper assumes that this 
inequality is always satisfied. Thus, inventories built up at time t must always exceed the 
consumption of the younger generation at time t, in order for fiat money to be positively 
valued, i.e. the young must be net savers. This is a reasonable assumption as this 
economy makes no allowance for welfare spending by the government that subsidises the 
consumption habits of the various generations, since we assume that that government 
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expenditure does not yield agents with any additional utility and therefore does not affect 
agents' decisions. 
Equation (10) establishes an inflation rule that can be compared with the equilibrium 
condition found in the OLG modef used in chapter 6, i.e. equation (1) establishes the 
following equilibrium price rule: 1/ p, = s(p, / P1+i) with M = 1 under perfect foresight, 
i.e. p 1•+1 = Pi+i. It is easy to generalise this formulae as follows: 
Mj p 1 = s(p,/ p,•+t) with M > 0. (11) 
The equivalence between (10) and (11) is readily established by dividing the (11) 
evaluated at time t + 1 by (11) evaluated at time t. However, these equations have very 
different information requirements, i.e. in (10) expectations depend on information 
available at both time t and at time t+ 1 (i.e. a multi-period expectations equilibrium), 
whereas in (11) expectations depend only on information available at time t (i.e. a single-
period expectations equilibrium). It is this difference in informational requirements of the 
two equilibrium conditions that lead to different results in terms of the convergence of 
adaptive learning rules to unique solutions of an overlapping generations economy. If 
equilibria are characterised by (11) and agents form expectations of the price level using 
a simple adaptive learning rule, then agents will learn to believe in the locally unique 
monetary equilibrium. However, section 3 shows that if equilibria are characterised by 
(10) and agents from expectations of the inflation factor using a simple adaptive learning 
rule, then agents will learn to believe in a continuum of nonunique, nonstationary 
equilibrium paths. 
Since establishing.that (10) has a single monetary steady state at l = 1, we can linearise 
(10) at this point to obtain the following first difference equation: 
1 b( e e ) • h b s'(l) l 1+l = + lt+l - lt+2 Wit = --
s(l) 
(12.a) 
If the model is closed under perfect foresight, then we can write (2.12.a) as follows: 
l1+1 =7;+(1-7;} (12.b) 
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This allow us to see that there are two classes of solutions to (12.b): 1) the zero order 
solution where z/+1 = 1, and 2) the set of nonstationary first order solutions which take the 
form of (12.b) with zl+1 '# 1 . Note that there are an infinite number ·of these first order 
solutions with each solution being indexed by a different initial value for the inflation 
factor. 
The implicit function theorem allows us to describe the behaviour of dynamic equilibria 
around the steady state, i.e. z = 1, by using solutions to a first order. difference equation of 
the form .z1+1 = f(z, ). Substituting zl+1 = f(z,) into (12.a), assuming perfect foresight, we 
get z,+1 = 1 + b[z,+1 - /(zi+J]. The first derivative of the implicit function fat z = 1 is then: 
f' = 1-i . When If 'I < 1 ,sequences of inflation expectations that begin close to the 
steady state will converge back to it. Note that, l!'I < 1 ~ b > 1, which means that the 
economy must be parameterised in such a way that both s' and s are positive at the 
steady state. By imposing the condition b > 1 on stationary monetary equilibria, members 
of the set of nonstationary equilibria all converge back to the monetary steady state. 
Therefore, the condition b > 1 is sufficient to guarantee that the monetary steady state is 
indeterminate. This can be seen as follows: Start with to. Recursive substitution of 
equation (12.b) into itself yields: 
1 I ( 1 )' ( 1 )' z, =--:L 1-- + 1-- l 0 • 
b-1 r=t b b 
Now, limz, = b - l = 1, i.e. the monetary steady state. 
,__ b-1 
It is worth examining the comparative statics of this model at the indeterminate steady 
state, i.e. at z = 1 . Of interest is the effect of an increase in the level of government 
spending on steady state value of inflation. We proceed as follows: 
=> Use equation (3) to write equation (9) in terms of the inflation factor t and assume 
rfi ~ . h . - s(z1+1) . pe ect .iores1g t, 1.e. z1+1 - ( ) , 
s l1+2 - g 
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~ Now evaluate the total derivative oft w.r.t. g at g = 0, i.e. 
dll dl dl dl dl 
7 
dg g=O = ai x dg + ag = ag; 
7 At the steady state value of inflation we have z = ( s)(z) or g = s(z )(i - l) ; 
s l -g l 
7 
Now ()g = s'(z)(z-1)+ s(z) _ s(z)(i-1) = s'(z)(t-1)+ s(z) = s(z) since z = 1 at the 
' dl l l 2 l l 
monetary steady state; 
dz I az l 1 . . 
7 - = - = -( )= -( )> 0 smce z = 1 at the monetary steady state; 
dg g=O ()g s l s 1 
Therefore, in this model the single indeterminate steady state is one where fiat money is 
positively valued, and an increase in government spending leads to an increase in the 
steady state value of inflation, i.e. the comparative statics at this steady state are not 
perverse. 
7.3 Adaptive Learning 
The perfect foresight assumption is a useful simplification that allows us to understand 
the dynamics of the model. This assumption can be relaxed by assuming that agents are 
aware of the general form of the model's perfect foresight solutions, but that they do not 
know the true parameterisation of the model's solutions and must learn these parameter 
values. Specifically, agents are assumed to form their expectations of future inflation 
using a simple adaptive learning rule of the form 
11•+1 = a+ f311 (13) 
where a and ~ are unknown parameter values. It is assumed that all agents have 
homogenous beliefs and therefore use the same learning rule (13) to learn about inflation. 
Substituting the adaptive learning rule (13) into the true law of motion (12.a) gives the 
actual law of motion of the economy (14), 
1 /3b 
l =--+--l 
I+) 1 + /3b 1 + /3b I (14) 
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An intuitive explanation of (15) is in order. T is an operator that maps the learning rule 
(13), represented by the parameter vector or =(a; P), into the true law of motion (12.a) 
to derive the actual law of motion (14). Agents, who begin with an initial set of beliefs 
for the values of 0, update these beliefs through a learning process that is modelled using 
the following differential equation; 
dO - = T[O(q)]-O(q) 
dq 
. (16) 
Equation (16) represents a revision process by which the learning rule 0 is adjusted 
towards the actual law of motion at a fixed rate per unit of fictional time l;. 
Given the actual law of motion (15), the learning process (16) can be written as a system 
of two differential equations: . 





where the~i11_d~pendent variable is fictional time, ~· It is relatively straightforward to solve 
this system of·:~ilations ~imultaneously with both a and /J equal to zero, which yields 
'--.'._~ 







(18.b) '~ '°''> ""'c "'-"", ""'''-"' . 
·-.o~~ 
By substituting the first set of fixed point (i.e. 18.a) into the actual law of motion (14) for 
the economy we see that they correspond to the zero order solution in which price level is 
constant. Likewise, by substituting the second set of fixed point (i.e. 18.a) into the actual 
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law of motion (14) for the economy we see that they correspond to the first order 
solutions in which price level is not constant. We shall refer to the particular first order 
solution where the initial inflation level equals that observed historically as the 
predetermined solution. 
The zero order solution and the predetermined solution predict very different responses to 
a macroeconomic disturbance. Consider a one-time permanent increase in the stock of 
money at an arbitrary moment in time, say time t: 
1. If agents learn using the zero order solution then the inflation level will immediately 
jump to the new equilibrium level in response to this monetary disturbance. The jump in 
price level would cause holders of money balances to be taxed exactly enough to pay for 
the increase in government expenditure. This inflation tax would have been unforeseen in 
the sense that agents who chose to hold money balances did so in the belief that the 
distribution of price level had point mass at its historically predetermined level. 
Therefore, the unforeseen shock is inconsistent with a single rational expectations 
equilibrium that characterises the economy both before and after the time of the shock as 
it is based on beliefs of the distribution of price level that tum out to be incorrect. See 
figure 1 below. 





2. If agents learn using the predetermined solution, then the inflation level will adjust 
rather slowly in response to this monetary disturbance and converge only asymptotically 
to the new monetary steady state. The market clearing mechanism works as follows: 
In period T: Given that all agents use the same learning rule (13), firms will anticipate 
that Pr+i /Pr will be positive, and this expectation implies that, given the level of real 
wages that existed historically, they should switch from holding money as a store of 
wealth into holding inventory. Firms will therefore hire more labour and drive up wages 
to the point where {J)r =a+ PZr+1• 
In period T + 1 and thereafter: The money stock will remain constant at the new higher 
level but output, employment and real wages contract back towards the stationary state in 
which OJ= a+ p (since b > 1). Since the demand for money is an increasing function of 
real wage {see equation (6)), the real demand for money in period T + 1 will be lower 
than in period T. The price level in time T + 1 must exceed the price level at time T to 
equate demand and supply. Note that this is the rationally anticipated increase in price 
level that triggered the expansion in economic activity in period T. See figure 2 below. 





It is worth noting that the sluggish adjustment in the price level that occurs when agents 
learn using the predetermined solution is consistent with the time series properties of U.S. 
macroeconomic data (see Sims 1989, in the Amer. J. Agr. Econ. volume 71). 
If the learning process governed by (16) is locally stable at either one of the two fixed 
points, i.e. (18.a) and (18.b), then that fixed point is a good candidate for the equilibrium 
solution of the model (see Evans (1989)). The stability of these fixed points can be tested 
by evaluating the Jacobian of (17.a) and (17.b) at each of the fixed points. If the roots of 
the resulting characteristic equation are all negative, then the particular fixed point is 
locally stable, or else it is locally unstable. 




Theorem 1. The zero order solution (18.a) is locally unstable under the learning rule 
(16). 
Theorem 2. The set of first order solutions (18.b) is locally stable under the learning rule 
(16). 
7.4 Summary Remarks and Conclusion 
Theorems 1 and 2 demonstrate that adaptive learning rules can lead rational agents to 
believe in nonstationary, indeterminate equilibria that are locally stable. Therefore, 
disequilibrium adaptive learning rules cannot be relied upon to isolate only stationary 
determinate equilibria. I will not dispute the fact that the learning rule used in this model 
is one of many rules that agents in the economy can adopt. However, without knowledge 
of how agents form expectations in a particular environment, it is difficult to· specify an 
appropriate learning rule a-priori. In summary; this analysis indicates that the 
convergence of a particular learning rule to a particular unique solution does not imply 
that learning behaviour will generally lead agents to the same solution. 
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The model presented here has profound implications for the rational expectations 
hypothesis as it casts some doubt on recent literature that uses dynamic learning process 
to show how agents learn the information required by the rational expectations 
hypothesis: i.e. it assumes that agents , have knowledge about the demand, and supply 
functions they face, how to extract present and future general equilibrium prices and 
about the stochastic law of motion of the economy over time. 
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7.5 Mathematical Appendix 
7.5.1 Derivation of equation 3 
~ Equation (2.b) can be written as follows: z:+ilfl11: + m1 - z:+1c;+, ~ 0; 
~ Add equation (2.a) to (3.2.b ): m1 (n: - n:}+ </Jn: + z:+i lfl11: ~ c: + z:+1c;+1 ; 
D•cc. • d • ,/, e > ~ tuerenttate w.r.t. n1 gives: .,, +l1+11/f - (J)1 
~ In order to have both methods of storing wealth in equilibrium there must be no 
arbitrage opportunities between holding real money balances and inventory, such that 
the differential equation becomes </> + z:+i 11' = (J)1 
7.5.2 Derivation of equation 9 
m, 
~ Equation 8 can be written as follows: l 1+1 = ---'--
m,+, - g 
~ At any time agents can choose between demanding labour and demanding money. 
Solving equations (4) to (6), and noting that labour demand equals labour supply in 
equilibrium we get the following: 


























~ lt+I = ( ) 
s (()t+l - g 
~ From the assumptions made in equations (4) and (5) we have that sO is an increasing 
function of real wealth. 
7 .5.3 Derivation of 12 
~ Use the Taylor expansion rule to expand (10) around l = 1, i.e.: 
1 
= s(l) + s'(l) r
1
e - l]- s'(l)s(l) rte - l] 
~ sro sro~~ s002 ~~ 
1 s' (1) r e e ] lt+I = + -- Llr+l - lt+2 
s(l) 
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7.5.4 Derivation of Equation 14 
=> From (12.a) we have z,+1 = 1 + b(z:+i -11•+2 ); 
=> Substituting (13) into (12.a) yields 11+1 = 1 + b[(a + Pz, )-(a+ Pz1+1 )] ; 
=> Collecting terms on the l.h.s. (1 +[lb )11+1 = 1 +bpi, ; 
=> l =-1-+_f!!:_l 
t+I 1 + /lb 1 + /lb I 
7.5.5 Derivation of Equation (19) 
The Jacobian is derived by calculating the first derivative of the differential equation 
system (17) with respect to a and~. i.e.: 
=> aa = -1 and aa = b 
aa ap (l+bp)2' 
ap ap b 
=> -=0 and-= -1 · aa ap (1+bp)2 ' 
7.5.6 Proof of Theorem 1 
=> At the zero order solution (18.a), the Jacobian matrix becomes 
J=[-1 -bJ 
0 b-1 
=> The characteristic equation is given by det[lll -J] = 0 ~(A- -l)(A--[b-1])= 0; 
=> The characteristic equation has one negative root, -1, and one positive root, b-1; 
=> The fixed point (18.a) is therefore locally unstable as all the roots of the characteristic 
equation are not negative; 
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7 .5. 7 Proof of Theorem 2 
=> At the zero order solution (18.b), the Jacobian matrix becomes 
J = [~ 1/:~1] 
=> The characteristic equation is given by det[AI -J] = O ~ (A-+ 1( A, -[ 1 ~ b ]) = O; 
=> The characteristic equation has two negative roots, -1 and (b-1)/b, since b > 1; 
=> The fixed point (18.b) is therefore locally stable as all the roots of the characteristic 
equation are negative; 
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Chapter 8 - Conclusion 
The analysis conducted in this thesis was aimed at better understanding the role of 
expectations in the price fonnation process. Since general competitive analysis lacks a 
coherent explanation of how expectations are fonnulated it is difficult to promote one 
theory over another on purely theoretical grounds, e.g. rational expectations hypothesis 
versus the theory of rational beliefs. 
Of key interest is the question of whether agents have the structural knowledge assumed 
by the rational expectations hypothesis, which is embedded in Fama's (1976) definition 
of the efficient market hypothesis. The research agenda presented some empirical 
evidence that supports analysis of models in which agents are not assumed to have 
structural knowledge about the nature of the world in which they invest. However, 
Samuelson (1965 and 1973) first showed that the efficient market hypothesis is closely 
related to the principle of a martingale. Indeed, close examination of the fonnulae derived 
based on Shiller (1981b and 1981c) and Mankiw's (1985) interpretation of the efficient 
market hypothesis reveals that the tests merely deal with particular martingales. Given 
that the definition of the martingale principle is unique, but not its interpretation, one has 
to be careful when interpreting the empirical results reviewed here. 
Relatively simple general equilibrium models were employed to illustrate that modelling 
risk requires a thorough analysis of investor expectations embedded in asset prices in 
order to better understand the infonnation conveyed by observed risk premia. Analysis of 
the role of diverse expectations in competitive equilibria show that a prerequisite for the 
existence of a short-run Walrasian monetary equilibrium is the existence of at least one 
agent whose expectations are insensitive to current prices. The presence of such an 
insensitive trader ensures that expectations vary in a manner that is not ''wild", thereby 
maintaining the upper hemicontinuity of the aggregate excess demand function, such that 
a competitive equilibrium results. Since this analysis was concerned with the short-run 
properties of OLG models, it would be constructive to consider what characteristics 
agents' diverse expectations must have in order for a dynamic system to be locally stable. 
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Merely assuming that agents have diverse beliefs is unsatisfactory as this assumption 
avoids an important analytical question: are the conditions under which diverse beliefs 
arise sufficiently general to warrant studying the impact of diverse expectations on the 
price formation process? This issue is addressed by showing that any stable dynamical 
system generates a stationary probability measure based on its underlying generating 
probability that is unrelated to the data generated by the dynamical system. An agent's 
belief system is then consistent with the observed data if the stationary measure generated 
by his belief system is equal to the stationary measure generated by the dynamical 
system's true probability measure. Agents can then construct beliefs that are biased 
relative to the stationary measure generated by the data in the short-run, but unbiased on 
average over his investment horizon, since an agent's belief can be characterised as a 
weighted average of the stationary measure generated by the data and the agent's beliefs 
in structural change. 
Sunspot theory is used to show that it is not necessary to abandon the rational 
expectations hypothesis in order for competitive markets to be subject to speculative 
fluctuations that are driven by expectations. The analysis shows that correlated beliefs 
can cause competitive markets to be subject to speculative fluctuations that are driven by 
expectations. This model only considers the effect on the price formation process of 
extrinsic uncertainty that is perfectly correlated with the rational expectations of agents. It 
would be worthwhile to consider whether the same results apply to the case where agents 
hold diverse beliefs that may become perfectly correlated depending on the observed 
environment in a dynamic system where beliefs are constrained such that the system is 
locally stable. 
Finally, an example by Duffie is used to show that diverse beliefs are not temporary 
phenomena since disequilibrium learning analysis can not be relied on to teach investors 
the economy's equilibrium map. This leads to an important conclusion; it is difficult to 
specify an appropriate learning rule a-priori that rules out a diversity of beliefs without 
knowledge of how agents form expectations in a particular environment. 
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